King of Thieves? (photo via World Economic Forum)
Is it fair to conclude yet that Hamid Karzai has given up caring about the way he’s viewed in NATO capitols? On Thursday, frustrated with parliament’s reluctance to bless his brazen bid to control an independent elections watchdog, he delivers a paranoid and undignified harangue about the West’s secret machinations to control a country that it could care less about if there aren’t Soviets or terrorists involved. On Friday, he tries to walk it back to Secretary Clinton. And on Saturday?
President Hamid Karzai lashed out at his Western backers for the second time in three days on Saturday, accusing the U.S. of interfering in Afghan affairs and saying the Taliban insurgency would become a legitimate resistance movement if the meddling doesn’t stop. [snip]
At one point, Mr. Karzai suggested that he himself would be compelled to join the Taliban if the Parliament didn’t back his controversial attempt to take control of the country’s electoral watchdog from the United Nations, according to two of those who attended the meeting. The people included a close ally of the president.
On the presumption that Karzai is being accurately quoted — something his spokesman denies — this is starting to fall into some I-wish-a-motherfucker-would territory. A failed attempt at a power-grab calling the integrity of the next government into question leads Karzai to bandwagon with the Taliban? That’s like the guy at the Burger King angrily swearing that if he accepts my expired coupon he’ll be left with no choice but to give me unlimited refills. Let the Omar-Karzai negotiations begin! Can we throw in Ahmed Wali Karzai and a couple draft picks?
The governance effort in the south is about strengthening sub-national governance and creating credible, deliverable reachback to the ministries. Whether by design or by default, the effect is that it balances/reduces Karzai’s influence while bolstering the stuff he was supposed to be doing anyway in terms of making a material impact on Afghan lives. Obviously it’s a strategy that has its limits: Karzai still governs the country, appoints ministers, etc. (To say nothing of what sub-national governance means in an area, for instance, in which people self-identify as Taliban.)
He successfully stole an election — that should be a decisive verdict on his interest in a well-run Afghanistan. To the extent the U.S. has no choice but to stick with him, the current strategy of caring more about sub-national governance than Kabul governance for immediate-to-medium-term impact has its merits. It wouldn’t be such a terrible thing to dial down tensions, but if Karzai is just going to brazenly walk back his walkbacks, then it’s sort of pointless.
