Police and military checkpoints are a familiar sight on many roadways in poor countries. Although some of the officers are legitimately keeping the peace, others are out to line their pockets with baksheesh. Despite their apparent banditry, though, these extortionists respond to market forces in much the same way as do lawful businesspeople, finds a new study from Indonesia. “My research question was, Are corrupt officials just like any other economic actor?” says Benjamin A. Olken, an associate professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the study’s lead author. “If they are, then we have a wealth of economic tools to help us analyze how bribes are going to behave. And we also have to think about the market structure of bribe-takers before designing reforms.” Olken found that the corrupted officials on Aceh and North Sumatra’s highways indeed act like uncoordinated business monopolies–a situation that is bad for consumers because it raises the price of each bribe. It would be better to consolidate bribe-takers under the umbrella of a single monopolist who sets prices and coordinates activities. For instance, the “one-stop shop” reforms of many governments—which allow citizens to get, say, six permits from one office, rather…