Author: Eric J. Fry

  • The Economic Recovery Myth

    “Beauty is truth; truth beauty,” the poet, John Keats famously mused in his “Ode on a Grecian Urn.” Neither Greece nor Goldman Sachs can seem to get the hang of this concept.

    Grecian finances, for example, illustrate an opposing principal: deception is ugly. For more than a decade, the Greeks have engaged in a mass deception – that a revenue-starved nation could finance generous social programs. The idea was never viable, feasible or legitimate. But the Greeks wanted to believe it…and so did the rest of the European Union. They all wanted to believe that Greece’s last six defaults were a fluke – that the new and improved Greece would behave nothing like the old, profligate one.

    The truth would have been better. Greece would have been better off if it had never started its game of make-believe. If, instead of pretending it could afford the unaffordable, it had devised a plan for maintaining legitimate solvency.

    The Greeks didn’t do that. Instead, they joined the euro bloc and pretended to “act German.” For eleven years this charade succeeded. But the Greeks are not German. (They aren’t even French). Like many American marriages, Greek finances inhabit a chronic state of crisis, interrupted by brief interludes of calm.

    But the Greeks are not unique. The nations of the West are full of deadbeats. The Spaniards and Portuguese play make-believe as well as the Greeks. And so do the Italians. But make-believe is not just a Mediterranean game; it is an international game. And no one plays it better than Uncle Sam. He also pretends to possess the means to “make good” on his debts. And so far, his creditors believe him. Your editors don’t. We think the guy is “all hat and no cattle.” We don’t think Uncle Sam can actually afford to pay the debts he’s got already, much less the trillions he’s adding to his debt load year by year.

    Based on raw numbers, Uncle Sam belongs in a debtor’s prison. But that doesn’t stop him from borrowing even more money or dispensing more freebies to a populace addicted to “something-for-nothing” or enabling certain privileged financial institutions to leech from the taxpayers’ jugular.

    This “system” won’t work. It is not a system at all. It is half fairy tale, half scam. America’s budget deficit, at 13% of GDP, is nearly identical to Greece’s. And America’s accumulated debts – at 86% of GDP – do not trail very far behind Greece’s at 112% of GDP. But that comparison is hardly comforting. In absolute terms, no debtor can compare to America.

    As fellow Reckoner, Joel Bowman observed recently, “In a misguided effort to rescue the economy from the untold horrors of the ‘abyss,’ the prophets of modern central planning seek to transfer society’s means of production from the most to the least productive class; from private fist to public mouth; from worker to moocher; host to parasite.”

    In doing so, these charlatans shackle the current generation’s liabilities to the income statements of futures generations. The nearby chart (which first appeared in the May 10, 2010 edition of The Daily Reckoning) shows the total “bare bones” funding requirement for various countries during the next three years.

    Bare Bones Funding Requirements

    Specifically, this chart shows the amount of borrowing that would be required by each country to fund anticipated deficits during the next three years and to re-finance all government debt coming due in the next three years…America’s three-year funding requirement is not nothing. And America is certainly not immune to the kind of investor scrutiny that could produce a debt crisis…or a currency crisis.

    In a pinch, Greece could probably borrow $30 billion here or there to plug its revenue shortfall. But in a pinch of similar relative size, the US might not be able to borrow $7 trillion…especially not when the US is unable to scrounge up cash from its own citizens.

    “For the 19th consecutive month, the national budget fell disastrously short of anything close to balanced,” Joel recently observed. “According to the Treasury Department’s own figures April’s $82.7 billion deficit was almost four times the shortfall registered in the same month last year. The official tally only tells part of the story. Sadly, it was the best part.”

    As Addison Wiggin observed last week in The 5-Minute Forecast, “That figure of $82.7 billion is merely the ‘BS’ figure the Treasury puts out there when it reports the deficit. The real tell is how much the national debt grew. And in April, that figure was twice the size of the ‘official’ monthly deficit – $175.6 billion.

    “Don’t look now,” Addison went on, “but we’re just a couple of weeks away from the national debt breaking $13 trillion. If you must know, the exact number this morning is $12,931,157,737,293.42.”

    Historically, April tends to produce a modest surplus (or at least a mitigated deficit), thanks largely to the influx of tax receipts due around the 15th of that month. But despite the administration’s assurances that the employment landscape is steadily improving, receipts were down more than $20 billion from the same month last year (2010: $245.27 billion; 2009 $266.21).

    Despite the severity of America’s indebtedness, most people in positions of power refer to this disaster as if it were merely a broken water pipe. “We really should fix it,” they say, as if we could turn a valve here or replace a gasket there and get everything running smoothly again. But no quick fix is possible. In fact based on the numbers, no long fix is possible either.

    This, too, is a lie…and it’s not pretty.

    Eric J. Fry
    for The Daily Reckoning Australia

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  • Commodities In Your Portfolio

    The Wall Street Journal says its time to load up on commodities. The price charts seem to agree.

    “Portfolios that add commodities after the Federal Reserve tightens the discount rate, perform better than portfolios that don’t,” observes Journal writer, Carolyn Cui.

    The Fed raised the discount rate in February and seems likely to continue raising rates. Therefore, says Cui, investors should be increasing their commodity exposure. She bases her observation on a new study to be published in the Journal of Investing. The authors of the study researched data from December 1970 through August 2007.

    Cui explains the process: “The researchers added a basket of commodity futures tracking the S&P GSCI Commodity Index to five types of stock portfolios: value, small-cap, momentum, growth and large-cap. The commodities added to the returns of all five equity styles during periods when the Fed tightens the discount rate.”

    Interestingly, most commodity prices bottomed out in mid-February, which is exactly when the Federal Reserve hiked the discount rate to 0.75% – the first increase in the discount rate in more than three and a half years. From its February lows to the present, the CRB Index of commodity prices is up 8%. The CRB’s advance is not just an “oil thing.” Most commodities are advancing, including the long-slumbering agriculture complex.

    Several price indices are validating these recent inflationary signals coming from the commodity markets. The Producer Price Index is up 6% year over year; import prices are up 11.4%, and the ISM’s Prices Paid Index has more than doubled during the last 12 months.

    Perhaps these price trends are inspiring the Fed to begin “tightening” – i.e. raising interest rates. Whatever the Fed’s exact motive, it has begun to raise rates…and that’s enough of a reason to begin buying commodities, according to the study Cui cites.

    “The strategy is pretty simple to follow and doesn’t require much trading,” says Cui. “During the 37 years the study covered, the Fed changed the discount rate 113 times, but only 18 of those moves represented directional changes – meaning investors would need to get in and out of commodities only 18 times.

    “So how can investors take advantage of the latest Fed rate-tightening cycle?” Cui asks. “First, they must decide how much money they want to devote to commodities. The study modeled allocations of 5%, 10% and 15%, and found that the 15% dose produced the best results.

    “Next,” she says, “investors need to decide what to buy… There are commodity mutual funds and exchange-traded funds like the iShares S&P GSCI Commodity Indexed Trust. Investors also can make more-targeted bets with single-commodity funds: The SPDR Gold Shares tracks gold prices by holding physical bullion; US Commodity Funds LLC runs a suite of ETFs tracking prices of crude oil, natural gas and gasoline.”

    A basket of commodities is probably the best approach for the long-term investor.

    Eric Fry
    for The Daily Reckoning Australia

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  • The Goldman Sachs Phenomenon

    Now that the American financial sector is safe and unsound once again, has the threat of serious economic crisis genuinely passed? And has the structure of American capitalism actually improved? Or did the Fed merely dress a sow in lingerie and call her a raving beauty?

    In other words, what did the Fed accomplish by lavishing billions of dollars upon the financial sector? Was the Fed’s inflationary rescue mission really worth all the trouble? Or would the nation have been better off if Bernanke and Paulson had simply gone golfing while Bear Stearns failed?

    At first glance, the Fed’s rescue seems to have halted a serious crisis in its tracks. The rescue also seems to have preserved the viability of the American banking system. But upon closer inspection, we discover that the Fed’s rescue also preserved at least one dysfunctional characteristic of our economic system – namely, an over-reliance on “asset-swapping” activities, rather than “asset-producing” activities.

    Australian author, James Cumes, asserts that the US economy has become overly dependent on trading things back and forth, rather than manufacturing goods and selling them. He calls this new reality the “Goldman Sachs Phenomenon.”

    “In the larger Anglo-Saxon economies,” says Cumes, “transfer of ownership [has] supplanted fixed-capital investment as the most common form of what purported to be ‘investment.’ Investment has become a means of making a fast buck, not by entrepreneurial effort, construction of factories and installation of productive equipment, but by gambling to add market value through mergers and acquisitions…that would lead to higher shareholder value in the marketplace…

    “Despite the higher, short-term market values [that might ensue], they would not necessarily add anything to productivity or to the volume or value of final output” – “Inevitably,” Cumes continues, “there are social impacts from this deal-maker, day-trader, casino-like type of ownership investment, especially to the extent that it spreads over a more and more major part of the economy…Inequality is dramatically intensified by generous bonuses for senior executives and others in financial firms in the United States and such other financial centres as London.”

    The Fed’s bailout of the financial sector seems to have supercharged the Goldman Sachs phenomenon. Not only do the top dogs at publicly traded financial firms “make bank,” they continue to make bank even after destroying billions of dollars of shareholder wealth. And the top dogs enjoy their privileged positions under the watchful, doting eyes of the Federal Reserve and Treasury. No bad deed goes unrewarded.

    “Of course, there is justice in rewarding effort and enterprise,” Cumes concludes. “That is historically one of the ways in which a capitalist system has justified and maintained itself; but there are other considerations too. “Indeed, if our present essentially democratic capitalism is to survive – and survive securely – it must pay attention to social outcomes. Poverty in the midst of plenty is not a comfortable social situation. Some inequality there will always be but gross and growing inequalities must, over time, be a threat to social, political and even strategic stability, as well as economic and financial stability.”

    But these “big picture” concerns do not seem to concern the head of the Fed and Treasury. In fact, throughout this crisis, Bernanke and Paulson have assiduously avoided implementing (or even suggesting) any regulatory changes that would impinge upon the limitless liberties of Wall Street’s investment banks. The perpetrators of the crisis remain in power and the corporate structures that supported their recklessness remain in place. Instead, incredibly, Treasury Secretary Paulson wags his regulatory finger at hedge funds.

    Huh? Why? Hedge funds did not create the crisis, they merely profited from it. Aren’t the investment banks the ones who created trillions of dollars of crazy derivatives? And aren’t they the ones who loaded their balance sheets with suicidal quantities of leverage? And aren’t they the ones who are now receiving billions of dollars of government support?

    So here’s a radical idea: How about regulating the perpetrators of the crisis, rather than the profiteers? Or maybe the Fed should require all the top-ranking officers of every company that receives a bailout to resign? Or how about one upper-level resignation for every $1 billion a Wall Street investment bank borrows from the Fed’s discount window.

    This isn’t complex stuff, folks. If the Treasury Secretary sincerely wished to clean up and re-regulate the banking system, his new regulations would only require about 50 words:

    1. No officer of any publicly traded financial institution may receive more than $10 million per year in total compensation.

    2. No financial institution may borrow more than $10 for every one dollar of readily marketable assets (i.e. “Level I” assets) on its balance sheet.
    3. No financial institution may incur any liabilities “off-balance sheet.”
    4. No exceptions.

    Implement these regulations and you would have forever eradicated the DNA of financial catastrophe from the American financial system.

    But what would critics say about such “draconian” new regulations? (We’ll call these regulations the “Level Playing Field Act of 2008.”) After choking on their foie gras, they would probably protest, “That’s not nearly enough compensation for top officers! You’d lose the top talent!” Then they would protest: “What! No off-balance sheet financing? Are you crazy? That’s where all the juice is! You would lose the ability to ramp up return on equity!”

    To which we would reply: “Hallelujah!” and “Amen!”… Finally, we could purge the financial system of all the “talent” that has delivered America’s most severe credit crisis since the Great Depression. Finally we could purge the system of the “creative” leverage that the “talent” has amassed over the last several years. Finally, we’d have a banking system that would operate like one – a banking system that would provide capital to entrepreneurial endeavors, rather than to catastrophic speculations.

    The American financial system does not need “talent” and “creativity.” It needs prudence and perspicacity. It does not need creative bankers. It needs dull bankers.

    Why? Because the American financial system needs to safeguard its capacity to finance creative and talented entrepreneurs. It needs to safeguard its capacity to preserve the purchasing power of our currency and to safeguard the legendary America capacity to create wealth from the bottom-up, not to destroy wealth from the top-down.

    But the American financial system still possesses too much talent and creativity to operate prudently. In fact, Ben Bernanke and Hank Paulson may be the most creative finance officials in American history.

    Consider yourselves forewarned!

    Eric J. Fry
    for The Daily Reckoning Australia

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  • America Hates Goldman Sachs

    If you shine a light on a cluster of cockroaches, they scatter and hide. But when you shine a light on a cluster of investment banking con men, they simply stare back and reply, “The SEC’s charges are completely unfounded in law and fact and we will vigorously contest them and defend the firm and its reputation.”

    As the entire investing world knows by now, Goldman Sachs is the latest cockroach to scuttle under the spotlight. Last Friday, the Securities and Exchange Commission accused Goldman of defrauding investors out of $1 billion.

    The details of the SEC’s complaint allege that Goldman failed to disclose “vital information” about a mortgage-back security called Abacus. The SEC said: “Unbeknownst to investors, Paulson & Co. [a hedge fund]…which was posed to benefit if the [securities in Abacus] defaulted, played a significant role in selecting which [securities] should make up the portfolio…In sum, Goldman Sachs arranged a transaction at Paulson’s request in which Paulson heavily influenced the selection of the portfolio to suit its economic interests.”

    Goldman responded in classic fashion – crying “Foul!” and claiming that it is the victim of a gross misunderstanding. Does anyone really believe them? To rephrase the question, does anyone really believe that this single instance of alleged fraud is the only such instance?

    This question reminds us of another truism about cockroaches: There’s never just one. Any financial firm that is capable of committing a fraud as egregious and flagrant as the one the SEC’s complaint describes is certainly capable of committing a second fraud…and maybe even a third or a fourth…or a fortieth.

    The fraud the SEC identifies in its complaint against Goldman is not a mere “Oops!” It is a fraud that every licensed stockbroker in the land would recognize as a career-ending no-no.

    “The product was new and complex,” explained Robert Khuzami, a director from the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, “but the deception and conflicts were old and simple.”

    In other words, a lie is a lie.

    Nevertheless, your editor is content to let due process run its course…and to wait as long as necessary for the guilty verdict to arrive.

    Whatever the ultimate verdict, Goldman is already “guilty by association” in the eyes of most Americans. It is guilty by its close association with the practices that precipitated the financial crisis of 2008. It is also guilty by its close association with the powers in Washington who decided which firms would receive billions of dollars of emergency assistance (i.e. Goldman Sachs) and which would be allowed to fail (i.e., Lehman Bros.). And most of all, it is guilty by its close association with the obscene sense of entitlement that characterizes Wall Street pay practices.

    In short, America hates Goldman Sachs.

    So the fact that Goldman may have actually committed a large-scale fraud is a very big deal. Suddenly, the Goldman-haters are carrying loaded weapons…and the ensuing firefight might produce some significant volatility in the financial markets.

    For starters, this event might produce a very convenient excuse for a very pronounced selloff. But Goldman is not merely an excuse for a stock market selloff; Goldman is the stock market…and it is also the commodity market and the Treasury market. Goldman is the biggest market maker in the US stock market and among the biggest players in every major commodity market. Goldman is also one of the largest primary dealers of Treasury Securities.

    So maybe it is no fluke that most commodities tumbled Friday, right along with the stock market. Gold and crude oil both tumbled more than 2%. And as this new week begins, Goldman’s troubles are mounting.

    Citing Goldman’s “moral bankruptcy,” Britain’s Prime Minister Gordon Brown called for a full inquiry by Britain’s Financial Services Authority in conjunction with the SEC. Germany also said it would ask for detailed information about the case. Both governments had to bail out banks that lost hundreds of millions of dollars on investments marketed by Goldman.

    None of this will be good news for the stock markets of the world. And yet, none of this is really a surprise either. Nearly two years ago, in a column entitled, “The Goldman Sachs Phenomenon,” your California editor remarked, “The American financial system still possesses too much talent and creativity to operate prudently… Consider yourselves forewarned!” We are re-publishing this column in today’s edition of The Daily Reckoning.

    Just two months before this column first appeared, JP Morgan Chase had acquired the failing Bear Stearns. As part of the deal the Federal Reserve took responsibility for $29 billion in toxic assets from the Bear Stearns portfolio – effectively handing a $29 billion subsidy to JP Morgan, and establishing a precedent for the hundred-billion-dollar subsidies that would flow to Wall Street’s largest firms just six months later.

    We smelled a rat back then…and the rat doesn’t smell any better now…

    Eric J. Fry
    for The Daily Reckoning Australia

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  • Trade of the Decade: Sell Stocks and Buy Gold

    Happy St. Patrick’s Day to everybody. I have only one clean Irish joke to share with you, and here it is: What’s Irish and sits on your lawn? Patty O’Furniture.

    That’s all I got.

    Anyway, I wish the Luck of the Irish to everyone here today…as well as the luck of the French…the Swedish…the Latvians…the Brazilians…and the luck of every other nation on the planet…because I think we might need it.

    As regular Daily Reckoning readers may know, I just rejoined the crew about five months ago. I originally wrote The Daily Reckoning with Bill Bonner near its inception. He started it in 2000; I joined him in 2001. I wrote it with him until 2005 and then I split off for a few years and wrote The Rude Awakening, and then rejoined him a few months ago.

    So about 10 years ago, when I first started working with Bill, he came up with this idea for a Trade of the Decade. It was really just a literary device. But it ended up being a brilliant investment call. Everyone loved stocks at the time; and everyone hated gold. So Bill just took the other side of both trades: Sell stocks and buy gold.

    This Trade of the Decade provided a great thematic backdrop for everything we would write about during the ensuing 10 years. We would write about the coming housing bust, about runaway government deficits and about lots of other things that provided absolutely no reason whatsoever to buy stocks, but plenty of reasons to buy gold.

    For good measure, we would also write about the scoundrels on Wall Street and about the hazards of leverage. And every once in a while, we would write about the hazards of leverage in the hands of the scoundrels on Wall Street. And that was yet one more reason not to buy stocks.

    So here’s a picture of the last 10 years in a nutshell: you can see that gold performed very well and that stocks did not. In fact, stocks delivered a negative return.

    Stocks, Home Price and Employment Decline

    So we were right – more or less – about what we anticipated. But that’s not really great news…which reminds me of that expression, “Be careful what you wish for.”

    I was talking to a married friend of mine recently and he said to me, “Eric, be careful what you wish for. I was chatting with my wife the other evening and I said, ‘Honey, we really need to communicate more effectively. So if you don’t tell me how you’re feeling, I’m not going to know how to make you happy. And so she said, ‘Okay, get off of me.’”

    So now what? What’s next for us investors? What’s the next Trade of the Decade?

    I don’t know of course, but I’ll offer a guess. Bill has offered his guess already. He has suggested selling Long-dated Treasury bonds and buying deep-value Japanese stocks. I agree with the first half of the trade. But the second half of my Trade of the Decade is to buy uranium.

    So my trade is to sell toxic assets and buy radioactive ones. I think this is a trade that will unfold nicely over 10 years, but over 10 weeks or 10 months I’m not so sure. So check back in 10 years and we’ll see.

    My Trade of the Decade derives from the idea that the US and most of the other Developed Nations – also known as Welfare States – have begun an irreversible decline, and meanwhile SOME Emerging Markets have begun a very long-term growth phase.

    These divergent trends won’t unfold in one day. In fact, they may not even unfold in one decade. But the time has arrived to begin considering the investment implications of these trends.

    The good news is that even as mature economies like the US die, they won’t be all bad. Many things improve as they die. I think of maple leaves, for example, and agave plants. I learned a little something about these Agave plants. They are “monocarpic.” I didn’t know that word. Now I do. Monocarpic plants flower just once, then die. It feels to me like the US is like a monocarpic plant that has just flowered. The bloom was spectacular.

    We just enjoyed one of the most incredible economic performances of any nation ever, which morphed into one of the most spectacular credit bubbles of all time. But it feels like that’s over now. The ensuing bust won’t unfold all at once, but it will unfold. That’s a guarantee. And one very solid clue that the bust is coming is that the government is trying to extend the bubble.

    We know this about governments: They are good at borrowing. But when it comes to re-paying loans. Not so good.

    Some of you might have already known that governments sometimes default on their obligations. I was shocked to learn this. In fact, I couldn’t believe it. So I Googled “government” and “default” and sure enough, my query returned 160,000,000 responses. When I changed the query to “government default on debt,” I still got 10,000,000 responses. So I read some of those query results and its true; governments do default sometimes. It’s not moral and it’s not right, but it happens.

    In general, you don’t want to lend money to a government when times are bad. It’s okay to lend money to governments when times are good. They don’t typically default or renege when times are good. But in a fair- to-poor environment you need to be careful. This is simply an historic fact.

    I ran into a fascinating little tidbit from a book about French financial history entitled, “The Undying Debt,” by Francois Velde. This is a story from the past. But it may also be a story from the future:

    “With the opening of hostilities [in WWI], the Bank of France suspended the link between francs and gold, and part of the war was financed with large issues of paper currency. When France’s prime minister re- established the link in 1928, he could only do so at 20% of its pre-war parity.”

    So in other words, the French got into a fix. They got out by defaulting on 80% of their obligations. The history of French financial management is not so different from that of any other nation. Time after time, France found itself a little short. And time after time, it defaulted…devalued…and reneged on its promises. To the extent that, over a three-century period of time, French government debt equal to ten ounces of gold – with a present value of about €7,850 – was reduced, says Velde, to €1.20.

    Oh mon Dieu! C’est pas vrai! Yes, it’s true. Governments default just as inevitably as Agave plants flower. But the timing is uncertain.

    So where are we now in the fiscal lifecycle here in the US?

    Well I’m going to share a few vignettes. No answers; just some observations.

    Vignette #1: The US government – as well as several governments in Europe – is attempting to supplant aspects of the private sector.

    I don’t think that’s going to work. You cannot ever convert a parasite into a host. They are completely different organisms, which perform completely different functions. So right now we have credit contracting rapidly in the private sector, while it is expanding dramatically in the public sector.

    Business lending is falling at a 16.6% rate…the steepest plunge since 1948. But government borrowing is more than making up for the shortfall in private borrowing.

    Unfortunately, government borrowing is not the same thing as private sector borrowing. Private sector borrowing facilitates capital formation. It facilitates capitalistic enterprise. But government borrowing burdens it. Government borrowing impedes it. Government borrowing produces more parasites. That’s about all it does.

    Check out this chart: It shows employment trends in the greater Washington, DC area.

    Government vs. Retail Employment in DC

    The upwardly sloping blue line is federal employment. The downwardly sloping yellow line is private sector retail employment. Now I don’t know what you all think about this chart, but I don’t think these are the kinds of employment trends that will produce national prosperity. These are the kinds of trends that will make the economy less productive…at least that would be my guess.

    But I’m always willing to test my assumptions. So let’s conduct a little poll.

    Raise your hand if you receive better customer service from your local DMV than from your local Starbucks.

    [No hands raised]

    Well I don’t either.

    Vignette #2: Talented individuals are fleeing the US

    The next little vignette I will share with you relates to a shocking “brain drain” here in the US. In the recent past, Ninety-two percent of Chinese Ph.D.s in science and engineering would remain in the United States for at least five years after their studies – and 85 percent of Indians.

    But last year, four researchers from Duke, Harvard, and Berkeley conducted a survey of more than 1,200 foreign-born students. The percentage of Chinese who plan to stay in the US after graduation is now just 54 percent, while the number of Indians who expect to remain is just 58 percent.

    What’s more, only seven percent of Chinese students surveyed and 25 percent of Indian students believed the American economy’s best days still lay ahead. But overwhelming majorities of both Indian and Chinese students believed their home country’s best days still lay ahead.

    Now they could be wrong. But we’re talking about a sliver of the talent pool that has a good sense for labor market trends and a good sense for where opportunity lies globally.

    Vignette #3 – An abysmal fiscal trend is unfolding in the US

    My third vignette relates to America’s deteriorating fiscal condition…

    The US crossed the $1 trillion deficit level for the first time in 1981, and 28 years later, we’ve added another $11 trillion. The deficit stands at $12.4 trillion right now and over the next ten years US debt is forecast to reach $25 trillion – pushing very close to Greek-like levels of debt-to-GDP.

    US Government Debt Per Person

    In the last ten years US Federal Debt per person has gone from $20,000 to $40,000. If we were to also include the present value of the government’s future unfunded liabilities like Social Security and Medicare, the debt per person would soar to more than $250,000!

    These statistics may not necessarily mean anything, but they don’t necessarily mean nothing.

    Vignette #4 – Geopolitical risks could exacerbate fiscal weakness

    On top of bad fiscal trends, you’ve got omnipresent geopolitical risks that are always lurking in the shadows. Some senior Chinese military officers proposed recently that their country should sell some US bonds to punish Washington for its latest round of arms sales to Taiwan.

    “Our retaliation should not be restricted to merely military matters,” Luo Yuan, a researcher at the Academy of Military Sciences, told Reuters, “For example, we could sanction [the US] using economic means, such as dumping some US government bonds.”

    Probably, Luo Yuan’s suggestion will gain no traction in Beijing. Probably. But his suggestion nevertheless underscores the precarious economic arrangements that support the modern world of finance. Prudent investors cannot afford complacency.

    Geopolitical tensions are not only a China-US thing, they are also a Germany-Greece thing.

    Everyone thinks Greece will pull out of its mess with austerity measures and German bailouts. I’m not so sure about either assumption.

    Of almost 31,000 votes cast in an online survey by the German daily “Bild,” 82 percent of respondents said the European Union should not rescue Greece. And an editorial in the same paper declared, “The proud, cheating, profligate Greeks” ought to be “thrown out of the euro on their ear.” I think this editorial expresses a very pervasive view in Europe that is not expressed by the politicians, but it is one that will influence their decision-making.

    Unfortunately, Greece’s finances are not unique; they are emblematic. Sovereign borrowers are out of control. Greece is just an icon for all of Europe, and also the US.

    So I view Greece as the Bear Stearns of the upcoming sovereign debt crisis. You may recall that in June, 2007, Bear Stearns stepped in to bail out two of its own hedge funds by pledging collateral for a $3.2 billion loan.

    Nine months later, in March, 2008, JP Morgan Chase took over a functionally bankrupt Bear. And at that point most of the official Wall Street elite believed that the crisis had been averted.

    But six months later, on September 15, 2008, Lehman Bros. filed for bankruptcy. And the rest is history. It is amazing to remember that 15 months elapsed between the first signs of difficulty in the US financial sector and Lehman’s bankruptcy. So mark your calendars; the Sovereign debt crisis should unfurl by May 2011 – that would be about 15 months after the initial headlines about Greece.

    Now the financial news is not all bad, however. In the Developing World we have some shining stars. And I would be putting my capital there.

    Eric Fry
    for The Daily Reckoning Australia

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