Author: Joshua Green

  • Stop Hyping Financial Reform

    Last week, the Senate followed the House and passed a bill to
    regulate Wall Street, all but ensuring President Obama another major
    legislative victory. At moments like these, the Washington press corps
    drops its adversarial tone and adopts a witness-to-history earnestness.

    Pronouncements are made about the historic nature of the new law
    (“The most profound remaking of financial regulations since the Great
    Depression,” declared the Washington Post). The key figures, like
    Senators Blanche Lincoln and Christopher Dodd, are lionized (“Dodd
    Prepares to Depart in Triumph,” blared The New York Times). All of this
    is routine and customary and to be expected. It’s also lazy and
    misleading.

    Like a good pulp thriller, the standard media narrative of any major
    law requires high stakes, a clear delineation between good guys and bad
    guys, and a satisfying resolution. But the truth about legislation,
    including financial reform, is usually more mundane.

    Politicians tout modest reforms as being great ones. They act in
    their own self-interest. And they often can’t gauge a law’s
    effectiveness until years after the fact, though you’ll rarely hear
    this. For the press, the tradition of “writing for history” entails
    burnishing the story, and that often means subordinating what was really
    at stake and why the major figures acted as they did.

    Three points in particular are likely to be underplayed. First, the
    new financial regulations are the most profound since the Depression
    chiefly because most of what Congress did in the interim was to
    eliminate regulations, which brought on the recent crisis. Nobody’s
    clearing a very high bar.

    Second, whatever Obama signs into law will be modest given the scope
    and severity of the crisis, nothing like the New Deal reforms. No bank
    will be broken up, no government agency punished, no Wall Street
    executive denied his bonus.

    The thrust of both the House and Senate bills is to repair and
    preserve the current system rather than reform it root and branch. “The
    system isn’t changing that much,” Douglas Elliott, a Brookings
    Institution scholar and former investment banker told National Journal.
    “There is a hope, I think, that everyone is going to do better.”

    Among the first to exhibit better behavior were the committee
    chairmen who drafted the Senate bill, Dodd and Lincoln. In a break from
    the Washington norm, the reform legislation got stronger, not weaker, as
    it wended its way through the Senate. This was especially interesting
    given that both senators spent years doing Wall Street’s bidding. Their
    about-face added drama to the proceedings. That no senator in either
    party was willing or able to thwart them only made the story better.

    The third point likely to be underplayed is that this unusual dynamic
    owes nothing to the integrity of the senators and everything to the
    anger of the American public. Dodd and Lincoln, both facing wrathful
    voters and long odds on reelection, simply were trying to survive (Dodd
    finally gave up and decided to retire — sorry, “depart in triumph”).

    It speaks volumes about the Democratic leadership’s attitude toward
    financial reform that its two toughest bills have both been acts of
    blatant insincerity driven by electoral desperation. That a few members
    of the GOP, which would block Mother’s Day if a Democrat proposed it,
    felt compelled to go along says as much about the power of an angry
    electorate. But that’s really not so bad. Cravenness, it turns out, can
    be a force for good. “This bill has been a constant one-upping of people
    proposing stronger and stronger provisions,” a Senate leadership aide
    marveled. “The dirty work of watering it down is dangerous, so it just
    keeps moving along.”

    A few big issues remain when the House and Senate merge their bills
    in the coming weeks. Will the “Volcker Rule” banning federally insured
    banks from making risky bets find its way into law? Will banks be forced
    to spin off their derivatives business? We may soon see for ourselves.
    Somewhere along the line, someone proposed televising the proceedings,
    and no one’s summoned the courage to stop them. This is undoubtedly for
    the good. Fear and self-preservation aren’t the most admirable
    qualities. They make for lousy copy. But they do seem to work. The real
    story of financial reform is that nobody wants to depart in triumph.

    Joshua Green writes a weekly column for the Boston Globe.





    Email this Article
    Add to digg
    Add to Reddit
    Add to Twitter
    Add to del.icio.us
    Add to StumbleUpon
    Add to Facebook






    Christopher DoddUnited StatesGreat DepressionWashington PostWall Street

  • Treasury's LeBron James

    One of the unexpected things I encountered while reporting this recent profile of Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner was a steady stream of paeans to his athleticism. Some of his colleagues seemed downright starstruck, and I came away convinced that this actually helped Geithner advance through the Treasury bureaucracy. Geithner is China right now, and courtesy of CNBC, we now have footage of this athletic prowess (at least on the basketball court), and I have to admit, he appears to live up to billing:
     
    I guess he didn’t pack for hoops, though. Chinese basketball uniforms always look a little goofy to me, but playing in a dress shirt and suit pants puts you up about ten notches on the dork ladder. I’m tempted to say he floats his jumper like he’d like Wen Jiabao to float the renminbi, but that would put me up there, too.





    Email this Article
    Add to digg
    Add to Reddit
    Add to Twitter
    Add to del.icio.us
    Add to StumbleUpon
    Add to Facebook



  • The New $100 Bill (Updated)

    monopoly_money_100.jpgJust got a press release from Treasury touting Tim Geithner’s unveiling of the new $100 bill and directing me to www.newmoney.gov to marvel at the new design. I clicked. Site doesn’t load. Did Goldman take them all?

    (Not-really-the-new-$100-bill image courtesy of Hasbro)

    Update: YouTube has it:

    (NAV Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons)



    Email this Article
    Add to digg
    Add to Reddit
    Add to Twitter
    Add to del.icio.us
    Add to StumbleUpon
    Add to Facebook



  • Goldman’s Biggest Sucker

    german-stereotypes.jpgGermans may be great engineers, but they sure look like lousy investors.

    The SEC’s complaint against Goldman Sachs alleges that it defrauded clients by conspiring with hedge-fund manager John Paulson to create collateralized debt obligations on subprime mortgage bonds that were almost certain to go bad. Paulson made $1 billion shorting these toxic assets. And who was foolish enough to buy them? The German state-owned bank IKB was one major victim, promptly losing $150 million, according to the SEC. The Wall Street Journal’s David Wessel calls IKB “hapless.” Apparently nobody ever thought “Achtung!”

    This isn’t the only example of Germans getting suckered into buying subprime mortgage bonds by big Wall Street firms. In Michael Lewis’s new book, “The Big Short,” about a handful of investors who anticipated the crisis and, like Paulson, bet against subprime mortgage bonds, one major source of bafflement is who is on the other side of the bet. They wonder, what investor would be foolish enough to buy this junk? Greg Lippman, a Deutsche Bank bond trader who made a fortune by placing himself in the middle of these deals, eventually reveals the answer: Germans. Says one of Lewis’s characters: 

    “Whenever we’d ask [Lippman]  who was buying this
    crap, he always just said, ‘Düsseldorf.’” It didn’t matter whether Düsseldorf
    was buying actual cash subprime mortgage bonds or selling credit default
    swaps on those same mortgage bonds, as they amounted to one and the
    same thing: the long side of the bet. 

    And of course
    they got pounded flatter than a Wienerschnitzel. What is it about the
    Teutonic psyche that made them such easy marks? If they’re not careful,
    “German investing” could assume a place alongside “Yugoslav auto
    manufacturing” and “English cooking” as things to be avoided at all
    costs.

    (Image source: The Language Institute)



    Email this Article
    Add to digg
    Add to Reddit
    Add to Twitter
    Add to del.icio.us
    Add to StumbleUpon
    Add to Facebook



  • Will a Jump in Mortgage Rates Kill the Recovery?

    My colleague Dan Indiviglio does a nice job of explaining what might happen after today, when the Fed ends its $1.25 trillion program to buy mortgage-backed securities. As Dan explains, the old thinking was “mortgage rates will jump.” The new thinking is “wait–they might not.” So far they have not. Whether or not they do is a question that concerns more than just potential home buyers. If mortgage rates jump, it becomes more expensive to buy a house, and home prices have just barely begun to stabilize. Higher rates put downward pressure on home prices. So, too, will the looming expiration of the home-buyer’s tax credit. That means more homeowners underwater on their mortgages, more foreclosures, and more pain. Higher rates will also hurt those with adjustable-rate mortgages about to reset (one benefit to the historically low rates of the last year or so is that these resets, while damaging, have not been nearly as devastating as they could have been). That would cause further defaults and potentially plunge the country back into recession.

    In a recent interview for this piece, I asked Tim Geithner whether this prospect worried him, and if it did, what he might do about it. He replied that it did, indeed, concern him. But he added–correctly–that the program fell under the Fed’s purview, so there wasn’t anything he could do (at least officially) to extend it or revise it. Given the administration’s repeated failure to stem the wave of foreclosures, Geithner had better hope rates don’t jump.





    Email this Article
    Add to digg
    Add to Reddit
    Add to Twitter
    Add to del.icio.us
    Add to StumbleUpon
    Add to Facebook