Author: Kevin Jon Heller

  • The World’s Best Airlines. (And No, None Are American.)

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    Skytrax has released its annual list of the world’s 10 best airlines.  Here they are, from #1 down:

    • Asiana Airlines
    • Singapore Airlines
    • Qatar Airways
    • Cathay Pacific
    • Air New Zealand
    • Etihad Airways
    • Qantas
    • Emirates
    • Thai Airways
    • Malaysia Airlines

    Two things stand out.  First, Asian and Australia/New Zealand dominate. I fly Air New Zealand and Qantas regularly, and think both are excellent.  (Air New Zealand is better, as the ratings indicate.)  I also like Virgin Australia, which isn’t on the list but has a great non-stop from Melbourne to Los Angeles for between $800-1000 (US).  My friends fly Singapore, Etihad, and Emirates regularly and rave about all three, especially Singapore.

    Second, there are no US airlines on the list.  In fact, no US airline wins any of Skytrax’s 50-odd individual awards, either.  That, of course, should come as no surprise to anyone who lives in the US.  Our airlines are absolutely atrocious — dirty, cramped, lousy food, unpleasant service, pathetic entertainment.  (The only airlines that are anywhere near as bad are British Midlands and British Airways.)  A friend recently flew to Melbourne on United.  It was a 14-hour flight and the only entertainment was the airline-selected movie shown on little televisions attached to the ceiling.  Air New Zealand, Qantas, and Virgin, by contrast, have in-seat TV screens with your choice of more than 120 movies.  And the food is good.

    Skytrax’s rankings don’t take them into account, but the difference between Asian and American airports is also stark.  Denver and Indianapolis have nice airports, but most are just as dirty, cramped, and unpleasant as the airlines themselves.  (And don’t get me started on US customs…)  The Asian airports, by contrast, are fantastic.  They’re spacious, clean, with great food choices and — invariably — free internet everywhere.  And getting though customs is a breeze.

    I really don’t miss living in the US.

  • The Non-Existent “Murder in Violation of the Law of War” — Redux

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    A couple of years ago, I blogged about how Salim Hamdan was prosecuted in a military commission for conspiring to commit the non-existent war crime “murder in violation of the law of war.”  Hamdan was acquitted on that count, but the crime is starring again in the unconscionable prosecution of child-soldier Omar Khadr.  That’s unfortunate in itself — but what is particularly unfortunate is that, according to the Vancouver Sun, Harold Koh and the State Department tried to get the charges dismissed but were rebuffed by the Department of Defense:

    Officials in the Obama administration demanded a game-changing rule change for the Guantanamo Bay military tribunal that would have likely scuttled the war crimes murder charge against Canadian-born terror suspect Omar Khadr, Canwest News Service has learned.

    The officials sought to strip a new commissions manual of a law-of-war murder definition that is central to Khadr’s prosecution in the mortal wounding of Special Forces Sgt. First Class Chris Speer during a 2002 firefight in Afghanistan, insiders say.

    Omission of the segment could have also obliged prosecutors to trim or abandon “up to one-third” of its cases, according to one inside estimate. Prosecutors said in the wake of the Bush administration they were prepared to take about 60 Guantanamo detainees to trial — among them the accused co-conspirators of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks.

    The Pentagon issued its 281-page Manual for Military Commissions on the eve of hearings April 28 to May 6 in the Khadr case after the U.S. Congress updated the Bush-era Military Commissions Act with legislation President Barack Obama said makes them fair. Prosecution and defence teams use the courtroom rules to present their cases, but a new manual was necessary to conform to the legislative changes in the 2009 act.

    The failed bid to change part of law-of-war murder rule — as well as separate arguments insiders say took place over other rules — illustrates how the commissions remain a point of division in the Obama administration. Numerous appointees — and even Obama himself — were sharply critical of the tribunals after the Bush administration launched them as a key tool in its post-9/11 “war on terror.”

    [snip]

    Among those leading the charge against the contested murder segment was Harold Koh, Obama-nominated legal adviser of the State Department, who once wrote that the U.S. was part of an “axis of disobedience” along with North Korea and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

    [snip]

    U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates signed off on the manual with the contested “comment” intact after Jeh Johnson, his legal adviser, went head-to-head with Koh, one official recounted.

    “Harold Koh doesn’t have any authority over the defence department,” said this official. “The general counsel of DOD was fighting Koh on it; he advises Secretary Gates . . . who is going to follow his own lawyer.”

    As the article notes, and as Scott Horton discusses here, Koh and the State Department had an ulterior motive in opposing the crime — they are worried that it might come back to haunt the US’s drone program:

    The pretext for demanding the draft-rule edit centred on concern about defending the legitimacy of Central Intelligence Agency drone attacks on terror suspects in Pakistan, one insider confided.

    According to this official, it was feared that aspects of the commission manual’s “comment” in the section titled Murder in Violation of the Law of War could be applied to the attacks. Key among the contested phrasing is a statement that says murder and some other offences rise to the level of war crimes if committed “while the accused did not meet the requirements of privileged belligerency” — which principally covers regular war law-abiding combatants.

    Their fears are legitimate.  The war crime doesn’t exist under international law regardless of whether the US pretends that it does.  But the US would find it very difficult to argue that another country could not prosecute a CIA agent involved in a drone strike for “murder in violation of the law of war” given its willingness to prosecute Khadr (and apparently dozens of others) for the same crime.

    Stay tuned!

    P.S.  It’s worth noting that four of the five “war crimes” Khadr allegedly committed do not actually exist under international law: murder in violation of the law of war, attempted murder in violation of the law of war, conspiracy, and material support for terrorism.  The only one that does exist — though the charge sheet does not provide much information about what Khadr allegedly did — is spying.

    P.P.S.  For a very interesting discussion of “murder in violation of the law of war” as municipal, common law offense, see my friend John Dehn’s article in the Journal of International Criminal Justice here.

  • Dershowitz’s Idea of “Fair” International Law

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    So, Alan Dershowitz has decided that international law needs to be “delegitimized,” because it is unfair to Israel.  It is reasonable to consider, therefore, what Dershowitz believes a “fair” international law would allow Israel to do.  Here is one of his suggestions, from a 2002 Jerusalem Post editorial entitled “New Response to Palestinian Terrorism” (emphasis mine):

    In light of the willingness of suicide bombers to die in the process of killing Israelis, the traditional methods of deterrence and retaliation seem insufficient. To succeed, Israel must turn the Palestinian leadership and people against the use of terrorism and the terrorists themselves. One way to do this is to make terrorists directly bear the responsibility for losses inflicted on the Palestinian cause as a direct result of their terrorism.

    Here is my proposal. Israel should announce an immediate unilateral cessation in retaliation against terrorist attacks. This moratorium would be in effect for a short period, say four or five days, to give the Palestinian leadership an opportunity to respond to the new policy. It would also make it clear to the world that Israel is taking an important step in ending what has become a cycle of violence.

    Following the end of the moratorium, Israel would institute the following new policy if Palestinian terrorism were to resume. It will announce precisely what it will do in response to the next act of terrorism. For example, it could announce the first act of terrorism following the moratorium will result in the destruction of a small village which has been used as a base for terrorist operations. The residents would be given 24 hours to leave, and then troops will come in and bulldoze all of the buildings.

    The response will be automatic. The order will have been given in advance of the terrorist attacks and there will be no discretion. The point is to make the automatic destruction of the village the fault of the Palestinian terrorists who had advance warnings of the specific consequences of their action. The soldiers would simply be acting as the means for carrying out a previously announced policy of retaliation against a designated target.

    Further acts of terrorism would trigger further destruction of specifically named locations. The “waiting list” targets would be made public and circulated throughout the Palestinian-controlled areas. If this automatic policy of destroying targets announced in advance is carried out with the full support of the entire government, including those who are committed to a resumption of the peace process, a clear message will be sent to the Palestinian people: Every time terrorists blow themselves up and kill civilians, they are also blowing up one of their own villages.

    The most charitable reading of this proposal is that Dershowitz is advocating that Israel commit a wide variety of war crimes and/or crimes against humanity involving civilian objects.  The less charitable one — and the more persuasive — is that he is advocating that Israel commit a wide variety of war crimes and/or crimes against humanity involving civilians themselves.  After all, given that he is calling for an “automatic,” discretion-less response, the bulldozers would knowingly and deliberately kill civilians if they did not heed Israel’s call to flee a village targeted for destruction — as they almost certainly wouldn’t.

    If Dershowitz thinks that international law is unfair because it does not permit these kinds of crimes, I hope it remains unfair for decades to come.

  • The ECCC Issues a Landmark Decision on JCE III

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia has just held that JCE III, otherwise known as “extended” joint criminal enterprise, did not exist under customary international law during 1975-1979, the period over which the ECCC has temporal jurisdiction. The decision is a stunning rebuke to the ICTY, which invented — literally out of thin air — that form of JCE in Tadic, its first decision.

    In a nutshell, JCE III holds a defendant who participates in a common plan to commit an international crime responsible for the commission of unplanned crimes that he was aware might be committed.  Consider, for example, a group of soldiers who pillage a captured village pursuant to a common plan.  If one of the soldiers commits rape while pillaging the village, any of his comrades will be guilty of both pillage and rape if they foresaw the possibility that rape would be committed during the pillaging.

    JCE III has always been controversial, with scholars criticizing it on two basic grounds.  First, they have pointed out that JCE III violates the principle of culpability because — as the example above indicates — it holds a defendant responsible for a crime even though he did not commit its actus reus and did not possess its necessary mens rea.  The ICTY has even held that JCE III results in the defendant’s conviction as a principal, not as an accessory, despite overwhelming domestic practice to the contrary.

    Scholars have also argued that JCE III does not exist under customary law, contrary to the ICTY’s assertion in Tadic.  There is no question that JCE I and JCE II, “basic” and “systemic” JCE, are consistent with customary international law; both are amply supported by WW II-era international and domestic jurisprudence.  But the same cannot be said of JCE III: none of the WW II-era cases applied it, and an equivalent mode of participation exists in very few national jurisdictions.

    The ECCC’s decision addressed the second criticism, agreeing with critics that the ICTY invented JCE III.  It’s a long analysis and highly technical, so I won’t try to summarize here.  But it’s absolutely devastating, leaving Tadic in smoldering ruins.  Readers interested in JCE should definitely give the decision a read.

    I have to admit, I feel more than a little vindicated by the ECCC’s decision.  I wrote a long motion in the Karadzic case arguing that customary international law does not permit a defendant to be convicted of a special-intent crime such as genocide via JCE III.  The motion relied on much, if not most, of the same international and domestic jurisprudence that the ECCC cites in defense of its decision.  The ICTY refused to address the substance of the motion, holding that the JCE III issue was not “jurisdictional” and could be dealt with in the final judgment if Karadzic was convicted.  The ECCC’s decision indicates the absurdity of the ICTY’s position.

    I have always been skeptical of the ECCC, particularly concerning its ability to generate quality jurisprudence.  I am delighted to say that the early returns indicate my skepticism might have been unwarranted.

  • Garzon Granted Permission to Work at the ICC

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    I continue to believe that this is a terrible idea:

    Spain’s top judicial panel had suspended Mr Garzon on Friday pending his trial on charges he exceeded his authority by ordering an investigation into mass killings by the forces of former dictator Francisco Franco.

    The suspension from his functions as a judge was widely thought in Spain to be an obstacle to a transfer to a foreign court but the judicial panel approved Garzon’s request to spend seven months at The Hague court.

    “Legal reasons could not be found to prevent the hiring of the judge as a consultant”, Gabriela Bravo, spokeswoman for the judicial panel told reporters.

    If Julian and I agree about something, could we possibly be wrong?

  • More on Israel’s Support for Apartheid

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    As the smear campaign against Richard Goldstone gets ever more desperate, it seems opportune to provide a bit more information about Israel’s support for apartheid, to which Goldstone’s pales in comparison.  Here is Sasha Polokow-Suransky again, this time responding to attacks on Goldstone by the Speaker of the Knesset and Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister:

    Goldstone’s apartheid-era judicial rulings are undoubtedly a blot on his record, but his critics never mention the crucial part he played in shepherding South Africa through its democratic transition and warding off violent threats to a peaceful transfer of power — a role that led Nelson Mandela to embrace him and appoint him to the country’s highest court.

    More importantly, Ayalon’s and Rivlin’s moralism conveniently ignores Israel’s history of arming the apartheid regime from the mid-1970s until the early 1990s. By serving as South Africa’s primary and most reliable arms supplier during a period of violent internal repression and external aggression, Israel’s government did far more to aid the apartheid regime than Goldstone ever did.

    The Israel-South Africa alliance began in earnest in April 1975 when then-Defense Minister Shimon Peres signed a secret security pact with his South African counterpart, P.W. Botha. Within months, the two countries were doing a brisk trade, closing arms deals totaling almost $200 million; Peres even offered to sell Pretoria nuclear-capable Jericho missiles. By 1979, South Africa had become the Israeli defense industry’s single largest customer, accounting for 35 percent of military exports and dwarfing other clients such as Argentina, Chile, Singapore, and Zaire.

    High-level exchanges of military personnel soon followed. South Africans joined the Israeli chief of staff in March 1979 for the top-secret test of a new missile system. During Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli army took South African Defense Force chief Constand Viljoen and his colleagues to the front lines, and Viljoen routinely flew visiting Israeli military advisors and embassy attachés to the battlefield in Angola where his troops were battling Angolan and Cuban forces.

    There was nuclear cooperation, too: South Africa provided Israel with yellowcake uranium while dozens of Israelis came to South Africa in 1984 with code names and cover stories to work on Pretoria’s nuclear missile program at South Africa’s secret Overberg testing range. By this time, South Africa’s alternative sources for arms had largely dried up because the United States and European countries had begun abiding by the U.N. arms embargo; Israel unapologetically continued to violate it.

    The blatant hypocrisy of the latest attack on Goldstone is nothing new. In November 1986, Benjamin Netanyahu, then Israel’s U.N. ambassador, gave a stirring speech to the General Assembly denouncing apartheid and insisting that “Arab oil producers provide the umbilical cord that nourishes the apartheid regime.” (Never mind that Israel remained absent from the 1980 U.N. vote to impose an oil embargo on South Africa in deference to its friends in Pretoria.)

    Netanyahu was right that Arab and Iranian oil was flowing through middlemen to the apartheid regime, but he categorically denied Israel’s extensive military and trade ties with South Africa, calling charges of lucrative arms sales “flat nonsense” and accusing his critics of trying “to defame Israel.”

    In fact, Israel was profiting handsomely from selling weapons to Pretoria at the time. Writing in the New York Times, Thomas Friedman estimated that the two countries did $400 million to $800 million of business in the arms sector in 1986. According to declassified South African documents, the figure was likely even greater: A single contract for modernization of South African fighter jets in the mid-1980s amounted to “approximately $2 billion,” and  arms sales in 1988 — one year after Israel imposed sanctions against the apartheid regime — exceeded $1.5 billion. As the former head of the South African Air Force Jan van Loggerenberg told me bluntly: “Israel was probably our only avenue in the 1980s.”

    Declassified South African arms-procurement figures (which exclude lucrative cooperative ventures and shared financing arrangements) reveal the full extent of Netanyahu’s lie. The “independent IMF figures” he cited (which excluded diamonds and arms) suggested trade was a minuscule $100 million annually. It was actually between five to 10 times that amount — depending on the year — making the apartheid regime Israel’s second- or third-largest trading partner after the United States. Not all of the weapons Israel sold were used in external wars, and there is no denying that Israeli arms helped prolong the rule of an immoral and racist regime.

    Who, exactly, deserves to be barred from the US?

  • One Big Wall Street Journal Lie

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    Whoops, spoke too soon about the WSJ’s anti-ICC editorial.  It does indeed contain a lie — and its a doozy:

    What’s more, no amount of reform of the founding treaty will change the ICC’s inherent flaw. The ICC is a child of the doctrine of “universal jurisdiction,” which holds that courts can adjudicate crimes committed anywhere in the world.

    As anyone who has spent five minutes reading the Rome Statue knows, the Court is based on two forms of jurisdiction: territorial and active-nationality.  Both of which the U.S. uses and accepts that other states may use.  Proposals to base the ICC on universal jurisdiction were soundly rejected during the drafting of the Rome Statute.

    Not that the Editorial Board of the WSJ cares.  In the absence of facts, lies suit them just fine.

  • Fred Hiatt Also Chooses the Post’s Photos?

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    Too funny not to post (h/t, Gawker):

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    (The man in the photo, for those who don’t know, is Malcolm X, not Obama.)

  • Quote of the Day — The IMT on the Use of Armed Force in Self-Defense

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    From the Judgment:

    It was further argued that Germany alone could decide, in accordance with the reservations made by many of the Signatory Powers at the time of the conclusion of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, whether preventive action was a necessity, and that in making her decision final judgment was conclusive. But whether action taken under the claim of seIf-defense was in fact aggressive or defensive must ultimately be subject to investigation and adjudication if international law is ever to be enforced.

    Smart people, those Allied judges.

  • Howard on the Libel Suit Against Joseph Weiler

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    On a non-aggression note, Jennifer Howard has an article in yesterday’s Chronicle of Higher Education about Karin Calvo-Goller’s baseless criminal-libel suit in France against NYU’s Joseph Weiler.  It’s an excellent piece — and not just because she is kind enough to quote me.  Here’s a snippet:

    If you’re an author confronted with a negative book review, you have several options. You can write an angry letter to the editor. You can complain to friends and family about the reviewer’s lack of discernment. You can decide that bad publicity is better than no publicity at all and let the book speak for itself (often the wisest course, in my experience as a book-review editor).

    What you don’t do is sue the editor of the newspaper or journal that published the review.

    So it came as a shock to journal editors to learn that one of their own, Joseph H.H. Weiler, editor of the European Journal of International Law, would face a criminal-libel lawsuit in France over a review that he published on a Web site that he also edits, one that posts reviews of scholarly books.

    Although the case, set for trial in June, is so unusual that it seems unlikely to set a precedent that would seriously dampen academic reviewers’ freedom of critique, that possibility still has editors worried. And it has left observers scratching their heads over why a scholar would choose to dispute a review in court and not in the usual arenas of academic debate.

    The article is only free to non-subscribers for another four days.  So read it while it’s hot!

  • Dear Colleagues: We’d Like to Share Some Lies with You About the ICC

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    My UN Dispatch friend Mark Leon Goldberg notes today that a group of Representatives are circulating a “Dear Colleague” letter urging their colleagues to support a resolution “opposing the United States joining the Rome Statute or participating in the upcoming review conference.”  Reading the letter is an infuriating experience, not only for its ridiculously bad grammar — how does one “join” a statute? — but also because of its bald-faced lies about the ICC.  Here is the text of the letter:

    Protect U.S. Troops and American Sovereignty from the International Criminal Court

    Cosponsor H.Con.Res. 265, a Resolution Raising Concerns

    Current Cosponsors: Ros-Lehtinen, L. Smith, Garrett, McCotter, Lamborn, W. Jones, Burton, Franks, Chaffetz, Latta, Bachmann, Pitts, Akin, Kingston, Gohmert, Conaway, S. King, McClintock, Gingrey, Burgess, Manzullo, Marchant, H.Brown, Wittman, Jordan, Poe, Posey, Souder

    Dear Colleague,

    We urge you to join us in expressing the sense of the Congress that the United States should neither become a signatory to the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court nor attend the Review Conference of the Rome Statute in Kampala, Uganda in May 2010.

    That American troops could face criminal indictments in a foreign court for actions taken in the defense of U.S. national security interests is abhorrent. Yet in September 2009 the Office of the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Court announced that it was investigating accusations of war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed by U.S. and NATO forces fighting in Afghanistan. This presumably would implicate members of both the Bush and Obama Administration.  As such, today we are closer than ever before to a reality where American soldiers, Marines, and other military personnel could be brought before an international tribunal, without any of their constitutional rights, to face criminal charges.

    The United States must not become a party to the treaty that makes such charges possible—the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court. But in August 2009 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that it was a “great regret that we are not a signatory” to the Rome Statute.

    A major step on the road towards U.S. membership in the ICC is mere months away. From May 31 to June 11 an international conference will be held in Kampala, Uganda to consider proposals for amendments to the Rome Statute.  The Administration’s plan to participate in the Review Conference is in error. Engagement will do nothing to remedy the major defects of the Rome Statute, including:

    • That the ICC claims the power to exercise authority and jurisdiction over the citizens of nations—including the United States—that have not ratified the Rome Statute;
    • That the Rome Statute seeks to prohibit the “crime of aggression,” an offense that will inevitably be manipulated for political purposes to the detriment of U.S. national security interests, as the U.S. is regularly accused of “aggression” in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and;
    • The Rome Statute would revoke rights guaranteed by the Constitution to American military personnel and U.S. government officials charged with crimes, including the right to a jury trial by one’s peers, protection from double jeopardy, the right to confront one’s accusers, and the right to a speedy trial.

    To cosponsor H. Con. Res. 265, a resolution opposing the United States joining the Rome Statute or participating in the upcoming review conference, please contact Kristine Michalson in Congressman Lamborn’s office by emailing [email protected].

    Sincerely,

    Doug Lamborn, Member of Congress
    Thaddeus McCotter, Member of Congress
    Scott Garrett, Member of Congress

    In the words of the immortal Chris Rock, these people — which include those noted political theorists Steve King and Michele Bachmann — are just ign’ant.  Let’s start with the most obvious lies, concerning the Rome Statute’s “revocation” of constitutional rights.  The right of confrontation:

    Article 67(1)(e):  In the determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to… examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him or her.

    The right to a speedy trial:

    Article 67(1)(c):  In the determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to.. be tried without undue delay.

    And double jeopardy:

    Article 20

    1. Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the Court with respect to
    conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which the person has been convicted or acquitted by
    the Court.

    2. No person shall be tried by another court for a crime referred to in article 5 for which that
    person has already been convicted or acquitted by the Court.

    It’s true, of course, that the ICC does not use juries.  But even that claim is misleading, because Americans who commit crimes in civil-law countries are tried without juries all the time — it’s called territorial jurisdiction, which the US has never challenged.  Indeed, if the sponsors of the legislation are really worried about those evil “foreign courts,” they should prefer ICC trials to trials in a civil-law country — after all, the former are far more adversarial than the latter.

    I could go on, but what’s the point?  The sponsors of the legislation aren’t interested in facts or rational debate; if lying is the most effective strategy for whipping up opposition to the ICC, that’s fine with them.  Pathetic — but business as usual in American politics.

    P.S.  Someone might want to let the various Representatives know that the US doesn’t have to “join” the Rome Statute for Americans soldiers and officials to be subject to ICC jurisdiction.  Because Afghanistan is a member of the Court, they already are…

  • The CFR “Report” on the ICC Review Conference

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    Julian beat me to the punch regarding the new Council on Foreign Relations report, From Rome to Kampala: The U.S. Approach to the 2010 International Criminal Court Review Conference.  The first thing to note is that it isn’t really a “report.”  Reports have sober, reasoned analysis, careful argumentation, and document their controversial claims with footnotes to relevant material.  This “report,” by contrast, is nothing more than a political call-to-arms to undermine the ICC, one that simply regurgitates the same tired points that the US has been making for 15 years.

    The report is relatively short and worth reading in its entirety.  If you don’t have enough time, though, it can be reduced to the following three propositions:

    [1] The US has the right to unilaterally use military force whenever and wherever it wants to.

    [2] ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression would limit that right, so the Review Conference negotiations must be undermined.

    [3] The US should avoid being seen as openly undermining the ICC’s negotiations, because transparency will make undermining those negotiations more difficult.

    Some specific thoughts on the report:

    After World War II, the United States led Allied efforts to prosecute top German and Japanese officials for atrocity crimes and crimes against the peace (aggression), overcoming British and Soviet arguments for summary execution of the enemy leadership.

    fsafs

    The General Assembly resolution contains a nonexhaustive list of acts that may constitute aggression, while leaving open the possibility that additional acts may constitute aggression as determined by the Security Council. The resolution represented a political compromise, and many international law experts believe this definition is too vague for the purposes of imposing individual criminal liability.

    fsdfsd

    Two issues divided the Working Group. The first was whether the state whose nationals are alleged to have committed the crime must consent to the ICC’s jurisdiction over aggression, or whether the consent of the victim state is sufficient. States in favor of requiring the consent of the alleged aggressor state argue that it is mandated by international law.

    fsdfdsaf

    The United Kingdom and France have argued that given the Security Council’s primary role in regulating the use of force, including the determination that acts of aggression have occurred, it must have the last word on whether the ICC may move forward with prosecutions. Opponents of a decisive Security Council role have pointed to the risk of deadlock in the council, noting the council’s historical reluctance to label actions as aggression.

    kdjfs

    Given these divisions, the review conference is faced with three options… 3. Send the entire aggression issue to a new working group for further consideration. The United States is the only country to have openly advocated for this approach.

    kljfas;d

    The proposed definition reflects this uncertain state of the law by merely listing acts that might constitute aggression without defining when those acts are unlawful. The definition does not address how claims of self-defense or humanitarian necessity affect the categorization of the use of force as aggression.

    fdasfsd

    It is similarly unclear whether a preventive or preemptive strike against a proliferator of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—for example, a U.S. or Israeli strike against suspected Iranian nuclear weapon program sites—would constitute criminal aggression.

    thought experiment — without veto, would the us prefer a political body like the SC to determine or a legal body like the icj/icc? US okay with present arrangement for one reason — the veto.

    If aggression existed as a crime in 2003, for example, Iraq could have consented to the jurisdiction of the ICC after the U.S. invasion, potentially exposing U.S. leaders to investigation and prosecution for the decision to use force. In such a scenario, the ICC prosecutor could have investigated U.S. or coalition partners, asking them for detailed explanations of their legal rationale as well as for classified intelligence information regarding Iraq’s alleged weapons programs. The prosecutor might have then second-guessed the conclusion by the United States and other governments that their use of force was justified under existing UN Security Council resolutions.

    one can only hope so! uniquely american…

    Even if the definition were clear, allowing ICC aggression prosecutions to proceed without Security Council authorization could undermine Security Council efforts—including ongoing diplomacy—to restore peace and stability in conflicts, perhaps by sending conflicting signals to the parties regarding the merits of the underlying dispute.

    This from a country that until recently was 1 billion in arrears and was willing to veto peacekeeping operations unless Americans were given immunity!

    These concerns suggest that the Security Council, which is entrusted by the UN Charter with responsibility for
    maintaining international peace and security, should oversee determinations regarding aggression.

    It does — through deferral power. but no veto, which is the real objection.

    Although non-P5 states are less concerned about preserving Security Council authority, some recognize from a pragmatic standpoint the importance of support among P5 members for the court’s agenda, given the practical
    difficulties in apprehending suspects and collecting evidence without the support of the most powerful states.

    dfsd

    The goodwill created by the Obama administration’s decision to participate at the review conference could be quickly dissipated by an overly assertive American strategy, especially if critics successfully characterize the United States as obstructionist.

    The arrogance! bunch of children who will be thrilled the US shows up.

    Although U.S. negotiators could suggest specific changes to the text that would improve its viability as a criminal provision, this strategy is unlikely to succeed and could be counterproductive…. Offering alternative language may also create false expectations regarding U.S. support for aggression with an improved definition.

    dsds

    Rome Statute parties are evenly divided on the question of whether the consent of the alleged aggressor state is
    required to activate aggression jurisdiction.

    jflkjl

    [T]he United States must be clear that it will not support an outcome that allows the prosecutor to proceed with aggression prosecutions absent the consent of both parties involved and approval of the Security Council.

    dsaasd

    Nevertheless, given the inherently political nature of evaluating the use of force and the need to consider designations of aggression in the context of broader efforts to resolve conflicts and preserve stability, there is no viable substitute for Security Council primacy in making aggression determinations.

    fsdd

    The United States should make clear that if the state parties decide to activate the court’s jurisdiction over aggression without consensus (and by implication without addressing the most significant U.S. concerns), the likelihood that important nonparty states, including the United States, Russia, and China, will join the court will be greatly diminished.

    Concern troll…

    The United States should avoid obstructing the decisions of state parties on items of the review conference agenda where the United States lacks a national interest.

    At least it admits obstruction with the rest!

    Given the need for the United States to be active on the issue of aggression, and the opportunity to participate constructively in the stocktaking sessions, the delegation should remain neutral, or even voice support, on the remaining agenda items if they do not implicate significant U.S. interests.

    Again, patronizing…

    The United States is currently engaged in a noninternational armed conflict with al-Qaeda.

  • Eli Lake on the AUMF

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    Eli Lake has a fantastic essay at Reason.com on the myriad ways in which Obama has replicated the worst excesses of the Bush administration with regard to national security.  He rightly identifies the source of the problem — the AUMF, which was passed in a fit of hysteria three days after 9/11 and has no natural expiration date.  Here is the final paragraph:

    Above all, we must be honest with ourselves. Obama, like Bush, is committed to a long war against an amorphous network of terrorists. In at least the constitutional sense, he is no harder or softer than his predecessor. And like his predecessor, he has not come up with a plan for relinquishing these extraordinary powers once the long war ends, if it ever does. If change is going to come to U.S. policy on terrorism, it will have to come from a bipartisan recognition that Americans cannot trust their government to tell them when they are safe again.

    I am normally skeptical of claims that we need more bipartisanship, because in the present political climate they are normally code for “Democrats need to act more like Republicans.”  But there is definitely an elective affinity between progressives and libertarians concerning issues of (ever-expanding) executive power.  When Eli Lake and Glenn Greenwald are in substantial agreement about something, we ignore their views at our peril…

  • Call for Papers: Foucault and International Law

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    Our friends at the Leiden Journal of International Law — an exceptional journal — have asked us to post the following call for papers:

    Special Issue of the Leiden Journal of International Law (2011)

    Foucault and International Law

    Abstracts due by 12 May 2010; Complete articles by 17 September 2010

    The Leiden Journal of International Law is now soliciting articles for a special issue exploring the relevance of Foucault’s oeuvre to international law and legal theory. Apart from its merits for philosophy, political theory and sociology, the importance of Michel Foucault as a legal thinker (both as a thinker of law in his own right and as a thinker whose work can be illuminating for legal studies) is increasingly being felt. With the continuing translation and publication of Foucault’s lecture courses at the Collège de France and the ongoing importance of his already published work, Foucault’s work continues to provide fertile suggestions for rethinking many of our established notions of law, right(s), sovereignty and legal subjectivity. Yet to date there have been, with some notable exceptions, few sustained treatments of Foucault’s relevance to international law and international legal theory. This is the subject of Issue 2 of volume 24 (2011) of the Leiden Journal of International Law (LJIL).

    What is the relevance of Foucaultian methodologies (archaeology, genealogy, problematisation) to international law and international legal theory? What does a Foucaultian analytic of international law entail? How can we use it to analyse international legal subjectivity? How does that relate to, inter alia, sovereign statehood and/or human rights law? How can the Foucaultian toolbox contribute to our understanding of the devolution of international public law, its fragmentation and specialisation (e.g. as an instance of governmentality)? What about international law ‘from below’ (the relevance of Foucaultian models of power/resistance, anti-globalisation perspectives and critiques of neoliberalism and the global rule of law, for example). These questions are just a number of suggestions, intended as provocations for thought, within the general theme of ‘Foucault and International law’ we invite contributors to interrogate and critically engage with.

    Contributors will be asked to prepare an article of approximately 10,000 words (including footnotes) for publication in the LJIL, consistent with its instructions for authors. Those interested in contributing are requested to respond to this Call for Papers by email to managing editor Christine Tremblay (ljil [at] law [dot] leidenuniv [dot] nl) by 12 May 2010, attaching a 300-word abstract of the article you propose to contribute.

    The selected authors are requested to submit the full articles by 17 September 2010. All contributions will be subject to double-blind peer review in accordance with the usual procedures of the LJIL. Please contact the LJIL (guest) editors with any further questions: Tanja Aalberts (taalberts [at] fsw [dot] leidenuniv [dot] nl) and/or Ben Golder ([email protected]).

    The Leiden Journal of International Law is published with Cambridge University Press, and provides a forum for two vital areas, namely international legal theory and international dispute settlement. For further information, please visit the journal’s website: http://www.journals.cambridge.org/LJL

    It sounds like a fantastic special issue.  My second article, written when I was a grad student at the New School for Social Research, was on Foucault’s concepts of power, subjectification, and resistance.  Forgive the shameless self-promotion, but here is the cite for anyone interested in reading it: 79 SubStance 80 (1996).

  • Monitoring NGO Monitor — 18 Days and Counting

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    It’s been 18 days since I asked NGO Monitor to provide the same detailed accounting of their funding that they demand of the human-rights groups they so regularly malign and demonize.  Readers will be shocked — shocked! — to know that the organization has ignored my request, in keeping with its profoundly hypocritical approach to funding.

    In the meantime, of course, Gerald Steinberg continues to criticize others for doing precisely what NGO Monitor does:

    European democracies are spending tens of millions of euros, pounds and krona to manipulate Israeli society and politics. This largely hidden European money that funds so-called “civil society” organizations, like B’Tselem, Yesh Din, Ir Amim, the Public Committee Against Torture, Peace Now and dozens more, is undermining Jewish sovereignty and the right to determine our own future.

    The hypocrisy would be pathetic if it wasn’t so dangerous.  What is NGO Monitor hiding?  All we can do is speculate.

    Meanwhile, the clock continues to tick.

  • Some Thoughts on Eric Posner’s WSJ Editorial

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    Eric Posner has an editorial today in the Wall Street Journal today that uses the recent indictment of Judge Garzon in Spain as an opportunity to dust off the traditional far-right attack on the concept of universal jurisdiction and the existence of the ICC.  It’s a remarkably misleading editorial, one that deserves a thorough response.

    Mr. Garzon wanted to prosecute Pinochet in Spain for atrocities committed during his reign in Chile, despite the fact that Pinochet was a former head of state and had been granted amnesty as part of a deal that paved the way to democracy in his home country.

    Posner — here parroting Henry Kissinger’s famous 2001 essay — obviously knows very little about Chilean history.  Pinochet was not “granted” amnesty; he gave it to himself.  As the New York Times noted in 2006, “General Pinochet originally decreed the amnesty in April 1978, four and a half years after he seized power in the coup that overthrew an elected president, Salvador Allende.”  Nor did the amnesty “pave[] the way to democracy in his home country” — Pinochet’s military junta remained in power until 1990, twelve years after the amnesty was decreed.  That’s a long road.

    But don’t take it from me that the 1978 amnesty did not “pave the way” to democracy.  Listen to Michele Bachelet, the former President of Chile who was tortured by Pinochet in the infamous Villa Grimaldi in the 1970s.  From the same New York Times article: “‘This government, like other democratic governments before it, maintains that the amnesty was an illegitimate decision in its origins and content, form and foundation,’ Ms. Bachelet’s chief of staff, Paulina Veloso, said in an interview at the presidential palace here. ‘Our conviction is that it should never have been applied at all, and certainly should never be used again.’”  I guess Posner understands democracy in Chile better than the governments that were democratically elected after Pinochet was forced from power.

    In Belgium, complaints were famously lodged against Ariel Sharon in 2001 on account of his alleged involvement in massacres at Beirut refugee camps in 1982, and George H.W. Bush in 2003 for the bombing of a civilian air raid shelter during the first Gulf War. In the United Kingdom, an arrest warrant was recently issued against former Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni for her involvement in Israel’s recent intervention in Gaza. In Spain, investigations have been launched against Chinese, American and Israeli leaders.

    This is the typical right-wing move: invoke the few questionable uses of universal jurisdiction — and many of them were indeed questionable — to indict the concept itself.  But of course many prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction are neither politically motivated nor questionable.  More on that below.

    When [Pinochet] returned to Chile he received a hero’s welcome from his supporters.

    From his supporters?  Wow, what a surprise.  What Posner conveniently fails to mention — no doubt because it undermines his narrative of Judge Garzon frustrating the will of ordinary Chileans — is the reception that Pinochet received from everyone else when he returned in March 2000.  Thousands marched through Santiago to protest his return.  Chile’s Foreign Minister called his hero’s welcome “a disgrace,” and the President-elect, Ricardo Lagos, said it damaged Chile’s international image.  In May, less than two months later, the Court of Appeals in Santiago lifted Pinochet’s parliamentary immunity (self-servingly enacted by Congress to commemorate Pinochet’s return) in the infamous 1973 Caravan of Death case.  In August, the Supreme Court affirmed that decision.  In December, a judge indicted Pinochet for his involvement in the Caravan of Death.  Things got complicated after that, but it is fair to say that Pinochet’s legal situation got worse and worse over the next six years, until his death cheated his victims out of their day in court, Milosevic-style.

    It is no accident that Chilean courts did not take steps to hold Pinochet accountable for his crimes against the Chilean people until after Spain attempted to exercise universal jurisdiction over those crimes.  Posner implies that the Spanish prosecution was nothing more than Spain meddling in Chile’s internal affairs, but nothing could be further from the truth.  The lawyer behind the prosecution, Juan Garces, was Spanish, but he had written his dissertation at the Sorbonne on Chile’s economic and political system and was serving as one of Allende’s political advisors in Santiago when Pinochet deposed Allende in 1973.  Allende ordered Garces to leave the country so that someone would survive to “tell the story.”  When Garces and his colleagues first began to consider pursuing charges against Pinochet, they wanted to rely on Chilean courts.  They turned to Spain only when it became clear that there was no judicial will in Chile to strip Pinochet of the immunity he had granted himself.

    The Spanish prosecution, of course, never materialized.  But that does not mean that the efforts of Garces and his colleagues were in vain.  On the contrary, as a 1999 profile of Garces in Human Rights Brief noted, “the impact that the Pinochet case had on the Chilean judicial system is striking.  In particular, the case has helped the Chilean judiciary gain a greater degree of autonomy…. Until now, there has not been a tremendous outcry against the political influences in Chile that have restricted the judiciary’s ability to deliver substantive justice.  Today, however, there is a growing base of international and Chilean support for revising the Chilean judicial system.”  In other words — and this is what Posner fails to understand — the international attention created by the efforts to prosecute Pinochet in Spain helped Chile develop the will to do the job itself.

    All told, only a few dozen trials based on universal jurisdiction have taken place, mostly involving Rwandans and former Yugoslavs.

    So those prosecutions were bad things?  Even though they were not politically motivated, not controversial, were of great assistance to the ICTY and ICTR, and played an important role in the fight against impunity in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia?  I’m surprised Posner even mentioned these prosecutions, because they undermine his central thesis, which is that universal jurisdiction is an inherently bad idea.

    Universal jurisdiction arose centuries ago to give states a means for fighting pirates. In recent years, idealistic lawyers have tried to convert it into an all-purpose instrument for promoting international justice.

    By recent, Posner apparently means 1949.  After all, the Geneva Conventions require states — all of them, because the Conventions are universally ratified — to enact legislation that gives their domestic courts universal jurisdiction over grave breaches.  Universal jurisdiction also permitted Israel to prosecute Eichmann in 1961.  (Damn idealistic lawyers!)  And, of course, a variety of terrorism conventions rely on universal jurisdiction, such as those concerning aircraft hijacking and sabotage (1970 and 1971), crimes against internationally protected persons (1973), hostage taking (1979), theft of nuclear materials (1980), and crimes against maritime navigation (1988).

    But supporters of this law turned a blind eye to the diverse and often incompatible notions of justice that exist across countries. Everyone can agree to condemn arbitrary detention, for example, but in practice people disagree about what the term means.

    Terms like… torture?  Now we are getting to the real reason Posner opposes universal jurisdiction: it makes it more difficult for states like the US to ignore their international obligations.  The world thinks torture means what the Convention Against Torture says it means.  The US thinks it means whatever will allow the CIA to torture people.

    When Mr. Garzon indicted Pinochet, riots erupted in Chile. No matter, thundered the champions of international law: Let justice be done though the heavens fall. But when Mr. Garzon turned his sights on his own country, the gates of justice slammed shut. Spain’s establishment was not willing to risk unraveling its own transition to democracy, and rightly so. But then on what grounds should Spanish courts pass judgment on Chile?

    As for the riots, see above.  As for Posner’s supposedly rhetorical question, the answer isn’t what he thinks it is.  He thinks he is criticizing universal jurisdiction, but he has actually offered the most powerful defense of it — states don’t like to prosecute their own officials.  Spanish courts had grounds in 1998 to pass judgment on crimes committed by Pinochet because — thanks to Pinochet’s hand-tailored amnesty — Chilean courts couldn’t do it themselves.  And now that Spain’s government has decided it doesn’t want to expose its own bloody past to scrutiny, it behooves another state to do the job for them.

    Posner’s claim about Garzon threatening to unravel Spain’s “transition to democracy” is equally misguided.  How, exactly, would Garzon’s investigation into crimes committed between 1936 and 1951 do that?  Even if the 1977 amnesty was originally necessary for Spain’s democratization — which is far from clear — Spain has been a democracy for more than 30 years.  I think it could survive a few prosecutions for Franco-era crimes, especially given that Garzon’s investigation comes at a time “when public debate in Spain has recently begun to challenge the unwritten ‘pact of forgetting’ through which the country agreed to overlook the crimes of the Civil War era,” as indicated by the 2007 enactment of “a Historical Memory Law to recognise and broaden the rights of those who suffered persecution or violence for political, ideological or religious reasons during the Civil War and the Franco dictatorship.”

    The ICC’s small group of employees are supposed to pick and choose what to investigate among an infinite variety of international criminal activity all over the world. With limited resources, it must select only a few crimes for its attention. When domestic prosecutors make these choices, they rely on common values and must ultimately answer to the people. But because nothing like this exists at the global level, the ICC’s choices are inherently political.

    Now we transition, for some unknown reason, to the ICC.  This is the typical far-right critique of the ICC, but it gets no better no matter how many times it is repeated.  Domestic prosecutors “rely on common values and ultimately answer to the people”?  I seem to recall the Alberto Gonzalez era, when being a Democrat meant that you would be disqualified from being hired by the DOJ or end up prosecuted for imaginary crimes.  (Sorry, Mr. Siegelman.)  And, of course, the ICC prosecutor not only has to answer to the Pre-Trial Chamber (which is more than willing to cut him off at the knees; congratulations, Mr. Abu Garda), he can be removed by the Assembly of States Parties, which is far more democratic than, say, the U.S. Senate.

    It has so far launched a handful of investigations in weak African countries where terrible things have happened, and for its troubles is now regarded as a neocolonial institution. Yet if the ICC picks on a big country to show that this is not true it will be squashed like a bug.

    I actually agree with the first criticism — but it’s not the ICC’s fault that it is rhetorically effective to accuse it of neocolonialism.  And, of course, suggestions that the ICC is powerless to prosecute nationals of big (read: Western) countries only facilitates that rhetoric.

    Posner doesn’t bother to defend his claim that an ICC prosecution of a “big country” will cause it to be “squashed like a bug.”  Would Germany do that?  France?  The UK?  It’s doubtful.  What they would do, most likely, is prosecute their national themselves — serious prosecutions, not the kind that the U.S. reserves for its own war criminals.  And then, of course, the principle of complementarity would require the ICC to defer to them — which is exactly the point of complementarity.

    One cannot solve the perennial problem of “who will guard the guardians” by handing over authority to prosecutors and courts. But that is what the universal jurisdiction agenda boils down to. Mr. Garzon’s comeuppance should be a warning to those who place their faith in the ICC to right the world’s wrongs.

    I’m not exactly sure why Garzon’s “comeuppance” concerning universal jurisdiction should be a “warning” to a court that does not rely on universal jurisdiction.  I guess Posner’s point is that just as Spain has no business prosecuting other states’ crimes, the ICC doesn’t either.  In other words, unless a state prosecutes its own officials for committing crimes against its own citizens, nothing should be done.  Other states should just sit idly by, shrug their shoulders, and give pretty speeches about how the offending state should do better.

    It’s as if the past 60 years simply didn’t exist.

  • A Question for Koh Defenders

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    A simple question for those who believe “self-defense” and/or the AUMF authorizes the CIA to kill Americans abroad outside of armed conflict.  If Obama authorizes it, can the CIA put a bullet in the back of the skull of an American citizen believed to be affiliated with al-Qaeda while he is watching a movie in Topeka, Kansas?

    If not, why not?

  • Call for Papers: Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    UNTOLD STORIES: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS

    A two-day international symposium to uncover and explore some of the less well-known war crimes trials, both international and domestic.

    Melbourne Law School

    15th and 16th October 2010

    Presented by The Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law, Melbourne Law School, and supported by an Australian Research Council Discovery Project Grant

    Organizers: Gerry Simpson, Tim McCormack, Kevin Heller, Jennifer Balint

    CALL FOR PAPERS

    Deadline for Abstracts: 30th May 2010

    As international criminal law matures, there has been a return to history. Intriguing research agendas have focused on the origins of international criminal law in the repression of piracy or slave-trading and on the institutional innovations found at Versailles and The Hague. Meanwhile, familiar landmarks are being revisited in order to clarify ongoing doctrinal debates (aggression at Nuremberg, conspiracy at Tokyo, and so on). Alongside all of this is increased interest in less familiar war crimes trials, both international and domestic.

    The idea behind this symposium is to uncover and explore some of the less well-known – perhaps even obscure – war crimes trials. As an example, Kevin Heller, one of the organizers, will be presenting a paper on the twelve Nuremberg Military Tribunals held under Control Council Law No. 10. There will also likely be papers on the war crimes trials held in Bangladesh after the secession, on the recent genocide trial in Ethiopia, and on the post-war trials under Australian jurisdiction in the Far East.

    The symposium will be held over two days. We regret we cannot offer travel or accommodation expenses, but lunches and teas (morning and afternoon) will be provided. A speakers’ dinner will be held on the evening of the 15th and an informal dinner on the 16th for those who remain in town.

    In addition to the organizers, confirmed participants in the symposium include Mark Drumbl and Larry May. The organizers intend to publish the papers presented at the symposium as an edited book; Oxford University Press has indicated preliminary interest.

    If you are interested in presenting a paper at the symposium or contributing to the planned book, please send a 300-500 word abstract and a short C.V. no later than 30th May 2010 to Gerry Simpson c/o Cathy Hutton, Administrator, APCML (c [dot] hutton [at] unimelb [dot] edu [dot] au). Doctoral students are welcome to submit abstracts.

    Questions about the symposium can be directed to Kevin Heller (kheller [at] unimelb [dot] edu [dot] au)

  • An Unusual Setback for the New Jersey Nets

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    I rarely get to blog about the relationship between my two favorite things — professional basketball and international law — so I would be remiss if I failed to comment on the latest problem to afflict the New Jersey Nets, one of the worst teams in the NBA.  The Nets are in the process of being sold to Mikhail Prokhorov, a Russian billionaire.  As part of that process, the NBA conducted a “very extensive and stringent vetting process” regarding Prokhorov’s finances and concluded that “there was nothing that was disclosed that would cause [it] not to move forward with his application for Nets ownership.”

    Oops:

    A New Jersey congressman says he will demand a government inquiry into Mikhail Prokhorov, the Russian billionaire poised to buy the New Jersey Nets, for his extensive business dealings in Zimbabwe — a bombshell that could blow up the $200 million team deal and threaten the future of Brooklyn’s Atlantic Yards, The Post has learned.

    [snip]

    “This is disgusting,” Pascrell said. “Obviously, the Board of Governors of the NBA didn’t do their job properly when they vetted this deal.”

    He said the project received tax-exempt bonds.

    “It’s being financed partly by the taxpayer, and the public has a right to know,” he said.

    Prokhorov’s Renaissance Capital investment bank has interests in the Zimbabwean stock exchange, banks, a cellphone company, mining and a swanky, private big-game reserve. The company is intertwined with Onexim, the $25 billion Prokhorov-controlled investment fund behind the deal to bring the struggling NBA team to Brooklyn.

    Pascrell said he will ask the Treasury Department, which oversees the sanctions, to investigate Onexim. In 2008, Onexim became a 50 percent owner of Renaissance Capital, which has been actively investing in Zimbabwe since 2007.

    According to its Web site, Renaissance Capital has offices in Manhattan and was the financial sponsor of an economic forum in the Zimbabwean capital of Harare that provided foreign investors special access to government ministers in June 2009 — which experts say is a violation of the sanctions.

    I feel sorry for the Nets, but I won’t be sorry if the deal falls through because of Prokhorov’s ties to Mugabe’s regime.  Zimbabwe has never produced an NBA player, but many current players come from Africa — Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria (11!), Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania — and the NBA actively engages in outreach to the continent.  So it would be an insult to everything the NBA stands for to have one of its teams owned by a man who is propping up one of the world’s worst dictators.

  • Let’s Call Killing al-Awlaki What It Is — Murder

    by Kevin Jon Heller

    The Obama administration has been savagely criticized for authorizing the CIA to use lethal force against Anwar al-Awlaki, a US citizen who is allegedly a member of al-Qaeda in Yemen.  Glenn Greewald, for example, has described the decision — justifiably — as “unbelievably Orwellian and tyrannical.”  To this point, however, critics have ignored what I think is perhaps the most important point: An American who kills an American outside of the United States is guilty of murder.  Not political murder.  Not figurative murder.  Legal murder.

    18 USC 1119:

    (a) Definition.— In this section, “national of the United States” has the meaning stated in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(22)).

    (b) Offense.— A person who, being a national of the United States, kills or attempts to kill a national of the United States while such national is outside the United States but within the jurisdiction of another country shall be punished as provided under sections 1111, 1112, and 1113.

    The foreign-murder statute has to be the starting point of any analysis of the Obama adminstration’s decision to authorize the CIA to kill al-Awlaki.  If the CIA does kill him — and even if it doesn’t; see below — any CIA operative involved in the killing who is American is presumptively a murderer.  The only questions would be (1) whether for some reason 18 USC 1119 would not apply, or (2) whether the CIA operative would have a plausible defense if he was charged with murder in federal court.

    1. Does 18 USC 1119 Apply?

    There are three possible arguments as to why the foreign-murder statute would not apply.  The first is that, if al-Awlaki were killed on the battlefield — i.e., during an armed conflict — US criminal law, including 18 USC 1119, would be displaced by international humanitarian law (IHL).  That might be the case, for example, if an American CIA operative killed al-Awlaki in Afghanistan, which qualifies as an international armed conflict.  Even in such a situation, however, IHL would displace US criminal law only insofar as the CIA operative qualifed as a lawful combatant.  If he qualified as a lawful combatant, he would possess a combatant’s privilege to kill.  But if he did not qualify as a lawful combatant, he would not be privileged to kill and killing al-Awlaki could be prosecuted in federal court under US criminal law — under 18 USC 1119 in particular.

    Whether an American CIA operative would qualify as a lawful combatant in Afghanistan is a complex question.  I take it as a given that an operative who directly killed al-Awlaki, such as a CIA sniper, would not qualify as a lawful combatant.  I don’t know how many CIA field operatives who carry their arms openly and distinguish themselves from the civilian population.  The more difficult situation would be one in which a CIA operative killed al-Awlaki remotely, using a drone.  Personally, I don’t believe the issue of whether someone qualifies as a lawful combatant depends upon the weapon they use in combat. If the person who uses the weapon does not qualify as a lawful combatant, it should make no difference how high-tech his weapon is.  But I could be convinced otherwise.

    This argument, of course, depends upon the assumption that al-Awlaki would be killed in the context of an international armed conflict.  If he was killed outside of an international conflict — in Yemen, for example — IHL would not apply and thus would not displace US criminal law.  Which leads us to the second possible explanation of why 18 USC 1119 does not apply: because Obama has authorized the CIA to kill al-Awlaki.  That explanation seems implicit in much of the media’s coverage of the Obama administration’s decision; I have yet to see any reporter ask why Obama believes he has the legal authority to order Americans killed, given that 18 USC 1119 specifically criminalizes such killings.  The argument, however, is deeply problematic — and eerily reminiscent of debates over the Bush administration’s authorization of torture. The Bush administration argued that Bush had the authority as Commander-in-Chief to ignore the federal torture statute, 18 USC 2340; the Obama administration seems to now be arguing, albeit implicitly, that Obama has the authority as Commander-in-Chief to ignore the foreign-murder statute.  As Glenn constantly and rightly points out, progressives can’t have it both ways: if Bush could ignore the torture statute, Obama can ignore the foreign-murder statute; if Bush could not, Obama cannot.

    There is, finally, a third possible argument, one that was recently made by the Center for American Progress: namely, that the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) permits the CIA to kill al-Awlaki wherever he is found.  But that argument is no more convincing than the second argument: although Congress could repeal or amend 18 USC 1119, it cannot simply authorize the President to ignore the statute or authorize the CIA to violate it.  Again the torture analogy is apposite.  If the AUMF permits the President and the CIA to violate the foreign-murder statute, why did it not authorize the President and the CIA to violate the torture statute?  I don’t recall any progressive endorsing the latter argument, so why is a progressive organization like the Center for American progress endorsing the same argument now?

    2. Would a CIA Operative Have a Defense?

    The bottom line is that there is only one situation in which an American CIA operative who used lethal force against al-Awlaki would not violate 18 USC 1119 — on the battlefield while qualifying as a lawful combatant. (And note that Obama’s authorization means nothing in this situation; lawful battefield killings cannot be prosecuted under US criminal law regardless of whether they are “authorized.”  Combatant’s privilege is an inherent and essential part of IHL.)  In every other situation, the CIA operative would be guilty of murder under the foreign-murder statute.  The only question would be whether he would have a defense to that crime.

    There are, I think, three possibilities: self-defense, necessity, and mistake of law.  In terms of the first, we need to be careful not to elide the difference between “self-defense” as a justification for the use of force and “self-defense” as a criminal defense.   The former might permit the US to violate the sovereignty of the state in which al-Awlaki was killed by the CIA, which would otherwise be an act of aggression in violation of the UN Charter.  But it would not provide a CIA operative with a defense to murder in a criminal prosecution, just as “self-defense” does not provide a CIA interrogator — contra Yoo’s notorious 14 March 2003 torture memo — with a defense to torture.

    To be clear, that does not mean a CIA operative could not argue self-defense in a murder prosecution.  The defense would apply — but it would be governed by the normal requirements, most relevantly that the operative must have reasonably believed that lethal force was necessary to prevent the imminent use of deadly force.  The CIA operative would thus likely be entitled to the defense of self-defense only if he killed al-Awlaki to prevent an imminent attack by al-Qaeda; the defense would not justify the operative killing al-Awlaki at any other time.

    For similar reasons, it is unlikely that the CIA operative who killed al-Awlaki would be entitled to argue that the killing was necessary. To begin with, the Supreme Court has said that it is “an open question whether federal courts ever have authority to recognize a necessity defense not provided by statute.”  US v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop, 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001).  Moreover, even if they do, the necessity defense — like self-defense — requires a “clear and imminent danger,” which means that the CIA operative could only argue necessity if an attack by al-Qaeda was imminent.

    Finally, it is possible that the CIA operative could argue mistake of law.  Federal courts recognize a mistake of law defense when a government official “misleads a party as to the state of the law and that party proceeds to act on the misrepresentation,” as long as the party’s reliance on the misrepresentation is reasonable.  United States v. Nichols, 21 F.3d 1016, 1018 (10th Cir. 1994).  The reasonableness requirement would be critical if a CIA operative argued in a murder prosection that he had relied on Obama’s misrepresentation that it was lawful for him use lethal force against al-Awlaki.  A jury may well buy that argument that his reliance was reasonable, but I do not think they should.  Given the plain language of 18 USC 1119 and the fact that none of the recent (post-1998) terrorism-based relaxations of Executive Order 12333 contemplated the assassination of US citizens, I do not think it is reasonable to believe that the President of the United States can order the execution of an American citizen abroad simply because he has unilaterally decided that the citizen is a terrorist.

    Note also that those who authorized the CIA to kill al-Awlaki would be even less likely to have a legitimate mistake of law defense.  It is not simply criminal for an American to murder an American abroad.  It is equally criminal to solicit an American to murder an American abroad, to aid-and-abet an American to murder an American abroad, or to conspire with an American to murder an American abroad.  Obama and other high-ranking members of the administration involved in the decision to authorize al-Awlaki’s murder are thus potentially guilty of murder, as well.  Could Obama argue reasonable reliance on the OLC, which I presume has told him that he has legal right to authorize the CIA to kill al-Awlaki?  Perhaps, but I think the argument is much weaker for him than for the CIA operative who acts on Obama’s authorization.  And the OLC lawyers obviously could not rely on their own legal advice.

    Finally, although I think it’s clear that a CIA operative who uses lethal force against al-Awlaki is guilty of legal murder, it is important to acknowledge that there is — at least now — an insuperable procedural hurdle to prosecuting that operative under the foreign-murder statute.  Here is 18 USC 1119(c)(1):

    No prosecution may be instituted against any person under this section except upon the written approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or an Assistant Attorney General, which function of approving prosecutions may not be delegated. No prosecution shall be approved if prosecution has been previously undertaken by a foreign country for the same conduct.

    The Obama administration would never authorize the prosecution of a CIA operative who murdered al-Awlaki, much less one of its own lawyers or officials.  But who knows what the future will hold?  There is no statute of limitations for murder, so perhaps one day a genuine progressive will be elected President, someone who takes seriously the need to hold government officials accountable for their crimes — even those committed in the name of “fighting terrorism.”  In the interim, we need to constantly remind people that the criminal law is not optional, not something that can be cast aside every time the government decides it is too limiting.  And the best way to do that is to call the (potential) killing of al-Awlaki what it is — murder.