Author: Megan McArdle

  • The Benefits of Buying a House

    James Altucher has a lengthy column on why you should rent rather than buy.  Shorter version:  there are a lot of hidden costs, and outside of the bubble, housing has not historically been a great investment.  The phenomena that made it a great investment for some people (the emptying out and then filling up of cities, the introduction of self-amortizing mortgages, rising and then plummeting interest rates, and the special status of mortgage debt after 1986) will not indefinitely continue to push prices up; most of them have played out.  Over the long run, housing prices cannot grow much faster than incomes.

    I agree with all of this.  You should not buy a house because
    “renting is throwing your money away” or because you expect the house
    to become a cash cow.  As an investment, housing is a good form of
    forced savings, but do not expect price appreciation to make you
    rich–nay, not even if it made your parents and all your neighbors rich.

    But
    these articles, and the homeownership-skeptics (of which I am sort of
    one) often give short shrift to the benefits of owning.  Renting has
    hidden costs, too.  Outside of New York, with its massive stock of
    professional landlords hamstrung by restrictive rent rules, renting
    means you usually have to move every few years, because the landlord
    wants to live in the house again, or is selling it, or wants to raise
    the rent too much in the hope that you’ll be too lazy to move.  Moving
    costs a ton of money, between the movers (now that I’m getting old and
    creaky), the new furniture that is inevitably required, and the old
    furniture that cannot be fit into the new house and must be thrown
    away.  Moving also soaks up a month or so of your time on each side of
    the move, which needs to be factored in for both lost income and sheer
    misery.

    Then there is the inability to have your house the way
    you want it.  Sure, it’s not like we could afford high-end appliances. 
    But if we owned our house, I might be able to hope that someday we
    would acquire a water heater bigger than a thimble, rather than
    hopelessly resigning myself to shallow, lukewarm baths.  I might also
    be able to sink screws into the ceiling for a hanging potrack, install
    blackout curtains so that I could sleep later than 6 am in the summer,
    and otherwise make the house over more to my specifications.  But the
    owners are fond of their home the way it is, so it stays.

    For a
    long time, I didn’t care so much about this.  I liked the freedom
    renting gave me.  But once you’re committed to a city, and another
    person, that freedom starts looking overrated.



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  • Congressional Budget Office Says Dems Are Using Accounting Trick To Claim Medicare “Savings”

    “This bill will strengthen Medicare and extend the life of the program.”
    President Barack Obama, after the Senate health care bill secured 60 votes.

    The notion that the health care reform bill would make Medicare more solvent and also expand benefits never made any sense.  The health care reform bill makes cuts to Medicare, and uses them to pay for new spending; to the extent that we think we need to pay for, um, Medicare with cuts to Medicare, this bill actually weakens either the program, or our future budgets.

    I mostly ignored claims to the contrary because they seemed so self-evidently stupid.  But then this graphic started a-circulating among pundits who favored health care reform:

    wonkroomgraphic

    It’s from the Wonk Room blog at the Center for American Progress, and as you can see, it puts this claim up there front and central.  As you can see from the quote above, it’s not just an error made by one pundit.  As I recall, the claim was made more than once during the Senate debate, and of course, by our president in selling the bill.  The graphic was very widely distributed.

    Unfortunately, the CBO finally got around to ruling on this question, and no, this is not actually going to fix the Medicare budget problem; it’s an artifact of the way the government accounting is done.  

    The explanation is a little complicated, and I’m not sure how many of you want to go through it, but I’ll try my hand at a reasonably succinct explanation.  Basically, Medicare, like Social Security, has a “trust fund” (actually, more than one), which is supposed to fund it until the trust fund is exhausted in 2019.  The “trust fund” does not exist in any meaningful sense, because its “assets” consist of claims on the general fund, i.e. all the rest of the tax money.  As Medicare goes into deficit, it trades in those assets to cover its funding gap, which means the general fund has to find the money to pay off the special bonds by either raising taxes, cutting other spending, or borrowing more money.  After the trust fund is exhausted, the general fund has to find the money to pay for the Medicare deficit by either . . . raising taxes, cutting other spending, or borrowing more money.  The difference to taxpayers is nil.

    Technically, when you cut Medicare spending, that money shows up as an increase in the Medicare trust fund, rather than some other possible accounting entry.  But the effect on the unified budget is the same:  the money saved by cutting Medicare is spent on other stuff.  Whether Medicare is “calling bonds” or “demanding money to cover its deficit”, we still have to find exactly as much money to pay for Medicare as we did before.  Which is a lot of money.  One of the reasons the projected deficits for the rest of the decade are so big is that the cost of Medicare is outstripping the revenue raised by its payroll tax, and so we have to shovel in more and more money from the general fund.

    You can dedicate that money to paying for Medicare–but then you have to introduce a corresponding future liability on the general fund, in the amount of the Medicare savings.  That would mean that this bill would increase the deficit by hundreds of billions of dollars, rather than reducing it.

    Or as the CBO says:

    The key point is that the savings to the HI trust fund under the PPACA would be received by the government only once, so they cannot be set aside to pay for future Medicare spending and, at the same time, pay for current spending on other parts of the legislation or on other programs. Trust fund accounting shows the magnitude of the savings within the trust fund, and those savings indeed improve the solvency of that fund; however, that accounting ignores the burden that would be faced by the rest of the government later in redeeming the bonds held by the trust fund. Unified budget accounting shows that the majority of the HI trust fund savings would be used to pay for other spending under the PPACA and would not enhance the ability of the government to redeem the bonds credited to the trust fund to pay for future Medicare benefits. To describe the full amount of HI trust fund savings as both improving the government’s ability to pay future Medicare benefits and financing new spending outside of Medicare would essentially double-count a large share of those savings and thus overstate the improvement in the government’s fiscal position.

    It’s a little disappointing, really. At the rate that Democratic politicians were generating ever-more-spectacular budget savings from the same old set of health care proposals, I had expected our looming fiscal problems to be permanently resolved by this time next week.

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  • The Healthcare Bill Does Nothing To Solve The Looming Medicare-Induced Fiscal Crisis

    I am reliably insured by all the progressives in my Twitter feed and comment section that this bill will pay for itself.  Along with the CBO and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, I have my doubts.  But say it’s true.

    Now what?

    We still have a gigantic budget deficit pressing on us from Medicare.  Yes, you say you made serious Medicare cuts.  Then you turned around and spent that money on expanding coverage.  So the Medicare deficit, which will be $100 billion and growing in 2019, will still exist.  There will also be growth in the portion of Medicare that is currently paid for out of general revenue, putting further upward pressure on our deficits.  It’s impossible to say exactly how much that $100 billion will be growing every year, but $15-20 billion seems like a reasonable estimate, as least during the senescence of the Baby Boomers.

    This is why the argument that “If we can’t make these cost cuts, we can’t cut Medicare costs, so we’re doomed anyway” is such a silly, facile argument. “Medicare cuts” are not some undifferentiated substance, which one consumes or doesn’t as if they were cigarettes or baby carrots.  Medicare cuts range from easy to hard, and we just used up the easiest ones–cuts which, if you’ll notice, weren’t all that easy.  Doing this bill means it will be even harder in the future to cut Medicare, because the cuts we will have to make will almost definitionally mean deeper service cuts, and greater political controversy.  

    Now, perhaps this bill will “bend the curve” and lower the rate of healthcare inflation.  But as I understand it–the details of this bill are still emerging from the thicket of legislative language–the deepest cuts are still found by altering the growth formula for provider payments.  This is not curve bending, it’s haggling, and these are the sort of cuts which have so far proven the least able to withstand interest group pressure.

    So we aren’t done talking about healthcare.  We haven’t even really started.  Our budget problems loom as big as ever, and we just used up both political capital, and some of our stock of tax increases and spending cuts, to pay for something else.

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  • With Healthcare, Democrats Commit Unprecedented Act Of Political Suicide

    chris dodd

    So there’s now about a 90% chance that the health care bill will pass.

    At this point, the thing is more than a little inexplicable.  Democrats are on a political suicide mission; I’m not a particularly accurate prognosticator, but I think this makes it very likely that in 2010 they will lost several seats in the Senate–enough to make it damn hard to pass any more of their signature legislation–and will lose the house outright.  In the case of the House, you can attribute it to the fact that the leadership has safe seats.  But three out of four of the Democrats on the podium today are in serious danger of losing their seats.

    No bill this large has ever before passed on a straight party-line vote, or even anything close to a straight party-line vote.  No bill this unpopular has ever before passed on a straight party-line vote.  We’re in a new political world.  I’m not sure I understand it.

    The irony of this is that this bill is great for me personally.  I’m probably uninsurable, and I’m in a profession where most people now end up working for themselves at some point in their career. So mandatory community rating is great news for me and mine. But I think that it’s going to be a fiscal disaster for my country, because the spending cuts won’t be–can’t be–done the way they’re implemented in the bill.  We’ve just increased substantially the supply of unrepealable, unsustainable entitlements.  We’ve also, in my opinion, put ourselves on a road that leads eventually to less healthcare innovation, less healthcare improvement, and more dead people in the long run.  Obviously, progressives feel differently, and it will never be possible to prove the counterfactual. 

    So there you are.  Alea iacta est. I sure hope I’m wrong.

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  • Senators Forced To Fly Blind To Beat The Christmas Healthcare Deadline

    Max Baucus

    The Democrats desperately want to pass a health care bill through the Senate before Christmas, so that it can go through conference and be voted in early next year.  The Senate is saying they can do this.  Here’s what I don’t get:  what about the CBO score?

    Unless they actually just strip the bill back to the last version to get a full score, then they’ll be voting blind.  Maybe if that’s what Lieberman asks for, you can tack on something Stupak-like and get to 60 with an essentially unchanged score (for all the heat of the debate, the amount of money involved is trivial). 

    But is that exactly what Lieberman and Nelson are asking for?  We still don’t know what’s in this mythical deal.  If there are any material changes, it will simply not be possible to push this thing through the Senate before Christmas, at least not if you want to know what it’s going to cost.  Essentially, the amount of time it takes to work through a cloture vote means that they need to call for cloture on Thursday.  And while the CBO is a marvelously efficient organization, it does not actually whip through its work faster than a speeding bullet.  Estimating the effect of any changes is simply going to take time.

    Is the Senate willing to vote without a score?  As someone recently remarked to me, “Kent Conrad doesn’t go to the bathroom without a CBO score”.  Claire McCaskill has indicated she’s unwilling to vote until she sees a good score.  And I don’t think they’re the only ones.  The CBO just wasted five days scoring The Deal that Wasn’t. 

    If that’s the case, I just don’t see how you get to a cloture motion by Thursday.  They’re still debating amendments.  And if I were a moderate Senator who doesn’t really want to face voters having voted for this thing, I think the one thing I’d be asking for right now is some material changes from Baucus Lite, to slow it down and hope it dies of terminally bad poll numbers and progressive outrage in the New Year.

    Of course, Reid has pulled off difficult votes before.  On the other hand, he’s also slipped a lot of deadlines.  I suppose we’ll find out soon, either way.

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  • It’s Not Just Lieberman: Several Democrats Are Freaked Out About Healthcare Reform Passing

    This was the topic of hot discussion in the McSuderman household this morning.  If Lieberman really wants health care reform but is (as he is supposed to, I reluctantly concede) protecting his state’s insurance interests, then all the progressives need to do is say “Give us the list!  Whatever you want, you can have it!” The problem is that

    a) Reid’s apparently seriously pissed off and not acting particularly rationally
    b) Lieberman already knows he’s going to lose his committees the minute the Democrats don’t need him next year and
    c) Since it’s not clear that he actually wants anything to pass, there’s a serious worry that he’ll just dance away and make more demands.

    But it’s not just Lieberman.  I doubt Blanche Lincoln actually wants to vote for this thing, but she needs the party for reelection help in a tough race coming up, so she’s perfectly willing to let Nelson and Lieberman kill it if they can.  If they get on board, I suspect that Lincoln might develop sudden last minute doubts.  I’m not sure Landrieu wouldn’t as well.  Conservative Democrats facing tough reelections do not actually want to have to go on record as voting either before or against this.

    Lieberman is in some ways in the easiest position–the party is not helping him get reelected, and he’s going to lose his committees eventually anyway, because everyone’s mad at him.  So the other weak sisters are willing to let him take the lead.  But if he gives in, will they go along, or will they just find their own reasons for saying no?

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  • Should The Fed Pop These Wild Asset Bubbles?

    Yesterday, I mentioned one criticism of Bernanke’s tenure as Federal Reserve chief — that he isn’t focusing enough on curbing unemployment. Another common one is that he (and his predecessor) failed to pop the real estate bubble before it grew too large. Didn’t some of those brilliant economists at the Fed fear that a gigantic housing bubble was forming? Should they have taken the initiative to pop it before it grew large enough to bring about a massive financial crisis?

    These questions were asked to Wall Street Journal economics editor David Wessel in an interview with the Big Think as part of its special series on the financial crisis called “What Went Wrong?” The series consists of several weeks of interviews of figures in the financial industry.

    In answering a question about how the Fed failed to see the housing bubble, Wessel touches on the broader question of how it should act when it notices a bubble forming:

    I think that when you go back and look at what was going on inside the Fed, there were people who warned that this was a housing bubble. But, they were not convincing and the reigning view at the Fed was, even if it is a bubble, we shouldn’t interfere with it. We should let the markets do their thing and if it bursts, it will be as Bernanke and Paulson said in late 2007 even, it’ll be contained. And they were comforted by the fact that when the tech stock bubble had burst earlier in the 2000’s, it had done a lot of damage to people who had bought a lot of internet stocks, but it hadn’t really done a lot of damage, lasting damage, to the economy. And so they looked at it as they looked at that. So, it was not only a failure of analysis, it was failure of ideology in the best sense, a world view that led them to believe that even if there was a housing bubble, they shouldn’t do anything.

    Of course Bernanke and everyone else who was taken seriously at the Fed were wrong that a housing bubble wouldn’t be that big of a deal. But I think Wessel’s point about what the Fed learned form the tech bubble misses something. I believe it goes beyond the Fed’s observation that the tech bubble did not causing much lasting economic destruction.

    In fact, the Fed played a part in popping the internet bubble. Consequently, many blamed the Former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan for causing the recession that followed. And the anger in the market that resulted from that action might have been what prevented the Fed from treating the real estate bubble far less aggressively. I don’t think the “failure of ideology” was based on theory or principle, but on appeasing the market. (See the end of this post for additional analysis of these two bubbles and the Fed’s actions.)

    But really, there was an even graver problem here: ideology might have been trumped if the Fed’s analysis was better. An industry specific equity bubble is fundamentally different from a housing bubble — not realizing that was its “failure of analysis.” For starters, all investors know growth stocks contain a lot of risk, but real estate was historically touted as the safest of assets, almost never decreasing in value. There also wasn’t a trillion dollar asset-backed market based on tech stocks, with its highly-rated bonds having complex structures that investors didn’t fully grasp.

    When tech stocks went bad, investors lost money, some dotcom’s failed, and that was it. It didn’t really affect Main Street. But you can’t get much more Main Street than houses. Yet, Wall Street was even more deeply entrenched due to mortgage-backed securities and other structured products. And then investors panicked, because they didn’t understand those assets or know how much of banks’ portfolios were bad from toxic securities. That’s why a housing bubble turned out to be far more dangerous than a sector-specific equity bubble.

    Clearly, the Fed miscalculated just how interconnected the housing market was and the kind of fallout that would result when prices declined nationally by over 30%. But that’s a justified correction, given how irrationally home values had risen. The Fed should have behaved like it did with the tech bubble, and prevented the housing bubbles from inflating as soon as home prices were clearly increasing far more rapidly than history has proven to be reasonable. Unfortunately, I think the Fed was uncomfortable doing so, because it did not want to be held responsible for causing another recession. In the retrospect a little recession in 2005 would have been quite a bit less painful than a financial crisis three years later. Of course, hindsight is always 20-20.

    Additional analysis of the two bubbles:

    In mid-1999, the Federal Reserve began slowly raising the Federal Funds Rate as the internet bubble inflated. Eight months later, the internet bubble began to pop. At that time the Fed continued raising rates another point from 5.5% to 6.5%, where it left it for six more months. During that time period, the Nasdaq lost over 50% of its value. The diagram below shows this:

    fed funds v nasdaq tech bubble.PNG

    Of course, many people were quite angry with the Fed. Some blamed Former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan for causing the recession that followed. Let’s compare what happened with the tech bubble and the housing bubble. Here’s a similar graph with S&P/Case-Shiller’s U.S. national housing price index versus the Federal Funds Rate:

    fed funds v home prices bubble.PNG

    (I apologize for the smoothness of the Fed Funds curve — it should be a step function. But since the housing index was only quarterly, I couldn’t get it any more exact in Excel.)

    As you can see, the housing bubble was allowed to take off to a far greater extent than the internet bubble did. From Q1-2002 through Q2-2004, the Fed was decreasing the rate or leaving it constant. Meanwhile, the index shows housing values having increased by 30% over that period — in just nine months. For the next six months rates increased, but still remained relatively low, not to exceed 4% until December 2005 — as the index increased an additional 22%. But as the internet bubble grew in 1999 through mid-2000, rates started at 4.75% and increased to 6%, then left at 6.5% for six months even after the tech market’s collapse.

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  • Paul Krugman’s Emergency Jobs Program Will Never Work

    This guest post originally appeared at TheAtlantic.com

    Paul Krugman and I seem to agree that the worst part of a recession is unemployment.  Losing value in your 401(k) is terrible, but not, for most people, catastrophic.  Losing your business or your job, on the other hand, is wretched, particularly when there are six job hunters for every job opening.

    Where we differ is that Krugman doesn’t understand why the administration has not made creating jobs a top priority.  He wants transfers to state and local governments, a tax credit for increasing payrolls, and a WPA-style jobs program.  Other bloggers have attacked the first two; I’ll just say that I’m skeptical that a temporary tax credit will induce strained businesses to take on significant new operating costs.  But I want to talk about the jobs program, because it’s a superficially compelling idea that just won’t work.

    I don’t say this because I necessarily think it’s a bad idea.  During an employment slump as deep as ours, there are some compelling reasons to support the creation of temporary, low paid public jobs as an alternative to collecting unemployment.  There are risks, since someone doing a low-paid temporary job has less time to seek more fitting permanent employment.  But the risks are not so large that I would be unwilling to try such a program in the face of 10% unemployment.  Unfortunately, all this is entirely academic, because the federal government cannot create something akin to the CCC or the WPA on the time frame that would help the people who are suffering now.

    For one thing, there are powerful public sector unions, who are going to fiercely resist any attempt to create low paid temporary jobs that could be done by well paid government workers who have excellent benefits and job security.  I doubt the Republicans would be willing to take this one on (or well disposed to a New WPA).  But with Democrats in control, this is pretty much a fatal objection.

    Even if you could surmount union opposition, the federal government has an ever-increasing thicket of red tape that makes such a thing impractical.  It takes months to get hired for a job with the federal government.  It takes months to ramp up a new program.  By the time you’d gotten your NWPA through Congress over strenuous union objections, appointed someone to head it, set up the funding and hiring procedures, and actually hired people, it would be 2011.  Maybe 2012.  Perhaps you could waive all the civil service and associated procedure surrounding federal hiring, but I don’t see how.

    My father was the head of a trade association for the heavy construction industry, and most of my closest relatives either work for the government, or have done so in the past.  As you can imagine, over my lifetime I’ve had a lot of conversations about government procedure and government projects.  Every so often I’ll read some description of a project out of the olden days–the battle against malaria in Panama, the handling of the Great Mississippi Flood, or the creation of the WPA–and just marvel at how fast everything used to be.  The WPA was authorized in April of 1935.  By December, it was employing 3.5 million people.   The Hoover Dam took 16 years from the time it was first proposed, to completion; eight years, if you start counting from the time it passed Congress. 

    Contrast this with a current, comparatively trivial project: it has been seventeen years since the Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor was established by USDOT, and we should have a Record of Decision on the Tier II environmental impact statement no later than 2010.  This for something that runs along existing rail rights of way, and in fact, uses currently operating track in many places.

    I imagine this all sounds like a nattering nabob of negativity.  If there are procedural hurdles to jobs programs and high speed rail, we should challenge them, not resign ourselves to subpar policy!  

    Look, I may be skeptical that health care reform will be a net positive, but I do concede there’s some chance I’m wrong (and I will be glad if it is so).  But this is not merely unlikely; is is the next nearest thing to impossible, short of armed revolution.  Many of the procedural hurdles involve court rulings, concerning law which Congress cannot overturn in some cases (due process), or isn’t going to (civil rights legislation, civil service protections).  The obstacles arise out of things that individually, people, specifically Democrats, like: transparency, due process, environmental care, civil rights, unionism.  Cumulatively, they are devastating to federal productivity.  But it’s hard to get much support for repealing or altering them individually–which is what you would have to do.  Philip Howard has built a second career out of railing against the steady trend towards hyperproceduralism, of which this is a small part.

    So in this case, I think we’re better off looking for second best: things that the government can enact and implement relatively quickly.  More generous unemployment benefits, and further temporary extensions of the period for which you can collect them.  Other forms of cash and quasi-cash assistance to struggling families, like food stamps.  Payroll tax holidays.  These may not be optimal, but they are things that Congress can actually get going almost immediately, putting cash in the hands of people who are suffering.

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  • Why Black Friday Data Points To A Grim Holiday Season

    From TheAtlantic.com…

    If you were counting on what Glenn Reynolds calls “the retail support brigade” to come riding over the hills, you might want to rethink. After last year turned in one of the worst holiday shopping seasons in decades, people were hoping that things might perk up this year, but Black Friday’s results don’t look too good for retailers.  Sales were up a paltry 0.5% from last year, and that only because a lot more people came out bargain-hunting.

    Sales on the day after Thanksgiving rose just 0.5% to $10.66 billion, according to ShopperTrak RCT Corp., a research firm that monitors sales at more than 50,000 stores. That compared with a 3% year-over-year Black Friday increase in 2008 and an 8.3% surge in 2007.

    “It’s a positive sign that we had an increase in sales, but the numbers certainly don’t indicate that those will be sustained,” said Britt Beemer, chairman of consumer behavior firm America’s Research Group.

    Nationwide, 195 million shoppers visited stores and websites over the four-day weekend, up from 172 million last year, the National Retail Federation said Sunday.

    It’s too early to be certain, of course, but to me this points to a brutal trend:  everyone is looking for bargains, and refusing to buy anything else.  That means that profit margins are likely to be thin, and even with aggressive discounting, retailers may not be able to drive much volume. 

    What’s bad for retailers may be good for us, of course.  The amount of consumer credit outstanding has fallen pretty dramatically, but because of the buying binge we were on, it’s still kinda high, as is the ratio of debt service payments to income.  On the other hand, many of us are retailers, or work for them, or for companies that sell all the things that Americans aren’t buying.  The contraction is probably necessary.  But it is not going to be pleasant.

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