Author: Patrick Chovanec

  • It’s Official, The Chinese Have Got The Gold Bug Now

    China Gold

    In a previous post, I mentioned a CCTV News report that China is seeing a recent surge of gold buying, as local investors nervous over a possible property bubble look for an alternative place to stash their cash.  Here are the links to that report, both in text and video form.  You can also watch my comments on the report here.

    According to CCTV, sales of gold for the May Day holiday in Beijing are up 70% over last year, and that sales of gold bars has doubled.  It notes that May is a popular season for weddings, which makes it a peak gold-buying period, but attributes this year’s increase to jitters over property prices:

    Mr. Zhang had planned to invest his money in the property market. But on second thought, he changed his mind . . . [Zhang] said, “The recent measures have been reining in tightly. So I changed my investment plan. I believe the gold market is more stable. It could also avoid investment risks and prevent the threat of the inflation.”

    Another CCTV report this Tuesday suggests the shift towards gold is not limited to Beijingers, but also includes investors from Wenzhou, a southeast coastal city famous for its itinerant entrepreneurs:

    Housing speculators from Wenzhou City in southeastern China are switching their money from property into gold following government restrictions on the real estate market  Tao Xingyi, president of Beijing-based Jinding Group, a company specializing in high-end gold trading and investment, said the company’s customers have increased by 300 — 400 percent recently . . . Tao said that within one month, three groups of Wenzhou investors made purchases of gold from his company worth more than 10 million yuan.

    I have no way of verifying these reports, but as I mentioned in my televised comments, I find it very interesting given the analogy I’ve always drawn between the way Chinese invest in empty apartments as a “store of value” and investment in non-productive assets like gold.  So it might very well make sense that, if they are no longer so certain stockpiled real estate will act as a reliable store of value, they would opt for gold as an attractive alternative.

    I was back on CCTV’s BizAsia program on Tuesday, talking about three topics: 

    • the reason investors continued to hammer the Euro this week, and why the crisis in Europe is taking such a toll on Asian markets;
    • interpreting the latest news that China has increased its holdings of US Treasuries;
    • what effect are the government’s recent cooling measures having on China’s property markets, and what further actions can we expect to see?

    You can watch a mini-clip of my comments on China’s US Treasury holdings here.  For the others, you’ll have to check out the video of the complete program here.

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  • It’s Not Just The City: There’s A Bubble In China’s Boonies Too

    china peasants(This is a guest post from the author’s blog.)

    One of the big debates among China real estate watchers is whether the country’s apparent property bubble  – characterized by frenzied purchase prices, low occupancy rates, and slumping rents — is restricted purely to premier cities like Beijing and Shanghai, or extends to 2nd and 3rd tier cities as well.  I’ve heard experts insist that it’s purely a top-tier phenomenon, but the evidence of my eyes and ears tells me that similar market dynamics have taking hold all across China.  An article earlier this week in the Los Angeles Times provides some evidence that I’m right.

    I’m briefly quoted in the article, mentioning how dependent local governments have become on property sales as a source of revenue (up to 40%, according to one central government study), which gives them every incentive to keep markets bubbling.  But my little tidbit aside, the article is well worth reading for its account of conditions in Hefei, a 3rd tier city that serves as the capital of Anhui province.

    When the author, Beijing-based reporter David Pierson, first called me up and asked about real estate speculation in 2nd and 3rd tier cities, Hefei was one of the first names off the tip of my tongue.  Before 1949, Hefei was a small market town, and even just a couple years ago, it was a pretty dusty, unassuming place.  Anhui province belongs to what I call (in my Nine Nations of China framework) The Crossroads, a largely rural region along the middle Yangtze River that supplies many of China’s migrant workers.  I’ve spent some time in Hefei on business, and I’ve been astounded at the colossal development taking place around its airport.  While impressive in both scale and grandiosity, it just didn’t make sense to me, and was actually one of the first things that got me thinking seriously about the prospect of a property bubble in China.

    It just so happened that David had just returned from Hefei, and that the frenetic real estate market there formed the basis for his story.  Noting that average housing prices in Hefei soared 50% last year, he describes the scene:

    Taxi drivers boast of owning multiple flats for investment. Billboards hawk developments with names such as Villa Glorious and Rich Country. Frenzied crowds pack sales events with bags of cash, buying units that exist only on blueprints …

    While pricey by local standards, [prices at $120,000 per apartment are] still a fraction of what homes cost in the capital. That’s why buyers continue to pour in from across the region, accumulating apartments as a hedge against inflation in a nation where there are few investment alternatives. More residential units were sold here the first three months of 2010 than in Beijing or Shanghai — cities four times the size of Hefei . . .

    About 15% of the city’s residents are now estimated to be construction workers . . . One of the most popular radio programs here is an afternoon talk show called “Blossom Real Estate.” Some prospective buyers get half a dozen text messages a day on their cellphones from developers advertising new properties . . . “Everyone in Hefei lives with the real estate industry,” said Guo Hongbing, a marketing consultant for several developers. “You can’t escape it.”

    Note several familiar trends I’ve been mentioning all along:  people (many of them from out of town) buying multiple apartments they have no intention of occupying; funds channeled into real estate due to lack of investment alternatives; a property market that far outstrips the local economy in size and energy; reliance on construction as a source of jobs; and buyer psychology approaching obsession.  In particular, David observes the same low occupancy rates that caught my attention in the first place:

    All the properties had been sold, and Guo was interested in estimating how many were left empty by investors. His unscientific method? Looking for curtains.

    “See, less than half that building is occupied,” he said, pointing to one block with several bare windows. “These speculators want to buy as many as possible.”

     So is China’s property bubble limited to Beijing and Shanghai?  One Chinese economist weighs in:

    “The situation in Hefei is a symbol of the craziness in China’s real estate market,” said Cao Jianhai, a professor of economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a government think tank. “Prices in second- and third-tier cities are increasing more dramatically than in the first tier. It’s very dangerous, and it puts local banks at risk.”

    For those who are interested in my take on the Chinese government’s efforts to cool down all this excitement, and whether they will prove effective or not, you may want to check out this syndicated AFP article that quoted me earlier this week.  One of the government’s main objectives, I note, is simply to signal its intent:

    “The government is sending out signals that it is not going to keep this party going and that has made people more cautious,” said Patrick Chovanec, an economics professor at Tsinghua University.

    But in a comment that didn’t make it into the article, I worried that while investors are getting jittery about prominent markets like Beijing and Shanghai, rather than exiting real estate altogether, they may just be shifting their focus to 2nd and 3rd tier cities.  As for the practical effect of some of the government’s more piecemeal measures (such as requiring higher down-payments on mortgages), I have my doubts:

    Chovanec warned the measures aimed at curbing speculative activity could miss their target because about 50 percent of residential purchases were paid for in cash.

    “Most of the people paying cash are buying their second, third, fourth or fifth unit to hold idle as a place to stash their cash,” he said.

    A holding tax on vacant properties and increased investment options for Chinese people would be more effective in curbing prices, Chovanec said.

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  • Two Reasons China’s 12% GDP Growth Is Bunk

    china angels(This is a guest post from the author’s blog.)

    Yesterday, China announced that its economy’s GDP grew at an annual rate of 11.9% in the first quarter (January-March) of 2010.  It’s a number that’s sure turn envious heads in the West, and cause people to wonder whether there are any heights that the Chinese economy won’t reach.  Soon after the GDP figures were released, I was interviewed on CCTV-9’s nationwide news program, to offer some perspective.  You can watch the interview here (the link is to the entire 1-hour news show, my portion begins at the 39-minute mark).

    The question, I cautioned, isn’t whether China can produce spectacular GDP growth figures, even in the face of a global slowdown – it already proved that last year.  The question is how sustainable that growth will be.  And in this respect, there are two main concerns.

    The first is that a large chunk of China’s GDP is coming from investment in fixed assets such as factories, real estate projects, and infrastructure (in 2009, fixed asset investment accounted for 90% of China’s net GDP growth).  GDP only measures how much is being invested, but not the return on those investments, i.e., whether they are good or bad.  Given how much has been invested so quickly, there’s a lot of concern that many of these investments will prove to be poor ones, the cost of which could come back to haunt China’s economy.  This is similar to a point I made in post last year on China’s ”quality of GDP”.

    The second concern is inflation.  To the extent that China’s fast-paced growth is being fueled by easy credit and money creation (China’s money supply expanded by 1/3 in 2009, and is up 22% over 1Q last year), it could be inflationary.  Consumer inflation is running at 2.4%.  That already exceeds the regulated deposit rate of 2%, which means that Chinese savers are effectively losing money by keeping it in the bank.  But a lot of economists are wondering why the inflation rate isn’t even higher.  I think there is very high inflation out there, in the form of asset inflation in real estate and the stock market, where a lot of that cheap credit has been channeled — it just hasn’t worked its way through the rest of the economy yet.  (The fact that China’s central bank has to constantly strive to counteract the inflationary effect of the new RMB it is forced to issue to maintain the US dollar peg isn’t helping, either).

    These two worries — bad investments and inflation — mean that China’s sky-high GDP growth is not necessarily as good news as it might seem.  The headline number may be impressive, but it could come with a steep price tag.

    On a separate but related note, AFP ran a story yesterday on how a stronger RMB might impact China’s exporters.  Near the end, it quoted me and an RBS economist both noting that while a weak RMB may be good for exporters, it might not be so good for China’s economy as a whole:

    Economists say a strong yuan is essential if China wants to achieve its goal of reducing its heavy reliance on exports and boosting private consumption as a driver of the world’s third-largest economy.

    “Exporters will suffer from a stronger currency,” said Ben Simpfendorfer, an economist at Royal Bank of Scotland in Hong Kong.

    “But currency appreciation will also force the pace of structural adjustment in the low value-added export sector, which is a necessary part of domestic rebalancing.”

    The exchange rate policy has propped up poor performing exporters at the expense of the broader economy, said Patrick Chovanec, an economics professor at Tsinghua University in Beijing. “It’s important to ask why exporters are currently doing well or remaining in business. Many of them can only do so because they’re able to exchange the dollars they earn for yuan at the peg,” Chovanec told AFP.

    “That’s great for exporters but the central bank has to buy all those dollars at the peg, invest them, and neutralize the inflationary effect. That’s a significant burden.”

    I’ve mentioned several times on this blog that while I do not believe strengthening the RMB is a “silver bullet” for resolving the trade imbalance between China and the US, I do think it’s in China’s long-term interests to move towards a more flexible exchange rate, and that a stronger RMB — if it is part of a comprehensive economic strategy — could bring substantial benefits as well as short-term pain to China.

    On the question of whether China’s March trade deficit signifies a trend toward real economic restructuring and more balanced trade or merely a “blip on the radar screen” — a subject I raised in my last post – I highly recommend checking out Rachel Ziemba’s latest post at Nouriel Roubini’s website.  She’s asking many of the same questions I am.

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  • Why China’s March Trade Deficit Means Nothing

    zhou china chinese(This is a guest post from the author’s blog.)

    Today I was on Al-Jazeera, responding to questions about China’s latest announcement that it ran a $7.2 billion trade deficit for the month of March — its first in six years.  This is essentially what I had to say:

    Today’s news must strike people as surprising, given all they’ve heard about China running chronic trade surpluses.  But you need to put it in context.  China’s exports every year are highly seasonal — they peak in the fall, when Christmas orders are being shipped, and drop in the spring.  So China’s trade surplus usually declines in the spring, and it’s not unprecedented for it to run a one-month deficit even in a year when it ends up running a sizeable trade surplus.  
     
    What tipped this month’s figure from a marginal surplus to a deficit was a surge in imports, up 66% from last year.  But it going to be important to drill down and take a closer look at exactly what’s making up those imports.  If they are finished consumer goods, then it could be a sign of rising consumption in China and a shift towards more balanced trade.  But if they consist mainly of raw materials, as many economists suspect, it could indicate that Chinese manufacturers are gearing up for a surge in exports later this year (a phenomenon compounded by rising commodity prices for inputs like iron ore and crude oil, in part due to rising Chinese demand).

    The key question is, is this a trend or a cycle?  Is it a trend towards higher domestic consumption and more balanced trade, or part of a production cycle that leads right back to where we started?  I’m not convinced yet this is a trend.

    There’s a lot of speculation that China may use news of this month’s trade deficit to fend off US pressure to strengthen the RMB, arguing that it is making progress in restructuring its economy and boosting domestic demand.  But if this is part of a cycle, as many suspect, and China goes right back to running trade surpluses in a month or so, that argument’s not going to have much staying power.  That’s probably why even Chen Deming, China’s Minister of Commerce (who has been very vocal these past few weeks about the damage a stronger RMB could do to exporters) is being careful not to overplay the news, describing the March trade deficit as “a blip on the radar screen” that may soon be reversed.

    The key thing to watch, regarding China’s willingness to strengthen the RMB, is the recovery of China’s exports.  They’re up just over 20% from last year, but that’s just barely back to the level they were at before the global financial crisis struck.  With Chinese exporters already struggling, China’s leaders have been reluctant to hit them with a “double whammy” in the form of a less competitive currency.  If exports continue their recovery, though, that will give the Chinese a lot more comfort in moving towards a more flexible exchange rate.

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  • Here’s What You Need To Know About The Devastating Drought In China’s Shangri-La Region

    (This guest post previously appeared at the author’s blog)

    Rare is the year that goes by without reports of a flood or drought somewhere in China.  But without a more specific sense of place and context, it’s hard to evaluate the significance of such calamities, or their impact on business and the economy.  The “Nine Nations of China” framework can often be helpful in getting a handle on the situation. 

    The part of China most often afflicted by both flood and drought is the Yellow Land, an arid, densely populated region dependent on the turgid and unpredictable Yellow River for its water supply.  The news these past few weeks, however, has been dominated by reports of a devastating drought affecting an entirely different area, the southwest provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi — the region I call “Shangri-La.”  Those who have read my description of Shangri-La may recall my mentioning, among its key resources, its plentiful supplies of water.  Normally that’s true, but this year is different. 

    According to news reports, Shangri-La has gotten barely a drop of rain since September — over seven months.  It’s worth keeping in mind, of course, that even in normal years, China is not like temperate regions in Europe or North America, which receive relatively even rainfall all year round.  All of China, the north as well as the south, is affected by the monsoon, with a rainy season (the summer) and a dry season (the winter and spring).  For instance, the city of Kunming, in the center of Shangri-La’s drought zone, averages more than 8 inches (20cm) of rain in July and August — as much as a tropical rainforest.  Even in the winter, though, it typically gets at least half an inch a month, and 3-4 inches per month in the fall.  Yunnan province’s name, which means “south of the clouds,” reflects the region’s reputation for having a moist, misty climate throughout the year. 

    Although some have been quick to blame this year’s drought on global warming, imperial records indicate that normally lush Shangri-La has, in fact, suffered severe droughts periodically throughout history (76 out of the 691 years from 1300 to 1991, to be precise).  Though rare — or perhaps because they are so rare — these periods can wreak havoc on the region’s fragile economy. 

    drought dead dry china bullShangri-La is the poorest of China’s “nine nations,” and highly dependent on the crops it can grow in its usually nourishing environment.  400 cities, with over 20 million people, are already facing shortages of drinking water.  But that’s merely an inconvenience, compared to the effect on farmers.  Over 11 million livestock are going thirsty.  The region’s tobacco crop (it’s main source of cash) and corn crop (it’s main source of subsistence) are planted in May – before the monsoon – but that may prove impossible this year.  Almost 5 million hectares are affected.  Farmers who can’t plant crops may have to migrate to find jobs to support their families.

    The drought is already having an effect on some of Shangri-La’s other important cash crops.  China’s rubber industry, based in southern Yunnan, has virtually ceased production due to water shortages.  Thailand, the world’s largest rubber exporter, which lies downstream and receives its water from Shangri-La’s rivers, is also severely affected.  As a result, Bloomberg reported Monday that global rubber prices have hit a 20-month high.  Chinese tire makers, mainly located in the Back Door and the Metropolis, are seeing their margins evaporate.  Already hit hard by U.S. tariffs, they face rubber prices that have risen to $3,633 per ton, more than double the price at the beginning of this year, and have been forced to start raising their own prices. 

    The flower business has also been hit hard.  As I’ve noted in the past, Shangri-La is a major producer of fresh cut flowers, its #2 export after tobacco.  Yunnan alone supplies over 80% of China’s flowers.  This year, about 31,000 hectares, over 80% of Yunnan’s flower fields, are short of irrigation, hurting both quantity and quality of flowers produced, and causing $125 million in direct economic losses to the sector.  Tens of thousands of small farmers in certain districts, like Chenggong County outside of Kunming, depend entirely on planting flowers for their income.  “This is the first time the flower industry in Yunnan has suffered such a big blow,” according to Li Ban, manager of the Dounan Flower Market, Asia’s largest.  Last year the market sold nearly 3 million flowers a day at its peak season, but this year daily sales have fallen to 1.4 million.  Due to short supply, flower prices in many Chinese cities, such as Shanghai, have doubled.  The price of baby’s-breath, for instance, has recently risen from 10 yuan/kg to 30. 

    In a previous post, I mentioned that global corporations like Starbucks, Nestle, and Maxwell have been investing in Shangri-La’s nascent coffee-growing industry.  According to China Daily, coffee is now Yunnan’s third largest export, behind tobacco and flowers.  But Hu Lu, deputy secretary general of the Coffee Association of Yunnan, says that “the drought will not only bring down the province’s coffee production in 2009 and 2010, but also have long-term effects on the coffee industry.”  The coffee harvest season began in October and ended in March, with the drought affecting the entire period.  “The continuous drought will hurt coffee trees and they might die of thirst, and then coffee growers will not have another harvest for five or six years,” Hu said.  Plans to increase coffee production next year are unlikely to be realized, and output may even drop.  Unlike rubber and flowers, where shortages have resulted in higher prices, global buyers like Starbucks can turn to other places to purchase their coffee beans, leaving local producers to sell their diminished yield at the same low prices.  China’s highly prized Pu’er tea, on the other hand, which is grown in some of the same locations, has been rising in price due to the drought’s effect on production.

    mekongEven power generation has been affected by the drought.  Shangri-La relies heavily on hydropower generated from dams along the region’s raging rivers, which carve steep paths through its mountainous terrain.  With their flow reduced, less power can be generated, both in Shangri-La itself, and downstream at the Three Gorges Dam (located in the Crossroads), where the dam’s reservoir has fallen six meters from a year before.  Xinhua news service reports that “300,000 tonnes of thermal coal was needed to plug a shortage in Hubei [in the Crossroads] estimated at 500 million kilowatts/hour due to a severe cut in hydropower, which supplies 30 percent of the province’s needs.”  The article mentions that power shortages are also affecting the export hub of Guangdong, in the Back Door.

    Those dams and reservoirs along Shangri-La’s mighty rivers are of interest to more than just the Chinese.  The topic has been front and center in the first big summit of the Mekong River Commission (MRC), taking place this week in Thailand.  The Mekong is one of several major rivers that flow through Shangri-La and provide Southeast Asia with much of its water.  In particular, the Mekong supports the rich fishing grounds of Tongle Sap (Great Lake) in Cambodia, and the fertile rice paddies of the delta in southern Vietnam, both of which feed millions.  China’s drought is having a big impact downstream, and several neighboring countries are blaming upstream Chinese dams for restricting what little flow there is left.  Four Chinese dams have been completed, and another four are under construction or planned, and they’ve been a source of concern in Southeast Asia for years.  But the drought — and historically low water levels on the lower Mekong (the lowest in 50 years) – have brought those concerns to head.  The MRC’s executive director, Jeremy Bird, has defended China, saying that downstream water shortages are due to natural causes (reduced rainfall), not the dams.  But the controversy is likely to stir further debate about China’s role in Southeast Asia, and the impact further efforts to harness Shangri-La’s water resources will have on its neighbors.

    ——–

    Other related stories:

    Read more Chinese economic analysis at Patrick Chovanec’s blog >


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  • Get To Know The 9 Nations Of China: The Back Door

    9 nations: the back door(This post appeared on the author’s blog. It is one in a series of profiles on the “nine nations” of China.)

    THE BACK DOOR
    (Hong Kong, Macau, Guangdong, Hainan)
    Territory: 231,963 km2 (2% of total)
    Population: 112 million (8% of total)
    Per Capita GDP: $6,910 (#2 of 9)
    Exports as % of GDP: 82%
    Net Trade Balance (ex-China): $176 billion surplus

    In Chinese, the “back door” refers to a way of doing business outside the normal, approved channels. The South Sea coast is China’s Back Door, far enough from the centers of power that nobody will notice if you bend a few rules. As locals put it, “The sky is broad and the emperor is far away.” Officials who were exiled to Yueh, as this land was once known, found it a fearful place whose inhabitants spoke strange dialects—Cantonese, mainly—and feasted on snakes, cats, and monkeys. But its clan-based villages, lush jungles, and rocky inlets offered ideal shelter for smugglers and secret societies to flourish. Unlike their staid northern cousins, these freebooters learned to take risks and profit from them. Other Chinese regard southerners as clever, sharp, and a bit slippery. But as rebels and renegades, emigrants and entrepreneurs, they infuse much needed flexibility and creativity into an otherwise rigid system.

    The Back Door might be troublesome to China’s rulers, but it has also been useful. When China was closed to the outside world, enclaves like Canton, Macau, and Hong Kong offered safely removed points of contact and exchange. So when Deng Xiaoping wanted to open China’s economy to trade and investment, the Back Door offered an ideal laboratory. If reforms failed, they could be disowned and contained without contaminating the rest of China. In fact, they succeeded beyond anyone’s wildest expectations, transforming the region into an export juggernaut and a model for the rest of China.

    The Back Door’s very success, however, poses a dilemma. Now that the rest of China has applied its example, is a laboratory really necessary? The region may have found a new purpose as a playground for Chinese tourists who gamble in Macau’s casinos, frolic at Hainan’s beach resorts, and ride the rides at Hong Kong’s new Disneyland. But there are others who think the experiment isn’t over, that the Back Door still has vital lessons to teach about democracy and rule of law. Perhaps China still needs a few rebels—at a safe distance, of course.

    See also: The Yellow Land

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  • The Secret Power Struggle In China To Succeed Hu Jintao

    chinese power struggle

    (This post appeared on the author’s blog.)

    The National People’s Congress (NPC) has been in full swing this week in Beijing.  Even if it’s mostly just theater, the NPC offers an important stage for up-and-coming politicians to jockey for position.  In two years (2012), President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao are expected to retire, along with nearly half of the 25-member Politburo.  An entirely new generation of Chinese leaders will take over, and exactly who that will be is still being thrashed out.

    I was recently reading the first in a series of upcoming articles in China Leadership Review by Cheng Li, of the Brookings Institute.  The series is called “China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012,” and the first part focuses on provincial leaders.  It’s a worthwhile read on many levels, but I was particularly struck by one point where he mentions that “approximately 58 percent of [provincial] leaders were born in … six provinces, and about 40 percent were born in four provinces of Eastern China (Shandong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Anhui).”  This seems to be a rather remarkable concentration, and I decided to explore the question further.

    Those who have read my article “The Nine Nations of China” in The Atlantic may recall that I highlighted the region I call the Yellow Land (the Yellow River Valley and North China Plain) as the traditional center of political power in China.  I also noted that the Metropolis (the Yangtze Delta) is the only region wealthy and central enough to rival the Yellow Land for political primacy.  This was essentially a historical argument based on the observation that, in virtually every period when China was ruled as a unified state, the capital was located in the Yellow Land.  The only exceptions to this rule were a handful of times it was moved to the richer Metropolis.  None of the other regions have ever ruled over a unified China.

    The implication — unproven — is that certain of the Nine Nations may continue to exert greater political influence in China today.  That’s also what intrigued me about Cheng Li’s observation that China’s leaders tended to come from certain provinces.  Are the historical patterns I noted reflected in the composition of China’s present-day leadership?

    To answer this question, I decided to focus on two groups.  The first is the 204-member Central Committee of the Communist Party.  This body includes not only China’s top leaders, as defined by the Politburo, but also most of its government ministers, top military leadership, senior party functionaries, and a large number of provincial party leaders and governors. 

    The second group consists of all 62 provincial party leaders and governors, plus the chief executives of the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions (SARs) and the director of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office — a total of 65 officials.  Taiwan was not included in the analysis, because of the difficulty of making reasonable comparisons across political systems.

    The following is the breakdown for each group, based on their members’ place of origin.  In a handful of cases where an official’s biography emphasized that he or she had been born in one place but is considered a native of somewhere else, I went with the latter.  Of course, one must also compare the results with the population of each region, which is not evenly distributed across China:

        Central Provincial
    Region Population Committee Leadership
           
    The Yellow Land 27% 37% 37%
    The Back Door 8% 2% 8%
    The Metropolis 11% 18% 18%
    The Refuge 8% 5% 2%
    The Crossroads 17% 16% 15%
    Shangri-La 10% 2% 2%
    The Rust Belt 8% 12% 8%
    The Frontier 6% 6% 8%
    The Straits 4% 2% 3%

     

    Two regions immediately stand out: the Yellow Land and the Metropolis.  True, they have larger populations than most, but even taking that into account, their political influence is clear.  While together they account for just over a third (38%) of China’s population, they account for well over half (55%) of its leaders, both on the Central Committee and provincial level.  That’s worth stating again, just to be clear — over half of China’s senior officials come from the Yellow Land or the Metropolis.

    The most under-represented region is, by far, Shangri-La (remote, mountainous southwest China) — with 10% of China’s population, it accounts for a paltry 2% of officials on the Central Committee and provincial level.  The Refuge (the Sichuan basin, just north of Shangri-La) also comes up short, accounting for 8% of the population but just 5% of the Central Committee and 2% of provincial leaders.

    The Back Door (the Pearl River Delta region) presents an interesting case.  Despite accounting for 8% of China’s population, its natives hardly hold any power (2%) on the Central Committee.  But, largely due to the fact that Hong Kong and Macau have been set up as semi-autonomous SARs (“one country, two systems”), the Back Door enjoys a proportional standing among provincial leaders.  This pattern is actually quite consistent with the Back Door’s historical character, in which it has been accorded considerable local autonomy in large part due to its lack of national influence.

    The Crossroads (the middle Yangtze) and the Rust Belt (Manchuria) both have political influence roughly commensurate with their populations.  To some degree, this may be due to their strong revolutionary heritages.  The Crossroads was where both the Nationalist and Communist revolutions got their start, and where many of China’s first generation of Communist leaders (including Mao) were born.  The Rust Belt was the first region to fall to Communist military control in 1947, and served as the focal point for state-led industrialized during the heyday of Soviet-style central planning.  It would not be surprising for a reasonable portion of the present Communist party leadership to hail from these regions.

    Finally, the Frontier (China’s far west) and the Straits (its southeast coast) are affected by their place at the margins of Chinese political life.  The natives of the Frontier receive a boost in their provincial-level influence from the requirement that all chairman (governors) of autonomous regions (including Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Ningxia) must belong to the minority that comprises the majority there (the same requirement does not apply, notably, to the regional party secretaries, who are almost always Han Chinese).  The Straits, in contrast, enjoys proportionally less influence within the PRC leadership, relative to its population, due to the unique status of Taiwan.

    Obviously, it would be unwarranted to see Chinese officials as “representing” their places of origin.  Many have held posts in other provinces and see their role and their careers from a national perspective.  But if 37% of all leading officeholders in the U.S. hailed from California, and over half came from California and Texas, it might tell you something about their outlook and assumptions.

    What the figures seem to suggest is that, while political power is fairly dispersed in China, some regions — the Yellow Land and the Metropolis — continue to play a dominant role consistent with their history and character, whereas other regions — Shangri-La, the Refuge, and to some degree the Back Door — play a far more marginal role on China’s political stage.  In any event, the numbers offer interesting food for thought.

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