Author: Sarah Miley

[JURIST] The US Supreme Court [official website; JURIST news archive] on Monday held [opinion, PDF] in Graham v. Florida [Cornell LII backgrounder; JURIST report] that the Eighth Amendment [text] ban on cruel and unusual punishments prohibits the imprisonment of a juvenile for life without the possibility of parole as punishment for the juvenile’s commission of a non-homicide offense. The First District Court of Appeal of Florida [official website] upheld the life sentence of Terrance Graham for a non-homicide offense committed when he was 17, concluding that Graham’s sentence was not “grossly disproportionate” to his crimes. The district court interpreted Supreme Court prison sentencing precedent to prohibit a per se ban on juvenile life sentences, and ruled instead that each case must be judged on its own facts. Justice Anthony Kennedy, delivering the opinion of the court, reversed and remanded the district court opinion, holding that life sentences without parole wrongly deprive juveniles of the opportunity to become rehabilitated and rejoin society:

Terrance Graham’s sentence guarantees he will die in prison without any meaningful opportunity to obtain release, no matter what he might do to demonstrate that the bad acts he committed as a teenager are not representative of his true character, even if he spends the next half century attempting to atone for his crimes and learn from his mistakes. The State has denied him any chance to later demonstrate that he is fit to rejoin society based solely on a non-homicide crime that he committed while he was a child in the eyes of the law. This the Eighth Amendment does not permit. … A State need not guarantee the offender eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him or her with some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term.

Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia and in part by Justice Samuel Alito. Alito also dissented in an opinion for himself. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor, even though these three Justices also joined the Kennedy majority opinion.

The court also handed down a per curiam decision on non-release sentences for juveniles in Sullivan v. Graham [opinion, PDF], dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. It is uncertain whether defendant Joe Harris Sullivan, who was 13 when he committed his crime, will benefit from the ruling in the Graham case because Florida courts had turned aside Sullivan’s Eighth Amendment challenge for procedural reasons. The Florida courts will now determine whether Sullivan can make a new challenge based on the Supreme Court’s decision.

[JURIST] The US Supreme Court [official website; JURIST news archive] on Monday ruled [opinion, PDF] 7-2 in United States v. Comstock [Cornell LII backgrounder] that mentally ill sex offenders may be civilly committed beyond their prison sentences. The court upheld the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act [18 USC s. 4248 text], which allows a district court to order the civil commitment of a mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date he would otherwise be released. The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss proceedings, holding that section 4248 exceeded Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause [Cornell LII backgrounder], that the “clear and convincing” requirement did not meet due process standards, and that the statute violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments of the US Constitution. The court reversed and remanded the Fourth Circuit’s decision, stating that the Necessary and Proper Clause [text] grants Congress sufficient authority to pass such laws. In delivering the opinion of the court, Justice Stephen Breyer stated that several considerations were used to compel the court’s decision.

We take these five considerations together. They include: (1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the long history of federal involvement in this arena, (3) the sound reasons for the statute’s enactment in light of the Government’s custodial interest in safeguarding the public from dangers posed by those in federal custody, (4) the statute’s accommodation of state interests, and (5) the statute’s narrow scope. Taken together, these considerations lead us to conclude that the statute is a “necessary and proper” means of exercising the federal authority that permits Congress to create federal criminal laws, to punish their violation, to imprison violators, to provide appropriately for those imprisoned, and to maintain the security of those who are not imprisoned but who may be affected by the federal imprisonment of others. The Constitution consequently authorizes Congress to enact the statute.

Justice Anthony Kennedy concurred in the judgment only, joined by Justice Samuel Alito. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia.

US Solicitor General and recent Supreme Court nominee Elena Kagan [official profile; JURIST news archive] defended the law [JURIST report] in January stating that it was necessary to protect individuals from people who have the kind of mental illness that is going to cause grave danger to the community. She stated that the federal government is in the best position to prevent this kind of danger, and therefore has a duty to act as a federal custodian. While some of the justices were skeptical of Kagan’s position, the majority of the court agreed with her assertion in its opinion. The court did not reach or decide any claim that the statute or its application denies equal protection, procedural or substantive due process, or any other constitutional rights.

[JURIST] Pakistan’s Lahore High Court (LHC) on Monday ordered the principal secretary for President Asif Ali Zardari [BBC profile; JURIST news archive] principle secretary to appear before the court in order to explain how Zardari is able to effectively serve as president while also leading the country’s ruling party. The petition was filed [Reuters report] by the Pakistan Lawyers Forum, which agreed with the secretary’s representation of Zardari due to security reasons. Zardari’s control of these two offices does not violate Pakistan’s Constitution [text], but the high court has previously barred officials from holding dual offices. After winning the presidency in September 2008, Zardari continued to serve as chairman of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) [official website], which won the plurality of seats in the 2008 election and currently heads the ruling coalition. The principal secretary is set to appear before the court on May 25.

Zardari gained control of the presidency after former military leader Pervez Musharraf [BBC profile; JURIST news archive] resigned amid impeachment pressure. In April, Zardari signed into law [JURIST report] the 18th Amendment bill [text, PDF], limiting presidential powers expanded under Musharraf. Under the amendment, which effectively reduces the role of the president to a figurehead, the vast majority of the president’s powers will be transferred [AFP report] to the office of the prime minister [official website]. The introduction of the bill came amid controversy over reopening corruption investigations against Zardari. Weeks earlier, Pakistan’s attorney general Anwar Mansoor announced his resignation over controversy surrounding a Supreme Court order to investigate corruption allegations [JURIST reports]. Last month, Swiss authorities denied a request [JURIST report] from Pakistan’s National Accountability Bureau [official website], refusing to reopen a corruption investigation against Zardari. Aides to Zardari believe that presidential immunity protects him from prosecution, even after the Supreme Court overturned an amnesty law [JURIST report] implemented by Musharraf.