Author: Vitaliy N. Katsenelson

  • China Defiance of Global Recession is a Super Bubble

    The world looks at China with envy. China’s economy grew 8.7 percent last year, while the world economy contracted by 2.2 percent. It seems that Chinese “Confucian capitalism” – a market economy powered by 1.3 billion people and guided by an authoritarian regime that can pull levers at will – is superior to our touchy-feely, democratic capitalism. But the grass on China’s side of the fence is not as green as it appears. In fact, China’s defiance of the global recession is not a miracle – it’s a “super-bubble.” When it deflates, it will spell big trouble for all of us.

    To understand the Chinese economy, consider three distinct periods: “Late-stage growth obesity” (the decade prior to 2008); “You lie!” (the time of the financial crisis); and finally, “Steroids ‘R’ Us” (from the end of the financial crisis to today).

    Late-stage growth obesity

    About a decade ago, the Chinese government chose a policy of growth at any cost. China’s leaders considered strong GDP growth essential for political survival and national stability. Because China lacks the social safety net of the developed world, unemployed people aren’t just inconvenienced by the loss of their jobs, they starve; and hungry people don’t complain, they riot and cause political unrest.

    Remember the 1994 movie “Speed?” A young cop (Keanu Reeves) had to save passengers on a bus that would explode if its speed dropped below 50 m.p.h. Well, China is like that bus with 1.3 billion people aboard. If the Communist Party can’t keep the economy growing at a fast clip, the result will be catastrophic.

    To achieve high growth, China has kept its currency, the renminbi, at artificially low levels against the dollar. The cheap renminbi makes Chinese-made even cheaper to buyers around the globe. Thus, China became a significant exporter to the developed economies.

    Normally, if free-market economic forces were at work, the renminbi would have appreciated and the US dollar would have declined. However, had China let this occur, demand for its products would have declined, and its economy wouldn’t have grown at roughly 10 percent a year, which it did during the past decade.

    The more China sold to the United States, the more dollars it accumulated, and thus the more US Treasuries it bought, driving our interest rates down. US consumers responded to these cheap goods and easy, inexpensive credit by going on a buying binge, further boosting Chinese economic growth.

    However, companies and countries that grow at very high rates for a long time will inevitably suffer from late-stage growth obesity. Consider Starbucks: In 1999, it had 2,000 stores and was adding 1.8 stores a day. In 2007, when it had 10,000 stores, it had to open 5.5 stores a day in a desperate bid to keep growth rates up. This resulted in poor decisions and poor quality – a recipe for disaster.

    In China, political pressure for full employment has led to similar late-stage growth obesity. In 2005, China built the largest shopping mall in the world, the New South China Mall: Today it’s 99 percent vacant. China also built up a lavish district in a city called Ordos: Today, it’s a ghost town.

    You lie!

    All good things come to an end, and great things come to an end with a bang…or a pop. When the financial meltdown erupted in 2008, US and global banks started dropping like flies. Economies everywhere suffered contraction. Even China’s.

    During the crisis, Chinese exports were down more than 25 percent, tonnage of goods shipped through railroads was down by double digits, and electricity use plummeted. Yet Beijing insisted that China had magically sustained 6 to 8 percent growth. In other words, China lies…or maybe it just doesn’t tell the truth. The country’s ruling elite go to great lengths to maintain appearances, including censoring media and jailing those who write anti-government articles. That’s why we have to rely on hard data instead.

    Steroids ‘R’ Us

    Today the global economy is stabilizing, thanks to Uncle Sam and other “uncles” around the world. But the consumers of Chinese-made goods are still in debt, unemployment is high, and banks aren’t lending. You might think the Chinese economy would be growing at a lower rate. But no, it is growing again at nearly 10 percent, as though the financial crisis never occurred.

    Though this growth appears to be authentic – electricity consumption is back up – it is not sustainable growth, because it is based on an unprecedented stimulus package and extraordinary government involvement in the economy.

    In the midst of the financial crisis, in late 2008, Beijing fire-hosed $568 billion stimulus program into the Chinese economy. That’s enormous! As a percentage of GDP, it would be like a $2 trillion stimulus in America, nearly triple the size of the one Congress passed last year.

    This story gets even more interesting. Unlike Western democracies, whose central banks can pump a lot of money into the financial system but can’t force banks to lend or consumers and corporations to spend, China can achieve both at lightning speed.

    The government controls the banks, so it can force them to lend, and it can also force state-owned enterprises (one-third of the economy) to borrow and to spend.

    But government’s are notoriously inept at allocating capital in the private sector. And the Chinese government is no exception. Political decisions (driven by the goal of full employment) are often uneconomical, while instances of corruption and cronyism result in “stimulus projects” that squander wealth, rather than create it.

    To maintain high employment, for example, China has poured money into infrastructure and real estate projects. This massive effort explains why the Chinese keep building new skyscrapers even though existing ones are still vacant. The enormous stimulus has exacerbated problems that already existed, threatening to turn China into a less shiny, but more drastic, version of debt-riddled Dubai.

    Ominously for the rest of us, what happens in China doesn’t stay in China. A meltdown there – or even a slowdown – would have severe consequences for the rest of the world.

    A sever Chinese slowdown would tank the commodity markets, for examkple. While demand for industrial goods would fall off a cliff. At the same time, China’s appetite for dollars would likely drop – putting pressure on the greenback’s value and driving US interest rates higher. No more 5 percent mortgages and 6 percent car loans. No more shortcuts to prosperity…for either China or the U.S.

    We look at China and are mesmerized by its 1.3 billion people, its achievements of the past decade, its recent economic resiliency, and its ability to achieve spectacular results on the fly. But we have to remember that economic bubbles are usually just a good thing taken too far. The Chinese economy is no exception. Its long-term future may be bright, but in the short run, we’ve got a bubble on our hands.

    Everyone wants a shortcut to prosperity, but there isn’t one. China has been trying to bend the laws of economics for a while, and with the control it exerts over its economy it may seem that it has succeeded. But China’s recent success is partly a mirage, which will dissipate into a painful reality. No, there is no shortcut to prosperity – not for individuals and not for nations.

    Vitaliy Katsenelson
    for The Daily Reckoning Australia

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  • Chinese Government Trying to Put Brakes on Economy

    The Chinese economy must be getting out of control, because the Chinese government is doing the unthinkable: It is desperately trying to put the brakes on the economy. When you pump a stimulus package that represents 14% of GDP through a fire hose into an economy, which was already on shaky bubble foundation, in a very short time you’ll have some serious unintended consequences — you’ll get super bubbles.

    To understand what’s taking place in China today, we need to rewind the clock about a decade. At that time the Chinese government chose a policy of growth at any cost. To achieve that, it kept its currency (the renminbi) at artificially low levels against the dollar — this helped already cheap Chinese-made goods become even cheaper than its competitors’. The US and global consumers were eager to buy them. China turned into a significant exporter to the US. Normally, if free-market economic forces were at work, the renminbi would have appreciated and the US dollar would have declined. However, if China let its currency appreciate, its exports would have become more expensive and the demand for Chinese products would have declined, and its economy wouldn’t have grown at 10% a year.

    But China isn’t your local democracy, and it needed to grow at any cost. So instead, through the government-controlled banking system, China accumulated a couple trillion dollars of foreign reserves in US dollars and euros. This had an unintended consequence: It helped keep US interest rates at very low levels, and lent a friendly hand in the financing of a huge consumption binge by the US consumer (i.e., China’s largest customer).

    The more China sold to the US, the more dollars it accumulated, and thus the more US Treasuries it bought, driving our interest rates down. The US consumer was in turn happy to leverage its future (through the “always” appreciating asset, its home) and delighted to consume cheap Chinese-made goods.

    This symbiotic match made in heaven between China and the US consumer worked great as long as housing prices kept rising and the financial machine kept multiplying dollars. But all good things come to an end, and great things come to an end with a bang. The financial meltdown erupted upon us and, well, you know how that story played out.

    So now let’s fast-forward a year. Today the global economy is stabilizing. But the US consumers of Chinese-made goods are now deleveraging, unemployment is high, US banks aren’t lending.

    Despite this, the Chinese export-based economy has clocked growth of 8.7% in 2009. The rest of the world looks at the Chinese growth miracle with envy; it seems that China has got economics figured out. But don’t hurry to trade your democracy for an authoritarian system. The Chinese grass is not as green as it appears.

    First, one shouldn’t believe all the economic numbers that are put out by the Chinese government. This is the government that magically managed to report 6% to 8% GDP growth in the midst of the financial crisis, when its exports were down more than 25%, tonnage of goods shipped through its railroads was down by double digits, and its electricity consumption was falling like a rock.

    Second, China will do anything to grow its economy, as the alternatives will lead to political unrest. A lot of peasants moved to the cities in search of higher-paying jobs during the go-go times. Because China lacks the social safety net of the developed world, unemployed people aren’t just inconvenienced by the loss of their jobs, they starve (this explains the high savings rate in China) and hungry people don’t complain, they riot. Once you look at what’s taking place in the Chinese economy through that lens, the decisions of its leaders start making sense, or at least become understandable.

    Unlike Western democracies, where central banks can pump a lot of money into the financial system but can’t force banks to lend or consumers and corporations to spend, China can achieve both at lightning speed. The Chinese government controls the banks, thus it can make them lend, and it can force state-owned enterprises (one-third of the economy) to borrow and to spend. Also, China can spend infrastructure project money very fast — if a school is in the way of a road the government wants to build, it becomes a casualty for the greater good.

    China has spent a tremendous amount of money on infrastructure over the last decade and there are definitely long-term benefits to having better highways, fast railroads, more hospitals, etc. But government is horrible at allocating large amounts of capital, especially at the speed it was done in China. Political decisions (driven by the goal of full employment) are often uneconomical, and corruption and cronyism result in projects that destroy value.

    Infrastructure and real estate projects are where you get your biggest bang for the buck if your goal is to maintain employment, because they require a lot of unskilled labor; and this is where in the past a lot of Chinese money was spent. This also explains why the Chinese keep building skyscrapers even though the adjacent ones are still vacant.

    Though Chinese economic growth in the past was very high, more recently the quality of growth has been low. For example, in an echo of past Chinese government asset-allocation decisions, China built the largest shopping mall in the world, the South China Mall, which is still 99% vacant years after construction. China also built a whole city, Ordos, in Inner Mongolia, on spec for one million residents who never appeared.

    The inefficiencies are also evident in industrial overcapacity. According to Pivot Capital, Chinese excess capacity in cement is greater than the consumption of the US, Japan, and India combined. Also, Chinese idle production of steel is greater than the production capacity of Japan and South Korea combined. Similarly disturbing statistics are true for many other industrial commodities. The enormous stimulus amplified problems that already existed to financial-crisis levels. China is a less shiny but more drastic version of Dubai.

    There is speculation that the Chinese consumer will pick up the demand slack for the US and European consumers who are deleveraging and buying fewer Chinese-made goods. This may happen, but it will take decades. The US and European consumers are two-thirds of much larger economies. The Chinese consumer is only one-third of the Chinese economy.

    We look at China and are mesmerized by its 1.3 billion people, its achievements of the last decade, its recent economic resiliency, and its ability to achieve spectacular results on the fly. But we have to remember that economic bubbles are usually just a good thing taken too far. This was the case with railroads in the US in the late 19th century: The railroads were supposed to change the landscape of the US, and they did, but that didn’t prevent a lot of them from going out of business first. The Internet was supposed to change how we communicate, and it did, but in the process it generated a tremendous bubble, followed by the loss of wealth for many. The Chinese economy is no exception. Its long-term future may be bright, but in the short run we’ve got a bubble on our hands.

    Everyone wants a shortcut to greatness, but there isn’t one. It would be great if the word (economic) cycle only existed in a singular form, and the only cycle we had in the economy was happy expansion. If there were no cycles, there would be no painful recessions. But as heaven couldn’t exist without hell, or capitalism without failure, economic expansion can’t exist without recession. China has been trying to bend the laws of economics for awhile, and with the control it exerts over its economy it may seem, at least for a short while, that the laws of economics work differently in China. But this is only a temporary mirage, which must be followed by huge pain and drastic consequences. No, there’s no shortcut to greatness – not in politics, not in personal life, and certainly not in economics.

    Regards,

    Vitaliy N. Katsenelson
    for The Daily Reckoning Australia

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