Author: WhiteHouse

04.13.10 03:27 PM

4:36 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon, everybody. We have just concluded an enormously productive day.

I said this morning that today would be an opportunity for our nations, both individually and collectively, to make concrete commitments and take tangible steps to secure nuclear materials so they never fall into the hands of terrorists who would surely use them.

This evening, I can report that we have seized this opportunity, and because of the steps we’ve taken — as individual nations and as an international community — the American people will be safer and the world will be more secure.

I want to thank all who participated in this historic summit — 49 leaders from every region of the world. Today’s progress was possible because these leaders came not simply to talk, but to take action; not simply to make vague pledges of future action, but to commit to meaningful steps that they are prepared to implement right now.

I also want to thank my colleagues for the candor and cooperative spirit that they brought to the discussions. This was not a day of long speeches or lectures on what other nations must do. We listened to each other, with mutual respect. We recognized that while different countries face different challenges, we have a mutual interest in securing these dangerous materials.

So today is a testament to what is possible when nations come together in a spirit of partnership to embrace our shared responsibility and confront a shared challenge. This is how we will solve problems and advance the security of our people in the 21st century. And this is reflected in the communiqué that we have unanimously agreed to today.

First, we agreed on the urgency and seriousness of the threat. Coming into this summit, there were a range of views on this danger. But at our dinner last night, and throughout the day, we developed a shared understanding of the risk.

Today, we are declaring that nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security. We also agreed that the most effective way to prevent terrorists and criminals from acquiring nuclear materials is through strong nuclear security — protecting nuclear materials and preventing nuclear smuggling.

Second, I am very pleased that all the nations represented here have endorsed the goal that I outlined in Prague one year ago — to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years’ time. This is an ambitious goal, and we are under no illusions that it will be easy. But the urgency of the threat, and the catastrophic consequences of even a single act of nuclear terrorism, demand an effort that is at once bold and pragmatic. And this is a goal that can be achieved.

Third, we reaffirmed that it is the fundamental responsibility of nations, consistent with their international obligations, to maintain effective security of the nuclear materials and facilities under our control. This includes strengthening national laws and policies, and fully implementing the commitments we have agreed to.

And fourth, we recognized that even as we fulfill our national responsibilities, this threat cannot be addressed by countries working in isolation. So we’ve committed ourselves to a sustained, effective program of international cooperation on national [sic] security, and we call on other nations to join us.

It became clear in our discussions that we do not need lots of new institutions and layers of bureaucracy. We need to strengthen the institutions and partnerships that we already have -— and make them even more effective. This includes the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the multilateral partnership that strengthens nuclear security, prevent nuclear trafficking and assist nations in building their capacity to secure their nuclear materials.

But as I said, today was about taking tangible steps to protect our people. So we’ve also agreed to a detailed work plan to guide our efforts going forward — the specific actions we will take. I want to commend my partners for the very important commitments that they made in conjunction with this summit. Let me give some examples.

Canada agreed to give up a significant quantity of highly enriched uranium. Chile has given up its entire stockpile. Ukraine and Mexico announced that they will do the same. Other nations — such as Argentina and Pakistan — announced new steps to strengthen port security and prevent nuclear smuggling.

More nations — including Argentina, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam — agreed to join, and thus strengthen, the treaties and international partnerships that are at the core of our global efforts. A number of countries -— including Italy, Japan, India and China -— will create new centers to promote nuclear security technologies and training. Nations pledged new resources to help the IAEA meet its responsibilities.

In a major and welcomed development, Russia announced that it will close its last weapons-grade plutonium production reactor. After many years of effort, I’m pleased that the United States and Russia agreed today to eliminate 68 tons of plutonium for our weapons programs -— plutonium that would have been enough for about 17,000 nuclear weapons. Instead, we will use this material to help generate electricity for our people.

These are exactly the kind of commitments called for in the work plan that we adopted today, so we’ve made real progress in building a safer world.

I would also note that the United States has made its own commitments. We are strengthening security at our own nuclear facilities, and will invite the IAEA to review the security at our neutron research center. This reflects our commitment to sharing the best practices that are needed in our global efforts. We’re seeking significant funding increases for programs to prevent nuclear proliferation and trafficking.

And today, the United States is joining with our Canadian partners and calling on nations to commit $10 billion to extending our highly successful Global Partnership to strengthen nuclear security around the world.

So this has been a day of great progress. But as I said this morning, this can’t be a fleeting moment. Securing nuclear materials must be a serious and sustained global effort. We agreed to have our experts meet on a regular basis —- to measure progress, to ensure that we’re meeting our commitments and to plan our next steps.

And I again want to thank President Lee and the Republic of Korea for agreeing to host the next Nuclear Security Summit in two years.

Finally, let me say while this summit is focused on securing nuclear materials, this is part of a larger effort -— the comprehensive agenda that I outlined in Prague last year to pursue the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. Indeed, in recent days we’ve made progress on every element of this agenda.

To reduce nuclear arsenals, President Medvedev and I signed the historic new START treaty —- not only committing our two nations to significant reductions in deployed nuclear weapons, but also setting the stage for further cuts and cooperation between our countries.

To move beyond outdated Cold War thinking and to focus on the nuclear dangers of the 21st century, our new Nuclear Posture Review reduces the role and number of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. And for the first time, preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism is at the top of America’s nuclear agenda, which reaffirms the central importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

And next month in New York, we will join with nations from around the world to strengthen the NPT as the cornerstone of our global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons even as we pursue greater civil nuclear cooperation. Because for nations that uphold their responsibilities, peaceful nuclear energy can unlock new advances in medicine, in agriculture, and economic development.

All of these efforts are connected. Leadership and progress in one area reinforces progress in another. When the United States improves our own nuclear security and transparency, it encourages others to do the same, as we’ve seen today. When the United States fulfills our responsibilities as a nuclear power committed to the NPT, we strengthen our global efforts to ensure that other nations fulfill their responsibilities.

So again, I want to thank my colleagues for making this unprecedented gathering a day of unprecedented progress in confronting one of the greatest threats to our global security. Our work today not only advances the security of the United States, it advances the security of all mankind, and preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism will remain one of my highest priorities as President.

So with that, I’m going to take a few questions. I’m going to start with Bill Plante from CBS.

Q Mr. President, thank you. The communiqué states in no uncertain terms that all of the unprecedented cooperation for which you’re calling will be done on a voluntary basis, not a binding commitment. What’s the likelihood that countries which have been at odds over these issues for a number of years are now going to cooperate? How can this be enforced?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let’s just take a specific example, Bill. For about 10 years, we had been encouraging Ukraine to either ship out its highly enriched uranium or transform it to a lower-grade — a lower-enriched uranium. And in part because of this conference, Ukraine took that step, announced that it would complete this step over the next couple of years.

So all the commitments that we talked about are ones that we’ve already booked, even before the communiqué and the work plan gets put into place. And that indicates the degree to which I think that there’s actually strong unanimity about the importance of this issue as a threat to the global and international community.

Now, keep in mind that we also have a number of international conventions that have been put in place. Not all of them have been ratified. In fact, the United States needs to work on a couple of these conventions dealing with the issues of nuclear terrorism and trafficking. But what this does is it sets out a bold plan. And what I’m encouraged about is the fact that we’ve already seen efforts that had been delayed for years, in some cases, since the end of the Cold War, actually finally coming to fruition here at this — at this summit.

Q It all depends on goodwill, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Bill, the point is that we’ve got world leaders who have just announced that in fact this is a commitment that they’re making. I believe they take their commitments very seriously.

If what you’re asking is, is do we have a international “one world” law enforcement mechanism — we don’t. We never have.

So in all of our efforts internationally, in every treaty that we sign, we’re relying on goodwill on the part of those who are signatories to those efforts. That’s the nature of international relations.

Jake Tapper, ABC.

Q Thank you, Mr. President. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said today that pressure and sanctions — speaking of Iran’s nuclear program — pressure and sanctions cannot fundamentally solve the problem. I was wondering if you could clarify exactly what you believe President Hu Jintao has agreed to, whether you think there actually will be economic sanctions with teeth that the Chinese will sign off on; and what you have told the Chinese in terms of their concern about how much fuel they get from Iran, what the U.S. can help them with in that regard. Thank you, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Here’s what I know. The Chinese have sent official representatives to negotiations in New York to begin the process of drafting a sanctions resolution. That is part of the P5-plus-1 effort. And the United States is not moving this process alone; we’ve got the participation of the Russians as well as the other members of the P5-plus-1, all of whom believe that it is important for us to send a strong signal to Iran that their consistent violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions as well as their obligations under the NPT have consequences, and that they’ve got a better path to take.

Now, you’re exactly right, Jake, that the Chinese are obviously concerned about what ramifications this might have on the economy generally. Iran is an oil-producing state. I think that a lot of countries around the world have trade relationships with Iran. And we’re mindful of that. But what I said to President Hu and what I’ve said to every world leader that I talked to is that words have to mean something, there have to be some consequences. And if we are saying that the NPT is important, if we’re saying that non-proliferation is important, then when those obligations are repeatedly flouted, then it’s important for the international community to come together.

And what I would say is that if you consider where we were, say, a year ago, with respect to the prospect of sanctions, the fact that we’ve got Russia and China, as well as the other P5-plus-1 members having a serious discussion around a sanctions regime, following up on a serious sanctions regime that was passed when North Korea flouted its obligations towards the NPT, it’s a sign of the degree to which international diplomacy is making it more possible for us to isolate those countries that are breaking their international obligations.

And as I said I think several weeks ago, my interest is not having a long, drawn-out process for months. I want to see us move forward boldly and quickly to send the kind of message that will allow Iran to make a different calculation.

And keep in mind, I have said repeatedly that under the NPT Iran has the right to develop peaceful civilian nuclear energy — as do all signatories to the NPT. But given the repeated violations that we’ve seen on the part of Iran, I think understandably the world community questions their commitment towards a peaceful civilian energy program.

They have a way of restoring that trust. For example, we put before them — I’m saying the P5-plus-1, now, as well as the IAEA — put before them a very reasonable approach that would have allowed them to continue their civilian peaceful nuclear energy needs, but would have allayed many of the concerns around their nuclear weapons program. They have rejected that so far. And that’s why it’s important — and I said from the start that we’re going to move on a dual track, and part of that dual track is making sure that a sanctions regime is in place.

Last point I’ll make about sanctions. Sometimes I hear the argument that, well, sanctions aren’t really going to necessarily work. Sanctions aren’t a magic wand. What sanctions do accomplish is hopefully to change the calculus of a country like Iran so that they see that there are more costs and fewer benefits to pursuing a nuclear weapons program. And in that process what we hope is, is that if those costs get high enough and the benefits are low enough, that in time they make the right decision not just for the security and prosperity of the world but also for their own people.

Scott Wilson, Washington Post. Where’s Scott? There we go.

Q Thank you, Mr. President. You have spoken often about the need to bring U.S. policy in line with its treaty obligations internationally to eliminate the perception of hypocrisy that some of the world sees toward the United States and its allies. In that spirit and in that venue, will you call on Israel to declare its nuclear program and sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty? And if not, why wouldn’t other countries see that as an incentive not to sign on to the treaty that you say is important to strengthen?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Scott, initially you were talking about U.S. behavior and then suddenly we’re talking about Israel. Let me talk about the United States. I do think that as part of the NPT our obligation as the largest nuclear power in the world is to take steps to reducing our nuclear stockpile. And that’s what the START treaty was about — sending a message that we are going to meet our obligations.

And as far as Israel goes, I’m not going to comment on their program. What I’m going to point to is the fact that consistently we have urged all countries to become members of the NPT.

So there’s no contradiction there. We think it is important that we have a international approach that is universal and that rests on three pillars: that those of us who have nuclear weapons are making serious efforts to reduce those stockpiles; that we all are working against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and those countries that don’t currently have nuclear weapons make the decision not to pursue nuclear weapons; and that all countries have access to peaceful nuclear energy.

And so whether we’re talking about Israel or any other country, we think that becoming part of the NPT is important. And that, by the way, is not a new position. That’s been a consistent position of the United States government even prior to my administration.

Let me call on Stephen Collinson of AFP.

Q Thank you, Mr. President. In your meeting with President Hu, did he give you any indication he would heed your call for a more market-oriented exchange rate for the yuan? If there’s going to be a change, when would you envisage that taking place? And what happened in the last few weeks to help you move on from a period of — quite a stormy period of public disagreements with China?

THE PRESIDENT: The fact is, actually, that the relationship between my administration and the Chinese government has been very productive during the course of the last year and a half. We started off working together at various multilateral fora — the first one in London with the G20. I then, out of the bilateral meetings that we had, worked with President Hu to set up a strategic and economic dialogue that looks at a whole range of areas in which the United States and China can cooperate. I made a visit to China that both of us considered very successful.

Now, there are some areas where we’ve got disagreement. And those disagreements are not new, and I have to say that the amount of turbulence, as you put it, that occurred was actually relatively modest when you look at the overall trajectory of U.S.-China relations. I mean, at no point was there ever a suggestion that it’s not in the interest of both our countries to cooperate, and that we have not only important bilateral business to do but also we are two very important countries in multilateral settings that have to deal with issues like climate change and the world economy in concert.

With respect to the currency issue, President Hu and I have had a number of frank conversations. As part of the G20 process we all signed on to the notion that a rebalancing of the world economy would be important for sustained economic growth and the prevention of future crises. And China, like the United States, agreed to that framework.

We believe that part of that rebalancing involves making sure that currencies are tracking roughly the market and not giving any one country an advantage over the other. And I’ve been very clear of the fact that it is my estimation that the RMB is under-valued and that China’s own decision in previous years to begin to move towards a more market-oriented approach is the right one. And I communicated that once again to President Hu. I think China, rightly, sees the issue of currency as a sovereign issue. I think they are resistant to international pressure when it comes to them making decisions about their currency policy and monetary policy.

But it is my belief that it is actually in China’s interest to achieve this rebalancing, because over time China is going to have to shift away from an economy that is solely oriented on exports and is going to have to start shifting towards an economy that is emphasizing domestic consumption and production, and is preventing bubbles from building up within the economy. And all of that will be facilitated with a more market-oriented currency approach.

So I don’t have a timetable, but it is my hope that China will make a decision that ultimately will be in their best interest.

Bob Burns of AP.

Q Mr. President, a few minutes ago when you were explaining the purpose of sanctions against Iran you said the point is to change Iranian government calculations, leading to altered behavior. Why hasn’t that happened in the case of North Korea, which, unlike Iran, actually does have nuclear weapons?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I’m not going to give you a full dissertation on North Korean behavior. I think it’s fair to say that North Korea has chosen a path of severe isolation that has been extraordinarily damaging to its people, and that it is our hope that as pressure builds for North Korea to improve its economic performance, for example, to break out of that isolation that we’ll see a return to the six-party talks and that we will see a change in behavior.

As I said, sanctions are not a magic wand. Unfortunately, nothing in international relations is. But I do think that the approach that we’ve taken with respect to North Korea makes it more likely for them to alter their behavior than had there been no consequences whatsoever to them testing a nuclear weapon.

Chuck Todd.

Q Thank you, Mr. President. Given the goals of this conference and the goals of your administration on nuclear policy, why does it appear as if Pakistan is playing by a different set of rules? I know they have not signed on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but it appears they’re expanding their nuclear program and the proximity to al Qaeda. Should there be more pressure internationally on Pakistan, not just coming from the United States, but the world?

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think Pakistan is playing by a different set of rules. I think we’ve been very clear to Pakistan, as we have been to every country, that we think they should join the NPT. I have actually seen progress over the last several years with respect to Pakistan’s nuclear security issues.

I want to lower tensions throughout South Asia when it comes to nuclear programs. And I think that the fact that President [sic] Gilani came here, signed on to a communiqué, and made a range of commitments that will make it more likely that we don’t see proliferation activities or trafficking occurring out of Pakistan is a positive thing.

Do we have a lot more work to do? Absolutely. But I think that President — Prime Minister Gilani’s presence here was an important step in assuring that we do not see a nuclear crisis anywhere in South Asia.

Okay? All right, Jeff Mason.

Q Thank you, Mr. President. A follow-up question on two that have been asked. First, how realistic do you believe it is that countries will agree on sanctions in the coming weeks, which is the deadline that you’re looking for? And a second, a follow-up on Pakistan — is the United States confident that Pakistan’s nuclear materials are protected and will not be vulnerable to terrorists like al Qaeda?

THE PRESIDENT: To take the second question first, just as a part of a follow-up on Chuck’s question, I feel confident about Pakistan’s security around its nuclear weapons programs. But that doesn’t mean that there isn’t improvement to make in all of our nuclear security programs. You’ll recall that we had a little incident a while back where we had nuclear-tipped missiles on a bomber flying across the United States and nobody knew about it. And Secretary Gates took exactly the right step, which was to hold those in charge accountable and to significantly alter our practices to make sure something like that didn’t happen again.

So I think it’s important to note that every nuclear power, every country that has a civilian nuclear energy program, has to take better steps to secure these materials. And Pakistan is not exempt from that, but we aren’t, either. And that’s I think the goal of this summit, and that was the goal of the communiqué and the work plan that we put forward.

With respect to sanctions, I think that we have a strong number of countries on the Security Council who believe this is the right thing to do. But I think these negotiations can be difficult. And I am going to push as hard as I can to make sure that we get strong sanctions that have consequences for Iran as it’s making calculations about its nuclear program and that those are done on a timely basis.

I’m not going to speculate beyond that in terms of where we are.

Last question, Ed Chen of Bloomberg.

Q Thank you, Mr. President. Good afternoon. Given the progress you have cited in recent days on your foreign policy agenda, to what extent do you feel like you have gained political capital with which to take further to the international stage for the rest of this year, to perhaps rejuvenate some initiatives in trouble spots such as the Middle East and elsewhere?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the work that we’ve done in recent days around nuclear security and nuclear disarmament are intrinsically good. They’re good just in and of themselves. And so we’re very pleased with the progress that we’ve made. And we could not have done this without extraordinary cooperation first from President Medvedev when it came to the START treaty, and then from my colleagues who were here today when it came to this Nuclear Security Summit.

What I think it signifies is the fact that so many of the challenges that we face internationally can’t be solved by one nation alone. But I do think that America’s leadership is important in order to get issues on the international agenda and to move in concert with other countries to have an effective response.

There are a host of other issues, obviously, that have to be addressed and one of the points that was made actually during the communiqué is we’re talking here about the instruments of potential war or terrorism, but obviously there are also the reasons, the rationales, the excuses for conflict, that have to be addressed as well.

And I remain committed to being a partner with countries around the world, and in particular hot spots around the world, to see if we can reduce those tensions and ultimately resolve those conflicts. And the Middle East would be a prime example. I think that the need for peace between Israelis and Palestinians and the Arab states remains as critical as ever.

It is a very hard thing to do. And I know that even if we are applying all of our political capital to that issue, the Israeli people through their government, and the Palestinian people through the Palestinian Authority, as well as other Arab states, may say to themselves, we are not prepared to resolve this — these issues — no matter how much pressure the United States brings to bear.

And the truth is, in some of these conflicts the United States can’t impose solutions unless the participants in these conflicts are willing to break out of old patterns of antagonism. I think it was former Secretary of State Jim Baker who said, in the context of Middle East peace, we can’t want it more than they do.

But what we can make sure of is, is that we are constantly present, constantly engaged, and setting out very clearly to both sides our belief that not only is it in the interests of each party to resolve these conflicts but it’s also in the interest of the United States. It is a vital national security interest of the United States to reduce these conflicts because whether we like it or not, we remain a dominant military superpower, and when conflicts break out, one way or another we get pulled into them. And that ends up costing us significantly in terms of both blood and treasure.

So I’m going to keep on at it. But I think on all these issues — nuclear disarmament, nuclear proliferation, Middle East peace — progress is going to be measured not in days, not in weeks. It’s going to take time. And progress will be halting. And sometimes we’ll take one step forward and two steps back, and there will be frustrations. And so it’s not going to run on the typical cable news 24/7 news cycle. But if we’re persistent, and we’ve got the right approach, then over time, I think that we can make progress.

All right? Thank you very much, everybody.

END
5:11 P.M. EDT

White House.gov Press Office Feed

04.13.10 02:16 PM

EXECUTIVE ORDER
– – – – – – –
BLOCKING PROPERTY OF CERTAIN PERSONS
CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONFLICT IN SOMALIA

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c) (UNPA), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, find that the deterioration of the security situation and the persistence of violence in Somalia, and acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, which have repeatedly been the subject of United Nations Security Council resolutions (including Resolution 1844 of November 20, 2008; Resolution 1846 of December 2, 2008; Resolution 1851 of December 16, 2008; and Resolution 1897 of November 30, 2009), and iolations of the arms embargo imposed by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 733 of January 23, 1992, and elaborated upon and amended by subsequent resolutions (including Resolution 1356 of June 19, 2001; Resolution 1725 of December 6, 2006; Resolution 1744 of February 20, 2007; Resolution 1772 of August 20, 2007; Resolution 1816 of June 2, 2008; and Resolution 1872 of May 26, 2009), constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, and I hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

I hereby order:

Section 1. (a) All property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the
possession or control of any United States person, including any overseas branch, of the following persons are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in:
(i) the persons listed in the Annex to this order;
and
(ii) any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State:

(A) to have engaged in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia, including but not limited to:

(1) acts that threaten the Djibouti Agreement of August 18, 2008, or the political process; or
(2) acts that threaten the Transitional Federal Institutions, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), or other international peacekeeping operations related to
Somalia;

(B) to have obstructed the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Somalia;

(C) to have directly or indirectly supplied, sold, or transferred to Somalia, or to have been the recipient in the territory of Somalia of, arms or any related materiel, or any technical advice, training, or assistance, including financing and financial assistance, related to military activities;

(D) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, logistical, or technical support for, or goods or services in support of, the activities
described in subsections (a)(ii)(A), (a)(ii)(B), or (a)(ii)(C) of this section or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order;
or

(E) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order.

(b) I hereby determine that, among other threats to the peace, security, or stability of Somalia, acts of piracy or armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia. (c) I hereby determine that, to the extent section 203(b)(2) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2)) may apply, the making of donations of the type of articles specified in such section by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection (a) of this section would seriously impair my ability to deal with the national emergency declared in this order, and I hereby prohibit such donations as provided by subsection (a) of this section.

(d) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section include but are not limited to:

(i) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; and

(ii) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

(e) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued
pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date of this order.

Sec. 2. (a) Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

Sec. 3. For the purposes of this order:

(a) the term "person" means an individual or entity;

(b) the term "entity" means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization;

(c) the term "United States person" means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any
jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States;

(d) the term "Transitional Federal Institutions" means the Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic adopted in February 2004 and the Somali federal institutions established pursuant to such charter, and includes their agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities; and

(e) the term "African Union Mission in Somalia" means the mission authorized by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 1744 of February 20, 2007, and reauthorized in subsequent resolutions, and includes its agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities.

Sec. 4. For those persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States, I find that because of the ability to transfer funds or other assets instantaneously, prior notice to such persons of measures to be taken pursuant to this order would render those measures ineffectual. I therefore determine that for these measures to be effective in addressing the national emergency declared in this order, there need be no prior notice of a listing or determination made pursuant to section 1(a) of this order.

Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA and the UNPA, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government consistent with applicable law. All agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order.

Sec. 6. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to submit the recurring and final reports to the Congress on the national emergency declared in this order, consistent with section 401(c) of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) and section 204(c) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)).

Sec. 7. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to determine that circumstances no longer warrant the blocking of the property and interests in property of a person listed in the Annex to this order, and to take necessary action to give effect to that determination.

Sec. 8. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the
United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

Sec. 9. This order is effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 13, 2010.

BARACK OBAMA

THE WHITE HOUSE,
April 12, 2010.

White House.gov Press Office Feed

04.13.10 02:16 PM

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

Consistent with subsection 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(b) (IEEPA), and section 301 of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1631 (NEA), I hereby report that I have issued an Executive Order (the "order") blocking the property of certain persons contributing to the conflict in Somalia. In that order, I declared a national emergency to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by that conflict, as described below.

The United Nations Security Council, in Resolution 1844 of November 20, 2008, reaffirmed its condemnation of all acts of violence in Somalia and incitement to violence inside Somalia, and expressed its concern at all acts intended to prevent or block a peaceful political process. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1844 also expressed grave concern over the recent increase in acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea against vessels off the coast of Somalia, and noted the role piracy may play in financing violations of the arms embargo on Somalia imposed by UNSCR 733 of January 23, 1992. In UNSCR 1844, the United Nations Security Council determined that the situation in Somalia poses a threat to international peace and security in the region and called on member States to apply certain measures against persons responsible for the continuing conflict. The United Nations Security Council has continued to express grave concern about the crisis in Somalia in UNSCR 1846 of December 2, 2008, UNSCR 1851 of December 16, 2008, and UNSCR 1872 of May 26, 2009.

Pursuant to the IEEPA and the NEA, I have determined that the deterioration of the security situation and the persistence of violence in Somalia, and acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. The order declares a national emergency to deal with this threat.

The order is not targeted at the entire country of Somalia, but rather is intended to target those who threaten peace and stability in Somalia, who inhibit the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia or the distribution of such assistance in Somalia, or who supply arms or related materiel in violation of the arms embargo. The order blocks the property and interests in property in the United States, or in the possession or control of United States persons, of the persons listed in the Annex to the order, as well as of any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State:

? to have engaged in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia, including but not limited to (1) acts that threaten the Djibouti Agreement of August 18, 2008, or the political process, or (2) acts that threaten the Transitional Federal Institutions, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), or other international peacekeeping operations related to Somalia;

? to have obstructed the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Somalia; or

? to have directly or indirectly supplied, sold, or transferred to Somalia, or to have been the recipient in the territory of Somalia of, arms or any related materiel, or any technical advice, training, or assistance, including financing and financial assistance, related to military activities.

The designation criteria will be applied in accordance with applicable Federal law including, where appropriate, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The designation criteria will also be applied taking into consideration the arms embargo on Somalia imposed by UNSCR 733 of January 23, 1992, as elaborated upon and amended by subsequent resolutions.

The order also authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to designate for blocking any person determined to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, logistical, or technical support for, or goods or services in support of, the activities described above or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the order. I determined that, among other threats to the peace, security, or stability of Somalia, acts of piracy or armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia. I further authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, in onsultation with the Secretary of State, to designate for blocking any person (defined as an individual or entity) determined to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the order.

I delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the authority to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and
regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA and the United Nations Participation Act, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the order. All executive agencies are directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of the order.

The order, a copy of which is enclosed, became effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 13, 2010.

BARACK OBAMA

THE WHITE HOUSE,
April 13, 2010.

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Nuclear Security Summit Work Plan
Reference Document

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

The international treaty against nuclear terrorism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in April 2005 bolsters the global legal framework to counterterrorist threats, including cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism opened for signature in September of 2005.

The Convention is a key part of global efforts to prevent terrorists from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the use of which could lead to catastrophic consequences. Based on an instrument originally proposed by the Russian Federation in 1998, the Convention provides for a definition of acts of nuclear terrorism and covers a broad range of possible targets, including those against nuclear power plants and nuclear reactors. Under its provisions, the alleged offenders must be either extradited or prosecuted. It also encourages States to cooperate in preventing terrorist attacks by sharing information and assisting each other in connection with criminal investigations and extradition proceedings. The treaty requires that any seized nuclear or radiological material is held in accordance with IAEA safeguards, and handled in regard to the IAEA´s health, safety, and physical protection standards.
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/…uclterror.html

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)

The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material entered into force on February 8, 1987 and as of March 2010 had 142 Parties as signatories. The Convention is the only legally binding international instrument in the area of physical protection of nuclear material and 1 of the 13 international counterterrorism instruments. It establishes measures related to the prevention, detection, and punishment of offenses related to nuclear material.

On July 8, 2005, States Parties to the CPPNM adopted by consensus an Amendment to the CPPNM. Whereas the obligations for physical protection under the CPPNM covered nuclear material during international transport, the Amendment to the CPPNM makes it legally binding for States Parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage and transport. It also provides for expanded cooperation between and among States regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage, and prevent and combat related offences.

The Amendment will enter into force when it has been ratified by two-thirds of the States Parties of the Convention. The Amendment constitutes an important milestone in international efforts to improve the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. The Amendment is vitally important for nuclear security and will have a major impact in reducing the vulnerability of States Parties to nuclear terrorism.

The General Conference has appealed to all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the CPPNM as soon as possible. The IAEA’s Board of Governors and General Conference have both encouraged all States Parties to ratify the Amendment and to act in accordance with its object and purpose pending its entry into force.
http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/cppnm.htm

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540

In April 2004, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted UNSCR 1540, establishing for the first time binding obligations on all U.N. member states under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to take and enforce effective measures against the proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery and related materials. UNSCR 1540, if fully implemented, can help ensure that no State or non-State actor is a source or beneficiary of WMD proliferation. All states have three primary obligations under UNSCR 1540 relating to such items: to prohibit support to non-State actors seeking such items; to adopt and enforce effective laws prohibiting the proliferation of such items to non-State actors, and prohibiting assisting or financing such proliferation; and to take and enforce effective measures to control these items, in order to prevent their proliferation, as well as to control the provision of funds and services that contribute to proliferation. If implemented successfully, each state’s actions will significantly strengthen the international standards relating to the export of sensitive items and support for proliferators (including financing) and ensure that non-state actors, including terrorist and black-market networks, do not gain access to chemical, nuclear or biological weapons, their means of delivery or related materials.
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c18943.htm

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 Voluntary Fund

The United States is strongly committed to establishing a voluntary fund to help provide the technical support and expertise to support implementation of UNSCR 1540. The United States will seek to make a meaningful contribution to such a trust fund once it is established, provided it contains effective transparency and accountability mechanisms. The United States is prepared to work with the UNSCR 1540 Committee and others to make that happen.
A voluntary U.N. trust fund could help match donors with states who need help to help strengthen national export laws and detection systems to prevent materiel, technology, and financial resources from making their way to governments and terrorists seeking to build these weapons. A number of nations, including the United States, provide bilateral assistance to countries to combat WMD and missile proliferation. Other multilateral organizations, such as the IAEA, offer assistance. Nongovernment organizations are another source of expertise and support. Expanding the multilateral efforts at the U.N. through a voluntary trust fund should inject more coordination, cohesion, and effectiveness into the many diverse national, multinational and nongovernmental assistance efforts.
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/state…ber/130100.htm

The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities: INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5

The IAEA’s Information Circular (INFCIRC) 225, which provides guidance and recommendations for developing and implementing the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, was last published in 1999 in its fourth revision. The United States has long pushed for the INFCIRC/225 to be revised again to address the post 9/11/2001 threat environment and to conform with and provide guidance for implementation of the amended CPPNM and UNSCR 1540 obligations. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration led the United States Government and a core group of like-minded member states to draft a revision that was presented to the IAEA. Subsequently, the IAEA called a number of member states consultant meetings and, most recently, a final stage technical meeting for concurrence on a revised text that is being sent to all member states for a final 120-day review. Publication of this important fifth revision (INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5), which provides guidance for planning and implementing effective physical protection regime, is anticipated in calendar year 2010.

International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Security Plan 2010-2013

The objective of the Nuclear Security Plan for 2010–2013, submitted by the IAEA’s Director General and approved by its Board of Governors, is to contribute to global efforts to achieve worldwide, effective security wherever nuclear or other radioactive material is in use, storage and/or transport, and of associated facilities, by supporting States, upon request, in their efforts to establish and maintain effective nuclear security through assistance in capacity building, guidance, human resource development, sustainability and risk reduction. The objective is also to assist adherence to and implementation of nuclear security related international legal instruments; and to strengthen the international cooperation and coordination of assistance given through bilateral programs and other international initiatives in a manner which also would contribute to enabling the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear energy and of such applications with radioactive substances.

The Plan is consistent with the objective of the Agency’s Medium Term Strategy 2006–2011, to “establish and achieve global acceptance of an agreed international framework for nuclear security and support its application”.
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/…gc53-18_en.pdf

IAEA Nuclear Security Series
Nuclear security issues relating to the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access and illegal transfer, or other malicious acts involving nuclear material and other radioactive substances and their associated facilities are addressed in the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidelines series of publications. These publications are consistent with, and complement, international nuclear security instruments such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment, the UNSCRs 1373 and 1540 and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

Publications in the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidelines series are issued in the following categories:

Nuclear Security Fundamentals contain objectives, concepts, and principles of nuclear security and provide the basis for security recommendations.Recommendations present best practices that should be adopted by member states in the application of the Nuclear Security Fundamentals.Implementing Guides provide further elaboration of the Recommendations in broad areas and suggest measures for their implementation.Technical Guidance publications comprise: Reference Manuals, with detailed measures and/or guidance on how to apply the Implementing Guides in specific fields or activities; Training Guides, covering the syllabus and/or manuals for IAEA training courses in the area of nuclear security; and Service Guides, which provide guidance on the conduct and scope of IAEA nuclear security advisory missions.http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/nucl…ity_series.htm

IAEA Implementing Guide on Development, Use and Maintenance of the Design Basis Threat

The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4 (Corrected) describes the design basis threat (DBT) tool and recommends development of a notional DBT. Recognizing the importance assigned to the DBT tool in INFCIRC/225, a number of IAEA member states requested that workshops be developed and conducted to present a methodology for developing, maintaining, and using a DBT. As an adjunct to the workshops, a draft was developed and circulated for comment.

The draft was intended to implement the recommendations in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4 (Corrected), which was issued in 1999. Since then, further developments have occurred to strengthen the international regime for the physical protection of nuclear material and radioactive material and associated facilities, including endorsement of The Physical Protection Objectives and Fundamental Principles (GOV/2001/41/Attachment) by the IAEA Board of Governors in September 2001, and endorsement of the revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources by the Board of Governors in 2004. These objectives and principles were then incorporated into the July 8, 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Implementing Guide represents an update of the original draft guidance reflecting further developments.

A DBT is a comprehensive description of the motivation, intentions, and capabilities of potential adversaries against which protection systems are designed and evaluated. Such definitions permit security planning on the basis of risk management. A DBT is derived from credible intelligence information and other data concerning threats, but is not intended to be a statement about actual, prevailing threats. Historically, states have used DBTs in their regulatory system to achieve appropriate allocations of resources to the protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities against malicious acts by potential adversaries that could result in high consequences, particularly radiological consequences or consequences of proliferation; however, a DBT can also be used to protect any asset with associated high potential consequences (e.g., other radioactive material of high activity).

The Implementing Guide:

Describes a DBT, including what it is and why and under what circumstances it is used;Identifies and recommends the roles and responsibilities of organizations that should be involved in the development, use, and maintenance of a DBT;Describes how to conduct a national threat assessment as a precursor to a DBT;Explains how a DBT can be developed, including:the information required to develop a DBT;the decision making processes for the development of a DBT; Explains how a DBT is incorporated into a State’s nuclear security regime;Explains the conditions for a review of the DBT, and how the review and update are conductedhttp://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publica…ub1386_web.pdf

International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS)

The International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) was created by the IAEA to assist states in strengthening their national nuclear security regime. IPPAS provides peer advice on implementing international instruments, and agency guidance on the protection of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities.

During the IPPAS mission, the state’s physical protection system is reviewed and compared with international guidelines (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4) and internationally recognized best practices. Based on this review, recommendations for improvements are provided including follow-up activities and assistance. Following IPPAS recommendations, actual upgrades of physical protection systems were initiated in several Member States through bilateral support programs.

At the request of a member state, IPPAS assembles a team of international experts who assess the state’s system of physical protection, compare it with international best practices and make recommendations for improvements. IPPAS missions are conducted both on a nation-wide and facility-specific basis. As of June 30, 2008, 41 IPPAS missions have been completed in all regions of the world.
http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/ippas.htm

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

Participants in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism are committed to the following Statement of Principles to develop partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism on a determined and systematic basis, consistent with national legal authorities and obligations they have under relevant international legal frameworks, notably the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment, UNSCRs 1373 and 1540. They call on all states concerned with this threat to international peace and security, to make a commitment to implement on a voluntary basis the following principles:

Develop, if necessary, and improve accounting, control and physical protection systems for nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances;Enhance security of civilian nuclear facilities;Improve the ability to detect nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances in order to prevent illicit trafficking in such materials and substances, to include cooperation in the research and development of national detection capabilities that would be interoperable;Improve capabilities of participants to search for, confiscate, and establish safe control over unlawfully held nuclear or other radioactive materials and substances or devices using them. Prevent the provision of safe haven to terrorists and financial or economic resources to terrorists seeking to acquire or use nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances;Ensure adequate respective national legal and regulatory frameworks sufficient to provide for the implementation of appropriate criminal and, if applicable, civil liability for terrorists and those who facilitate acts of nuclear terrorism;Improve capabilities of participants for response, mitigation, and investigation, in cases of terrorist attacks involving the use of nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances, including the development of technical means to identify nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances that are, or may be, involved in the incident; andPromote information sharing pertaining to the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism and their facilitation, taking appropriate measures consistent with their national law and international obligations to protect the confidentiality of any information which they exchange in confidence.Global Initiative participants recognize the role of the IAEA in the fields of nuclear safety and security and the IAEA has been invited to serve as an observer to the Initiative. All participants commend the IAEA for its action in the field of nuclear security. Participants intend for the IAEA to contribute to the Initiative through its ongoing activities and technical expertise.

The initial partner nations intend to establish a terms of reference for implementation and assessment to support effective fulfillment of the initiative, including by facilitating the provision of assistance to participants that may require it, and facilitating suitable exercises.

They express the desire to broaden participation in the Global Initiative to other countries who share the common goals of the Initiative, are actively committed to combating nuclear terrorism, and endorse the Statement of Principles.
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/126995.htm

The G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
Since its launch by G-8 Leaders at the June 2002 Kananaskis G-8 Summit, the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction has made significant progress toward its aim of preventing terrorists or states that support them from acquiring or developing WMD. The Global Partnership is addressing nonproliferation, disarmament, counterterrorism, and nuclear safety issues through cooperative projects in such areas as destruction of chemical weapons; the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines; the security and disposition of fissile materials; and rechanneling employment of former weapons scientists to peaceful civilian endeavors. The G-8 Global Partnership Working Group under the G-8 Senior Group coordinates international activities to advance the initiative. Progress to date is reported and goals and plans for coming years are discussed and approved during the annual G-8 summits.
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c12743.htm

April 13, 2010

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April 12-13, 2010

Armenia: Ratified International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, passed new export control law

Argentina: Joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; moving toward the ratification of the International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and 2005 Amendment of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

Australia: Moving toward the ratification of the International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

Belgium: Contributing $300,000 to International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Security Fund

Canada: Returning a large amount of spent highly enriched uranium fuel from their medical isotope production reactor to the United States; championing the extension of the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; funding highly enriched uranium removals from Mexico and Vietnam; hosting and funding a World Institute of Nuclear Security best practices workshop in Ottawa; unveiling $100 million in new bilateral security cooperation with Russia

Chile: Removed all highly enriched uranium (18kgs) in March 2010

China: Announce cooperation on nuclear security Center of Excellence

Egypt: Passed new comprehensive nuclear law in March 2010 that includes nuclear security, criminalization of sabotage and illicit trafficking provisions as well as envisaging an independent regulatory authority

France: Ratifying the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear materials; inviting an International Physical Protection Advisory Service security review from the International Atomic Energy Agency; incorporating training in nuclear security at the European Nuclear Safety Training and Tutoring Institute and the International Nuclear Energy Institute (announced during March 2010 Paris nuclear energy conference)

Finland: Invited an International Physical Protection Advisory Service security review from the International Atomic Energy Agency

Germany: Moving toward ratifying 2005 Amendment of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

Georgia: Signed instrument of approval for International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on April 7, 2010

India: Announcing the creation of a Nuclear Energy Center with a nuclear security component

Italy: Signed a Megaports agreement (to install detection equipment at ports) with U.S.; establishing a school of nuclear security in Trieste, in collaboration with the Abdus Salam International Center for Theoretical Physics and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to train nuclear personnel from developing countries

Japan: Launching an integrated regional support center; research and development on detection and forensics; contributing new resources to International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Security Fund; hosting and funding a World Institute of Nuclear Security best practices conference

Kazakhstan: Converting a highly enriched uranium research reactor and eliminating remaining highly enriched uranium; cooperative work on BN-350 rector shutdown and fuel security; hosting a Global Initiative Activity in June; considering a International Nuclear Security Training Center.

Malaysia: Passed new export control law

Mexico: Converting a highly enriched uranium research reactor and eliminating remaining highly enriched uranium working through IAEA

New Zealand: Contributing to International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Security Fund; contributing to the U.S. Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative

Norway: Contributing $3.3 million over the next four years to the IAEA nuclear security fund (flexible funds for use for activities in developing countries); contributing $500,000 in additional support to Kazakhstan’s efforts to upgrade portal monitors to prevent nuclear smuggling as part of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

Philippines: Joining the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

Republic of Korea: Hosting 2012 Nuclear Security Summit; hosting a Global Initiative activity

Russia: Signing Plutonium Disposition protocol; ending plutonium production; contributing to International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Security Fund

Saudi Arabia: Hosting a UNSCR 1540 conference for Gulf Cooperation Council

Thailand: Joining the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

Ukraine: Removing all highly enriched uranium by next Summit—half of it by year’s end

United Arab Emirates: Signed a Megaports Agreement with the U.S.

United Kingdom: Contributing $6 million to International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Security Fund; inviting an International Physical Protection Advisory Service security review from the International Atomic Energy Agency; ratification of the International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and 2005 Amendment of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

Vietnam: Converting a highly enriched uranium research reactor; joining the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

IAEA: Completing final review of the next revision of INFCIRC 225, the IAEA nuclear physical security guidance document

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Key Facts about the Nuclear Security Summit

An Historic Event

Not since 1945 has a U.S. President hosted a gathering of so many Heads of State and Government. This unprecedented meeting is to address an unprecedented threat—the threat of nuclear materials in the hands of terrorists or criminals.

The Promise of Prague

In April 2009, in Prague, President Obama spoke of his vision of a world without nuclear weapons even as he recognized the need to create the conditions to bring about such a world. To that end, he put forward a comprehensive agenda to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, reduce nuclear arsenals, and secure nuclear materials.

In April 2010, the United States took three bold steps in the direction of creating those conditions with the release of a Nuclear Posture Review that reduces our dependence on nuclear weapons while strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and maintaining a strong deterrent; signing a New START treaty with Russia that limits the number of strategic arms on both sides, and renews U.S.-Russian leadership on nuclear issues; and now has convened a gathering of world leaders to Washington to discuss the need to secure nuclear materials and prevent acts of nuclear terrorism and trafficking.

The Threat

Over 2000 tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium exist in dozens of countries with a variety of peaceful as well as military uses. There have been 18 documented cases of theft or loss of highly enriched uranium or plutonium, and perhaps others not yet discovered. We know that al-Qa’ida, and possibly other terrorist or criminal groups, are seeking nuclear weapons –as well as the materials and expertise needed to make them. The consequences of a nuclear detonation, or even an attempted detonation, perpetrated by a terrorist or criminal group anywhere in the world would be devastating. Any country could be a target, and all countries would feel the effects.

The Solution

The best way to keep terrorists and criminals from getting nuclear weapons is to keep all weapons and materials, as well as the know-how to make and use them, secure. That is our first and best line of defense. We must also bolster our ability to detect smuggled material, recover lost material, identify the materials origin and prosecute those who are trading in these materials.

The Nuclear Security Summit

Just as the United States is not the only country that would suffer from nuclear terrorism, we cannot prevent it on our own. The Nuclear Security Summit highlights the global threat posed by nuclear terrorism and the need to work together to secure nuclear material and prevent illicit nuclear trafficking and nuclear terrorism.
The leaders of 47 nations came together to advance a common approach and commitment to nuclear security at the highest levels. Leaders in attendance have renewed their commitment to ensure that nuclear materials under their control are not stolen or diverted for use by terrorists, and pledged to continue to evaluate the threat and improve the security as changing conditions may require, and to exchange best practices and practical solutions for doing so. The Summit reinforced the principle that all states are responsible for ensuring the best security of their materials, for seeking assistance if necessary, and providing assistance if asked. It promoted the international treaties that address nuclear security and nuclear terrorism and led to specific national actions that advanced global security.

The Communiqué

The Summit Communiqué is a high-level political statement by the leaders of all 47 countries to strengthen nuclear security and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism and:

Endorses President Obama’s call to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years, and pledges to work together toward this end;Calls for focused national efforts to improve security and accounting of nuclear materials and strengthen regulations – with a special focus on plutonium and highly enriched uranium;Seeks consolidation of stocks of highly enriched uranium and plutonium and reduction in the use of highly enriched uranium;Promotes universality of key international treaties on nuclear security and nuclear terrorism;Notes the positive contributions of mechanisms like the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, to build capacity among law enforcement, industry, and technical personnel;Calls for the International Atomic Energy Agency to receive the resources it needs to develop nuclear security guidelines and provide advice to its members on how to implement them;Seeks to ensure that bilateral and multilateral security assistance would be applied where it can do the most good;andEncourages nuclear industry to share best practices for nuclear security, at the same time making sure that security measures do not prevent countries from enjoying the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy.The Work Plan

The Summit Work Plan represents guidance for national and international actions to carry out the pledges of the Communiqué. This detailed document lays out the specific steps that will need to be taken to bring the vision of the Communiqué into reality. These steps include:

Ratifying and implementing treaties on nuclear security and nuclear terrorism;Cooperating through the United Nations to implement and assist others in connection with Security Council resolutions;Working with the International Atomic Energy Agency to update and implement security guidance and carry out advisory services;Reviewing national regulatory and legal requirements relating to nuclear security and nuclear trafficking;Converting civilian facilities that use highly enriched uranium to non-weapons-usable materials;Research on new nuclear fuels, detection methods, and forensics techniques;Development of corporate and institutional cultures that prioritize nuclear security;Education and training to ensure that countries and facilities have the people they need to protect their materials; andJoint exercises among law enforcement and customs officials to enhance nuclear detection approaches.Country Commitments

In addition to signing on to the Communiqué and Work Plan, many Summit Participants have made commitments to support the Summit either by taking national actions to increase nuclear security domestically or by working through bilateral or multilateral mechanisms to improve security globally. These specific commitments will enhance global security, provide momentum to the effort to secure nuclear materials, and represent the sense of urgency that has been galvanized by the nature of the threat and the occasion of the Summit. Many of these commitments are outlined in National Statements.

Next Steps

In preparation for the Summit, each participating entity named a -Sherpa? to prepare their leadership for full participation. This cadre of specialists, each of whom has both the expertise and leadership positions in their countries to effect change, is a natural network to carrying out the goals of the Summit. The Sherpas plan to reconvene in December to evaluate progress against Summit goals. Additionally, Summit participants plan to reach out to countries who were not able to attend the Washington Summit to explain its goals and outcomes and to expand the dialogue among a wider group. In 2012, leaders will gather again—this time the Republic of Korea—to take stock of the post-Washington work and set new goals for nuclear security.

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National Statement of the United States
Nuclear Security Summit
Washington, D.C. 2010

In April 2009, President Obama addressed the citizens of Prague and the world, stating clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world free of nuclear weapons. Recognizing this goal is not immediately achievable, the President laid the groundwork to ensure that through the steady accumulation of progress we move continually along the path toward this critical objective.

In that speech, the President identified the risk of nuclear terrorism as the most immediate and extreme threat to global security, called for an international four-year effort to secure vulnerable nuclear material, and announced his intent to host a Nuclear Security Summit. Over the past year, with the leadership of President Obama, we have made progress on this unprecedented call to action. At the United Nations Security Council last fall, we unanimously passed Resolution 1887 endorsing the goal of securing all nuclear materials and preventing the spread and use of nuclear weapons.

This Nuclear Security Summit takes place on April 12-13, 2010. Leaders from 47 nations as well as the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Union will gather in Washington, DC – the largest gathering of heads of state and government in Washington’s history.

Our objective is clear: ensure that terrorists never gain access to plutonium or highly-enriched uranium – the essential ingredients of a nuclear weapon. The challenge we face is how to lock down the over 2000 tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium exist in dozens of countries with a variety of peaceful as well as military uses. The consequences of a nuclear detonation, or even an attempted detonation, perpetrated by a terrorist or criminal group anywhere in the world would be devastating. Not only could there be an enormous loss of life but there would also be overwhelming economic, political and psychological consequences that would reverberate worldwide.

Just as the United States is not the only country that would suffer from nuclear terrorism, we cannot prevent it on our own. The goal of the Nuclear Security Summit is to highlight this global threat and agree to steps we can take together to secure nuclear material and prevent illicit nuclear trafficking. The Nuclear Security Summit provides an occasion for the United States to highlight some of its recent and future efforts to show leadership in improving the security of nuclear materials both at home and abroad.

Domestic Nuclear Security: Our first priority is to ensure that nuclear materials and facilities in the United States are secure. Through sustainable security programs, including a continual evaluation of the threat, inspections, and emergency response, preparedness and coordination programs, the United States keeps
its materials secure. Following September 11, 2001, security at domestic facilities was enhanced and is evaluated on a continuous basis. Most recently, on March 22, 2010, the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee—an ultra-secure uranium warehouse that replaces multiple aging facilities with a single, state-of-the-art storage facility— came on-line as one measure of our increased security posture.

As part of our ongoing efforts to evaluate the security of its nuclear facilities, we will request an advisory mission from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s International Physical Protection Advisory Service to review physical protection at the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Center for Neutron Research, licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Center’s reactor supports a broad program of research using neutron techniques, and develops and applies new neutron measurement technologies. NIST has committed to convert its reactor from highly enriched uranium to a new low enriched uranium fuel once that has been tested and approved for use. This advisory mission will provide an independent, confidential comparison of the physical protection regulations and their implementation with international guidelines and best practices.

Ratifying Conventions: The United States has accelerated efforts to complete ratification procedures for the two key international treaties governing nuclear security, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Legislation that brings U.S. laws into line with these treaties has been submitted to the Congress. Once laws are in place implementing the conventions, the United States will deposit its instruments of ratification.

Minimizing Highly Enriched Uranium: In 2009, the United States completed conversion of all 20 of our highly-enriched-uranium-fueled reactors that could be converted to use low enriched uranium fuel. There are six remaining highly-enriched-uranium-fueled reactors in the United States that will be converted to use low enriched uranium fuel once acceptable fuel has been developed.

Plutonium Disposition: The United States and Russia have just signed the Protocol to the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, which commits both countries to eliminate 68 metric tons of plutonium (34 each) from their weapons programs—enough material for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons combined. Furthermore, the United States is in the final stages of approval to bring up to 100 kilograms of plutonium from sites of concern into the United States pending disposition, thereby eliminating vulnerable, weapons-usable plutonium in certain cases where no other solution is available.

Nuclear Detection: Due to shortages in materials for current neutron detectors, the United States is working to develop and deploy new neutron detection technologies through an aggressive program of research, development, test, and evaluation. The time frame for this effort has been shortened from 5 years to 18 months.
Nuclear Forensics: With the emerging discipline of nuclear -archeology?, the United States has launched an international effort to develop nuclear forensics library, exercises, common lexicons, and other foundational elements that will provide the framework for cooperation between governments investigating the illicit use of nuclear materials.

Sharing Best Practices: Nuclear security can be advanced through sharing best practices among those with responsibility for securing and accounting for nuclear materials in the private and public sectors. We are working with Russia and other members to turn the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into a durable international institution. The United States strongly supports the World Institute for Nuclear Security as an effective forum for sharing best security practices, based on its broad membership in 44 countries, representing private industry, police, government agencies, state regulators and national laboratories. We will continue to provide financial support and expertise and encourage other countries to do so as well.

International Cooperation: Working within existing legal and multilateral nuclear security frameworks, U.S. nuclear security cooperative activities help states worldwide meet their nuclear security obligations, uphold the highest international nuclear security recommendations and standards, and maximize the peaceful benefits of nuclear materials while reducing the risks of their misuse. In its Fiscal Year 2011 budget request, the U.S. has requested the largest amount ever – $1.6 billion, a 31% increase over the previous year – for these programs across multiple agencies working with countries around the world.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540: In 2009 the UN Security Council created a committee to assist states in implementing their obligations under this universal, binding resolution. The United States has proposed, and intends to contribute to, a voluntary fund to help countries meet the obligations this resolution places on them, and to match them up with wide range of national, international, and nongovernmental sources of assistance.

Nuclear Security Programme of the International Atomic Energy Agency: In 2009, the United States led efforts to gain agreement of the 150-plus nations of the International Atomic Energy Agency to establish for the first time a dedicated budget line for nuclear security, which had until then been funded exclusively through voluntary contributions from member states. The U.S. voluntary contribution to this effort has risen 59% since 2007.

G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction: In 2002, under the leadership of Canada, the G8 committed $20 billion over ten years to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Eight years later, the 23 G8 Partners have allocated more than $18 billion to this effort. We have made progress with Russia to eliminate stocks of chemical weapons and to dismantle decommissioned nuclear submarines. We are ready to join with our Canadian colleagues and call for another ten-year extension with an expanded scope/mission and to commit up to another $10 billion towards new projects, including expanding our efforts to improving nuclear security to countries not previously eligible for G8 assistance.

White House.gov Press Office Feed

04.13.10 02:13 PM

This Work Plan supports the Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit. It constitutes a political commitment by the Participating States to carry out, on a voluntary basis, applicable portions of this Work Plan, consistent with respective national laws and international obligations, in all aspects of the storage, use, transportation and disposal of nuclear materials and in preventing non-state actors from obtaining the information required to use such material for malicious purposes.

Recognizing the importance of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as an important legally binding multilateral instrument addressing threats posed by acts of nuclear terrorism:

1. Participating States Parties to the Convention will work together to achieve universality of the Convention, as soon as possible;

2. Participating States Parties to the Convention will assist States, as appropriate and upon their request, to implement the Convention; and

3. Participating States Parties to the Convention encourage discussions among States Parties to consider measures to ensure its effective implementation, as called for in Article 20 of the Convention.

Recognizing the importance of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as the only multilateral legally binding agreement dealing with the physical protection of nuclear material in peaceful uses, and the value of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention in strengthening global security:

1. Participating States Parties to the Convention will work towards its universal adherence and where applicable, to accelerate the ratification processes of the Amendment to the Convention and to act for early implementation of that Amendment;

2. Participating States Parties to the Convention call on all States to act in accordance with the object and purpose of the Amendment until such time as it enters into force; and

3. Participating States Parties to the Convention will assist States, as appropriate and upon their request, to implement the Convention and the Amendment.

Noting the need to fully implement United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) on preventing non-State actors from obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their means of delivery and related materials, in particular as it relates to nuclear material:

1. Participating States support the continued dialogue between the Security Council committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 and States and support strengthened international cooperation in this regard, in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions and within the framework of the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy;

2. Participating States support the activities of the Security Council committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 to promote full implementation;

3. Participating States recognize the importance of complete and timely reporting as called for by UNSCR 1540, and will work with other States to do so, including by providing technical support or assistance, as requested;

4. Participating States note the outcome of Comprehensive Review by the Security Council committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540, including the consideration of the establishment of a voluntary fund, and express their support for ensuring the effective and sustainable support for the activities of the 1540 Committee;

5. With respect to the nuclear security-related aspects of Paragraph 3, sections (a) and (b) of UNSCR 1540, Participating States recognize the importance of evaluating and improving their physical protection systems to ensure that they are capable of achieving the objectives set out in relevant International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Series documents and as contained in the document “Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities,” (INFCIRC/225); and

6. Participating States in a position to do so are encouraged to provide technical assistance to those States that request it through appropriate mechanisms, including through the Committee’s efforts to match needs with available resources.

Welcoming IAEA activities in support of national efforts to enhance nuclear security worldwide and commending the work of the IAEA for the provision of assistance, upon request, through its Nuclear Security Programme and for the implementation of the Nuclear Security Plan 2010 – 2013, approved by the Board of Governors in September 2009 and noted by the IAEA General Conference, and welcoming IAEA programs to advance new technologies to improve nuclear security and nuclear materials accountancy.

Recognizing that the IAEA is facilitating the development by member states, in the framework of the Nuclear Security Series, of guidance and recommendations relating to the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access and illegal transfer, or other malicious acts involving, inter alia, nuclear material, and associated facilities, and is providing guidance in developing and implementing effective nuclear security measures.

Noting that pursuit of the objectives of this Work Plan will not be interpreted so as to alter the mandate or responsibilities of the IAEA:

1. Participating States note that the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series of documents provides recommendations and guidance to assist States in a wide range of aspects of nuclear security, and encourage the widest possible participation by all its member states in the process;

2. Participating States in a position to do so, will work actively with the IAEA towards the completion and implementation, as appropriate, of the guidance provided by the Nuclear Security Series, and to assist, upon request, other States in doing so;

3. Participating States in particular welcome and support the IAEA’s efforts to finalize the fifth revision of the recommendations contained in INFCIRC/225, which will be published in the Nuclear Security Series;

4. Participating States recognize the importance of nuclear material accountancy in support of nuclear security and look forward to the completion of the technical guidance document on “Nuclear Material Accountancy Systems at Facilities”;

5. Participating States will endeavor to incorporate, as appropriate, the relevant principles set out in the Nuclear Security Series documents, into the planning, construction, and operation of nuclear facilities;

6. Participating States, when implementing their national nuclear security measures, will support the use of the IAEA Implementing Guide on the Development, Use and Maintenance of the Design Basis Threat to elaborate their national design basis threat as appropriate, to include the consideration of outsider and insider threats;

7. Participating States welcome the IAEA’s efforts to assist States to develop, upon request, Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans to consolidate their nuclear security needs into integrated plans for nuclear security improvements and assistance;

8. Participating States recognize the value of IAEA support mechanisms such as the International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions to review, as requested, their physical protection systems for civilian nuclear material and facilities; and

9. Participating States call upon all member states of the IAEA in a position to do so to provide the necessary support to enable the IAEA to implement these important activities.

Noting the contributions to the promotion of nuclear security by the U.N. and initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, as well as other bilateral, regional, multilateral, and nongovernmental activities within their respective mandates and memberships:

1. Participating States will work together, as appropriate, to ensure that nuclear security cooperation mechanisms are complementary, reinforcing, efficient, consistent with related IAEA activities, and appropriately matched to identified needs in those States requesting assistance;

2. Participating States encourage, where appropriate, expanded participation in and commitment to international initiatives and voluntary cooperative mechanisms aimed at improving nuclear security and preventing nuclear terrorism; and

3. Participating States welcome the intent of the members of the G-8 Global Partnership, in a position to do so, to undertake additional programming to enhance nuclear security.

Recognizing States’ rights to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and noting the responsibility of each State for the use and management of all nuclear materials and facilities under its jurisdiction and recognize that highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium are particularly sensitive and require special precautions:

1. Participating States will consider, where appropriate, the consolidation of national sites where nuclear material is held;

2. Participating States will continue to exercise particular care in ensuring the safe and secure transport of nuclear materials, both in domestic and international transport;

3. Participating States, where appropriate, will consider on a national basis the safe, secure and timely removal and disposition of nuclear materials from facilities no longer using them;

4. Participating States will continue to exercise particular care in securing and accounting for separated plutonium, taking into consideration the potential of various forms for use in a nuclear explosive device;

5. Participating States will consider, where appropriate, converting highly-enriched-uranium fueled research reactors, and other nuclear facilities using highly enriched uranium, to use low enriched uranium, where it is technically and economically feasible;

6. Participating States, as appropriate, will collaborate to research and develop new technologies that require neither highly enriched uranium fuels for reactor operation nor highly enriched uranium targets for producing medical or other isotopes, and will encourage the use of low enriched uranium and other proliferation-resistant technologies and fuels in various commercial applications such as isotope production;

7. Participating States in a position to do so will provide assistance to those States requesting assistance to secure, account for, consolidate, and convert nuclear materials; and

8. Participating States will consider how to best address the security of radioactive sources, as well as consider further steps as appropriate.

Mindful of the responsibilities of every Participating State to maintain effective nuclear security and a robust domestic regulatory capacity:

1. Participating States will establish and maintain effective national nuclear security regulations, including the periodic review and adjustment of the regulations as the State considers appropriate;

2. Participating States undertake to maximize regulatory independence, consistent with each State’s particular legal and institutional structures;

3. Participating States will undertake to build regulatory capacity and ensure sufficiently trained and fully vetted professional nuclear security staff and adequate resources, taking into account current needs and future expansion of their respective nuclear programs; and

4. Participating States will pursue the review and enforcement of compliance with national nuclear security regulations as a matter of priority.

Understanding the role of the nuclear industry, including the private sector, in nuclear security and recognizing that national governments are responsible for standard setting within each State:

1. Participating States will work, in guiding the nuclear industry, to promote and sustain strong nuclear security culture and corporate commitment to implement robust security practices, including regular exercises and performance testing of nuclear security features, consistent with national regulations;

2. Consistent with State requirements, Participating States will facilitate exchange of best practices, where legally and practically feasible, in nuclear security in the nuclear industry, and in this respect, will utilize relevant institutions to support such exchanges; and

3. Participating States encourage nuclear operators and architect/engineering firms to take into account and incorporate, where appropriate, effective measures of physical protection and security culture into the planning, construction, and operation of civilian nuclear facilities and provide technical assistance, upon request, to other States in doing so.

Emphasizing the importance of the human dimension of nuclear security, the need to enhance security culture, and the need to maintain a well-trained cadre of technical experts:

1. Participating States will promote cooperation, as appropriate, among international organizations, governments, industries, other stakeholders, and academia for effective capacity building, including human resources development in nuclear security programs;

2. Participating States will encourage the creation of and networking among nuclear security support centres for capacity building to disseminate and share best practices and will support IAEA activities in this area;

3. Participating States encourage the creation of adequate national nuclear security capacities, and encourage supplier countries and technology suppliers to support those capacities in the recipient countries, including human resources development through education and training, upon request and consistent with each State’s particular legal and institutional structures;

4. Participating States will encourage an integrated approach to education and training and institutional capacity building by all stakeholders having a key role in establishing and maintaining adequate security infrastructure; and

5. Participating States will encourage the implementation of national measures to ensure the proper management of sensitive information in order to prevent illicit acquisition or use of nuclear material, and, where appropriate, will support bilateral and multilateral capacity building projects, upon request.

Underscoring the value of exchanging accurate and verified information, without prejudice to confidentiality provisions, to detect, prevent, suppress, investigate, and prosecute acts or attempted acts of illicit nuclear trafficking and nuclear terrorism:

1. Participating States will strive to improve their national criminal laws, as needed, to ensure that they have the adequate authority to prosecute all types of cases of illicit nuclear trafficking and nuclear terrorism and commit to prosecuting these crimes to the full extent of the law;

2. Participating States are encouraged to develop and apply mechanisms to expand sharing of information on issues, challenges, risks and solutions related to nuclear security, nuclear terrorism and illicit nuclear trafficking in a comprehensive and timely manner; and

3. Participating States are encouraged to develop methods and mechanisms, where appropriate, to enhance bilateral and multilateral collaboration in sharing urgent and relevant information on nuclear security and incidents involving illicit nuclear trafficking.

Noting the IAEA’s and Participating States’ work in the field of nuclear detection and nuclear forensics, aimed at assisting States in connection with the detection of and response to illicitly trafficked nuclear material, and determination of its origin, and recognizing the importance of respecting provisions on confidentiality of information:

1. Participating States will consider taking further steps, nationally, bilaterally or multilaterally, to enhance their technical capabilities, including the appropriate use of new and innovative technologies, to prevent and combat illicit nuclear trafficking;

2. Participating States will explore ways to work together to develop national capacities for nuclear forensics, such as the creation of national libraries and an international directory of points of contact, to facilitate and encourage cooperation between States in combating illicit nuclear trafficking , including relevant IAEA activities in this area; and

3. Participating States will explore ways to enhance broader cooperation among local, national and international customs and law enforcement bodies to prevent illicit nuclear trafficking and acts of nuclear terrorism, including through joint exercises and sharing of best practices.

April 13, 2010

White House.gov Press Office Feed

04.13.10 02:00 PM

3:47 P.M. (Local)

DR. BIDEN: Okay, so this has been an absolutely incredible trip. General Keen from the U.S. Army took us around with the U.S. military today. We saw areas of devastation. We saw schools. We saw camps.

But I think the one thing that we take away from it is really the strength and the resilience of the human spirit, and that’s what we saw today and that’s what we’ll take home to Washington with us.

Thank you.

MRS. OBAMA: Well, and I think it was important for Jill and I to come now because we’re at the point where the relief efforts are underway but the attention of the world starts to wane a bit. And as we enter the rainy season and the hurricane season, you know, the issues are just going to become more compounded. And I think it was important for us to come and shed a light.

But it was also important to speak to the President and First Lady, who is just — she is just a powerhouse. And she’s been working on education. The school that we visited, this sort of bus camp, was one of two sites that are feeding and caring for nearly a thousand children a day that are coming through those — that particular site. They’re reading, they’re dancing, they’re painting. I painted a purple fish, by the way — (laughter) — and Jill did a house —

DR. BIDEN: A house. (Laughter.)

MRS. OBAMA: With trees and everything. It’s very good.

But it’s providing some level of stability and normalcy for kids who don’t really have a place to go yet.

But what is clear is that there is still so much to do. I mean, when we flew over — we did an aerial tour because it was probably the quickest and safest way — but what you see — you know, imagine a country where every church and every school has been destroyed. And at least that’s what the — every church and every school has been destroyed and has to be rebuilt from the bottom up.

Now, that’s an incredibly daunting challenge, but as the President sees it, it’s also an incredible responsibility. But it’s going to take all of us. And that’s what we talked about when we met with the U.N. staff, is that this has not been a U.S. effort. This has been a global effort. America has been a leader, but it has not been the only leader, by any close margin. And in order for Haiti to get back to where it needs to be, it’s going to take the world continuing to invest, to partner, to show that sense of compassion.

Stepping up and seeing the world work on behalf of Haiti has been the absolute right thing to do. And it’s just been a privilege for Jill and I to be able to come to see for ourselves, to lend support, to boost morale wherever. You know, I think it’s important for us and America to know that we still have U.S. Embassy officials working here, working here tirelessly. They’ve left their families. Some have sent them back home. They’re living in tents. The same for U.N. officials.

And the world needs to understand that there is still a small cadre of people working day in and day out to get this country back on its feet. So we’re just happy to be able to shed a little light on this situation.

DR. BIDEN: God bless them.

MRS. OBAMA: Absolutely.

DR. BIDEN: And God bless the Haitians.

MRS. OBAMA: Absolutely. So thank you all. Thank you for following us around and covering this. This has been an emotional but important day for Jill and I.

So thank you.

DR. BIDEN: Thank you.

Q Based on what you saw today, do you think that the aid money that’s been contributed by Americans is actually reaching the Haitian people?

MRS. OBAMA: Yes. And, you know, by all accounts, the Haitian people are very happy with the relief efforts. Still, accountability is key. And, you know, I know that the governments are going to continue to work together. But I think that my sense is the Haitian people feel a deep appreciation for what the world has done, that’s for sure.

END
3:51 P.M. EDT

White House.gov Press Office Feed

04.13.10 03:55 PM

President Obama was pleased to welcome Dutch Prime Minister Jans Peter Balkenende again to Washington. The President thanked Prime Minister Balkenende for his continued friendship and strong leadership on Afghanistan, where Dutch forces are performing with distinction in the NATO mission. The President looks forward to continued close cooperation with Prime Minister Balkenende.

NOTE: Attached is photo of President Barack Obama talking with Prime Minister Dr. Jan Peter Balkenende of the Netherlands during the working lunch at the Nuclear Security Summit at the Walter E. Washington Convention Center in Washington, D.C., April 13, 2010. (Credit: Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

White House.gov Press Office Feed

04.13.10 04:00 PM

President Obama had the opportunity to engage with Chilean President Sebastian Piñera during the Global Nuclear Security Summit on a range of issues on the bilateral, hemispheric and global agendas. The President thanked President Piñera for Chile’s recently completed removal of all highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Chile and commended Chilean leadership in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and for working with us to achieve a successful Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference next month.

The Presidents agreed to work together to advance respect for shared values, including democratic governance, human rights, economic prosperity, and social inclusion throughout the Americas. Finally, the President renewed the U.S. offer to support Chile’s ongoing recovery efforts following the February 27 earthquake should the Chilean government request further assistance.

NOTE: President Barack Obama talks with President Sebastián Piñera of Chile during the working lunch at the Nuclear Security Summit at the Walter E. Washington Convention Center in Washington, D.C., April 13, 2010. (Credit: Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

White House.gov Press Office Feed

04.13.10 08:48 AM

The President has invited the bipartisan leaders of the Senate and the bipartisan leaders of the Senate Judiciary Committee on Wednesday, April 21st to discuss the Supreme Court vacancy left by the retirement of Justice Stevens. Senators Reid, McConnell, Leahy, and Sessions will travel to the White House on Wednesday morning for the meeting.

White House.gov Press Office Feed

04.13.10 11:01 AM

On Saturday evening, the President will travel to Krakow, Poland to attend the State Funeral of President Lech Kaczynski and First Lady Maria Kaczynska on Sunday, April 18th. The President will travel to Krakow to express the depth of our condolences to an important and trusted ally, and our support for the Polish people, on behalf of the American people.

White House.gov Press Office Feed

04.13.10 11:27 AM

“I welcome this significant announcement from President Medvedev. This important step forward continues to demonstrate Russia’s leadership on nuclear security issues, and will add momentum to our shared global effort.”

BACKGROUND: The ADE-2 reactor has been producing weapons-grade plutonium for nearly 52 years in the formerly secret Siberian city of Zheleznogorsk. Russian President Medvedev announced the imminent shutdown at President Obama’s Nuclear Security Summit in Washington.

White House.gov Press Office Feed

04.12.10 03:07 PM

President Obama met with Armenian President Sargsian on the margins of the Nuclear Security Summit earlier today.

The President commended President Sargsian for his courageous efforts to achieve normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey and encouraged him to fulfill the promise of normalization for the benefit of the Armenian people. President Obama also urged that both Armenia and Turkey make every effort to advance the normalization process and achieve legislative ratification of the protocols of normalization.

President Obama also expressed his support for Armenian democracy.

White House.gov Press Office Feed

04.13.10 04:50 AM

President Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Harper met late yesterday on the margins of the Nuclear Security Summit. The President and the Prime Minister noted the enduring strength of our bilateral partnership. President Obama commended Prime Minister Harper for Canada’s leadership on nonproliferation issues and its work to advance the G8 Global Partnership and prepare for a successful Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference next month. The leaders also discussed the importance of continuing progress for balanced and sustainable global growth.

White House.gov Press Office Feed

04.13.10 05:16 AM

WhiteHouse.gov Features New Earth Day Page to Serve as a Resource Guide

WASHINGTON, DC – President Obama today challenged Americans to take action in their homes, communities, schools, or businesses to improve the environment in honor of the upcoming 40th Anniversary of Earth Day, April 22, 2010. In conjunction with the video message of President Obama, the White House unveiled WhiteHouse.gov/EarthDay as a resource guide for all those interested in learning how they can help make a difference in their community.

The full text of the video is below:

“Forty one years ago, in the city of Cleveland, people watched in horror as the Cuyahoga River – choked with debris and covered in oil – caught on fire.

Images of the burning Cuyahoga shocked a nation, and it led one Wisconsin Senator the following year to organize the first Earth Day to call attention to the dangers of ignoring our environment.

In the four decades since, we have made remarkable progress. Today, our air and water are cleaner, pollution has been greatly reduced, and Americans everywhere are living in a healthier environment. We’ve passed the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and founded the Environmental Protection Agency. And in Cleveland, the Cuyahoga River is cleaner than it’s been in 100 years.

But the true story of the environmental movement is not about the laws that have been passed. It’s about the citizens who have come together time and time again to demand cleaner air, healthier drinking water and safer food – and who have demanded that their representatives in government hold polluters accountable.

That progress continues today, as individuals and entrepreneurs across the country help lay the foundation for a Clean Energy Economy – one solar panel, smart meter and energy efficient home at a time.

Since taking office, my Administration has been a partner in the fight for a healthier environment. Through the Recovery Act, we’ve invested in clean energy and clean water infrastructure across the country. We’re taking the necessary steps to keep our children safe and hold polluters accountable. And we have rejected the notion that we have to choose between creating jobs and a healthy environment – because we know that the economy of the 21st century will be built on infrastructure powered by clean energy.

But even though we’ve made significant progress, there is much more to do. And as we continue to tackle our environmental challenges, it’s clear that change won’t come from Washington alone. It will come from Americans across the country who take steps in their own homes and their own communities to make that change happen.

That’s why, as we get ready to celebrate the 40th anniversary of Earth Day, I want to leave you with a challenge.

I want you to take action – in your home or your community; at your school or your business – to improve our environment. It can be as simple as riding the bus or the subway to work, making your home more energy efficient, or organizing your neighbors to clean up a nearby park.

Just go to whitehouse.gov/earthday to learn how you can help. And then tell us your story about what you’re doing to make a difference.

In the end, it’s people like you – the small business owners and community leaders; the teachers and the students; the young people and the grandparents – who have made Earth Day so successful. And it’s going to be up to you to make an even bigger difference over the next 40 years.

So let’s get to work. Together, we can continue to make progress towards a cleaner environment and a healthier planet.”

White House.gov Press Office Feed

04.13.10 06:43 AM

Washington Convention Center
Washington, D.C.

9:45 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning, everybody. I’d like to get started. Let me begin by thanking all of you for your participation last night. I thought it was a very important discussion.

Before I begin, I want to take this moment once again to acknowledge the terrible tragedy that struck the Polish people this weekend. We are joined today by a distinguished delegation from Poland, led by Ambassador Kupiecki. Mr. Ambassador, all of us were shocked and deeply saddened by the devastating loss of President Kaczynski, the First Lady, and so many distinguished civilian and military leaders from your country. This was a loss, not just for Poland, but for the world.

As a close friend and ally, the United States stands with Poland and Poles everywhere in these very difficult days. As an international community, I know that we will all rally around the Polish people, who have shown extraordinary strength and resilience throughout their history. So our hearts go out to your people. Our thoughts and prayers are with them. We join them in this time of mourning. And so, if everybody is agreeable, I would like to ask for a moment of silence to show that solidarity and to honor those who were lost.

(Pause for moment of silence.)

Thank you. It is my privilege to welcome you to Washington and to formally convene this historic summit. We represent 47 nations from every region of the world, and I thank each of you for being here. This is an unprecedented gathering to address an unprecedented threat.

Two decades after the end of the Cold War, we face a cruel irony of history — the risk of a nuclear confrontation between nations has gone down, but the risk of nuclear attack has gone up.

Nuclear materials that could be sold or stolen and fashioned into a nuclear weapon exist in dozens of nations. Just the smallest amount of plutonium — about the size of an apple — could kill and injure hundreds of thousands of innocent people. Terrorist networks such as al Qaeda have tried to acquire the material for a nuclear weapon, and if they ever succeeded, they would surely use it. Were they to do so, it would be a catastrophe for the world — causing extraordinary loss of life, and striking a major blow to global peace and stability.

In short, it is increasingly clear that the danger of nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to global security — to our collective security.

And that’s why, one year ago today in — one year ago in Prague, I called for a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years. This is one part of a broader, comprehensive agenda that the United States is pursuing — including reducing our nuclear arsenal and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons — an agenda that will bring us closer to our ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

Over the past year, we’ve made progress. At the United Nations Security Council last fall, we unanimously passed Resolution 1887 endorsing this comprehensive agenda, including the goal of securing all nuclear materials. Last night, in closed session, I believe we made further progress, pursuing a shared understanding of the grave threat to our people.

And today, we have the opportunity to take the next steps.

We have the opportunity, as individual nations, to take specific and concrete actions to secure the nuclear materials in our countries and to prevent illicit trafficking and smuggling. That will be our focus this morning.

We have the opportunity to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, with the resources and authorities it needs to meet its responsibilities. That will be our focus at our working lunch.

We have the opportunity, as an international community, to deepen our cooperation and to strengthen the institutions and partnerships that help prevent nuclear materials from ever falling into the hands of terrorists. And that will be our focus this afternoon.

And we have the opportunity, as partners, to ensure that our progress is not a fleeting moment, but part of a serious and sustained effort. And that’s why I am so pleased to announce that President Lee has agreed to host the next Nuclear Security Summit in the Republic of Korea in two years. This reflects South Korea’s leadership, regionally and globally, and I thank President Lee and the South Korean people for their willingness to accept this responsibility.

I’d ask President Lee just to say a few words.

PRESIDENT LEE: Thank you for calling us, for supporting Korea to host next summit in 2012.

I assure you I will do best to make this summit a success. So I hope to see all of you in Korea. Thank you. (Appause.)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.

So today is an opportunity — not simply to talk, but to act. Not simply to make pledges, but to make real progress on the security of our people. All this, in turn, requires something else, which is something more fundamental. It will require a new mindset — that we summon the will, as nations and as partners, to do what this moment in history demands.

I believe strongly that the problems of the 21st century cannot be solved by any one nation acting in isolation. They must be solved by all of us coming together.

At the dawn of the nuclear age that he helped to unleash, Albert Einstein said: “Now everything has changed…” And he warned: “We are drifting towards a catastrophe beyond comparison. We shall require a substantially new manner of thinking if mankind is to survive.”

That truth endures today. For the sake of our common security, for the sake of our survival, we cannot drift. We need a new manner of thinking — and action. That is the challenge before us. And I thank all of you for being here to confront that challenge together, in partnership.

And with that, I’m going to ask that we take a few moments to allow the press to exit before our first session.

END
9:53 A.M. EDT

White House.gov Press Office Feed

04.13.10 07:36 AM

At the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., Mexico, the United States, and Canada reached agreement to work together, along with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to convert the fuel in Mexico’s research reactor. President Calderon expressed "the strong commitment of Mexico to prevent and suppress nuclear terrorism; with this kind of cooperation with the IAEA and our North American partners, we definitely contribute to reducing the risks associated with illicit trafficking of nuclear materials."

The three countries acknowledged that this project also provides an important step towards the replacement of the research reactor with a new low-enriched uranium fuelled reactor in support of Mexico’s nuclear energy development.

The conversion of the reactor’s use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel will enable the elimination of all the remaining highly enriched uranium from Mexico. This effort, a specific outcome of Nuclear Security Summit, will be completed under the auspices of the IAEA. It will further strengthen nuclear security on the North American continent.

President Obama indicated, "I welcome this critical step forward, which is a signal of our strong trilateral partnership, and our shared commitment to nuclear security in North America." Prime Minister Harper added that "this nuclear security project demonstrates that collective action can deliver concrete results".

This decision to eliminate the remaining highly enriched uranium reaffirms Mexico’s leadership in nuclear security and nonproliferation and serves as an example for other nations to follow.

White House.gov Press Office Feed

04.12.10 12:31 PM

WASHINGTON – With Tax Day approaching, huge numbers of American families are taking advantage of important tax savings made available through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. See below for some examples of these critical tax savings. On Saturday, during his weekly address, President Barack Obama spoke to the American people about how to take advantage of Recovery Act tax benefits ahead of Tax Day – April 15, 2010. Largely due to the Recovery Act, the average tax refund is up nearly 10 percent this year. One-third of the Recovery Act was made up of tax cuts – tax cuts that have already provided more than $160 billion in relief for families and businesses, and nearly $100 billion of that directly into the pockets of working Americans. To help taxpayers see for themselves exactly how they can benefit from Recovery Act tax credits and collect every dollar owed when they file this tax season, the White House launched a new interactive Tax Savings Tool available at www.WhiteHouse.gov/Recovery. The full audio of the address is HERE or click HERE for the text of the address and more information. The video can be viewed online HERE.

Tax Savings – By the Numbers

$160 Billion – Tax relief provided through the Recovery Act so far to families and businesses.

Nearly $100 Billion – Tax relief provided through the Recovery Act so far that has gone directly in the pockets of working families.

Nearly $3,000 – The record average tax refund taxpayers are seeing this tax season.

Nearly 10% – The percentage average tax refunds are up this year – something the IRS says is largely due to Recovery Act tax credits.

36% – The percentage of taxpayers that have not yet filed their federal income tax returns and should be aware of the Recovery Act tax credits they may be eligible for.

64% – The percentage of taxpayers who have already filed their taxes, but can still amend them after April 15th to collect on any Recovery Act credits they may have missed.

95% – The percentage of working families benefiting from the Recovery Act’s Making Work Pay tax credit, making it the broadest tax credit in the history of the country.

$800 – The amount most married couples are collecting through their paychecks this year thanks to the Recovery Act’s Making Work Pay tax credit. Individuals collected $400 this year thanks to Making Work Pay.

Up to $2,500 – The expanded amount eligible taxpayers can collect with the American Opportunity Credit to help cover college expanses thanks to the Recovery Act.

Up to $8,000 – The amount new homebuyers can collect this year for purchasing their first home thanks to the Recovery Act’s expansion of the First-Time Homebuyers Tax Credit.

Up to $1,500 – The amount homeowners can collect this year on improvements made to their homes like energy-efficient windows, doors and insulation thanks to Recovery Act tax credits.

$2,400 – The amount of 2009 unemployment benefits that taxpayers do NOT have to pay taxes on this year thanks to the Recovery Act.

Over $600 – The increase in Earned Income Tax Credit a single parent of three children making $15,700 in 2009 would collect this year thanks to the Recovery Act.

65% – The amount by which the Recovery Act cut the cost of COBRA health insurance premiums for unemployed workers last year through an up-front tax credit.

700,000 – The number of new homeowners who qualified for the First-Time Homebuyers Tax Credit through the Recovery Act in 2009.

120,000 – The number of times taxpayers have used the WhiteHouse.gov Tax Savings Tool to determine which Recovery Act tax credits they are owed -and how to collect on them.

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