{"id":168810,"date":"2010-01-09T04:45:59","date_gmt":"2010-01-09T09:45:59","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/nw0.eu\/2010\/01\/09\/trouser-bomb-clown-attacks-%e2%80%93-how-much-should-we-laugh.html"},"modified":"2010-01-09T04:45:59","modified_gmt":"2010-01-09T09:45:59","slug":"trouser-bomb-clown-attacks-%e2%80%93-how-much-should-we-laugh","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/168810","title":{"rendered":"Trouser-bomb clown attacks \u2013 how much should we laugh?"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Lewis Page
\nThe Register<\/a>
\nFriday, January 8th, 2010<\/span><\/p>\n

As the smoke clears following the case of Umar Farouk Abdul
\nMutallab, the failed Christmas Day \u201cunderpants bomber\u201d of
\nNorthwest Airlines Flight 253 fame, there are just three simple points
\nfor us<\/a> Westerners to take away.<\/p>\n

First: It is completely impossible to prevent terrorists from attacking airliners.<\/p>\n

Second: This does not matter. There is no need for greater efforts on security.<\/p>\n

Third: A terrorist set fire to his own trousers, suffering
\neyewateringly painful burns to what Australian cricket commentators
\nsometimes refer to as the \u201cgroinal area\u201d, and nobody seems
\nto be laughing. What\u2019s wrong with us<\/a>?<\/p>\n

We\u2019ll look at the first part to begin with.<\/p>\n

In order to destroy an airliner and kill everyone on board, one
\nneeds to do a certain amount of damage to it: a lot if it is on the
\nground without much fuel in it, not so much if it is fuelled up, less
\nyet if it is flying at low altitude, and least of all if it is flying
\nhigh up.<\/p>\n

Formerly there was the option of gaining access to the flight deck
\n\u2013 perhaps using the aircraft as a weapon, as on 9\/11<\/a>, perhaps to
\ncarry out a hostage strategy \u2013 but those days are gone. The 9\/11<\/a>
\nhijackers have seen to it that the best and most effective ways for
\nterrorists to employ airliners are no longer open to them. Pilots will
\nnever open flight deck doors again, no matter the threat to hostages in
\nthe cabin; passengers will not permit themselves to be dominated; armed
\nsky marshals are back. If all these fail, following the bloodbath at
\nGround Zero fighter pilots will not hesitate to shoot.<\/p>\n

So the damage must nowadays be done by other means than crashing,
\nmost practically by detonating a charge of high explosives on the plane
\nwhile in flight. This doesn\u2019t need to be too big, especially if
\nthe jet is at cruising height so that the explosive effects will be
\nenhanced by depressurisation. This is why airliners are a favourite
\ntarget: because a fairly small amount of explosive can potentially kill
\na large number of people in one go, which is not the case under most
\ncircumstances.<\/p>\n

It is an unfortunate and pretty much unavoidable fact that the
\nnecessary amount of explosives can easily be carried through any
\ncurrent or likely-future airport security regime, short of universal
\nstrip + cavity searches and a total ban on carry-on luggage.<\/p>\n

Let\u2019s consider, for instance, a future security check
\ninvolving backscatter X-ray-through-clothes perv scans \u2013 much
\nmore effective than millimetre wave \u2013 and X-raying of carry-on
\nbags as is already normal. There are several ways to beat this.<\/p>\n

Firstly, detonators and firing devices can be disguised within
\npermitted electronic equipment such that they will pass through
\nX-raying without trouble. An AA battery casing full of
\nhexamethylenetriperoxidediamine (HMTD) \u2013 or some similar
\nsensitive primary \u2013 with a flashbulb filament in it is almost
\nimpossible for an X-ray operator to pick out from among others, and can
\nbe triggered by the flash circuits of any camera.<\/p>\n

The difficult bit is the main charge, which needs to be a decent
\nweight and volume of acceptably stable high explosive. But it\u2019s
\nnot that difficult. Here are just a few ideas:<\/p>\n