{"id":217014,"date":"2010-01-18T23:59:18","date_gmt":"2010-01-19T04:59:18","guid":{"rendered":"tag:www.armscontrolwonk.com,2010-01-17:57f256023a9af1385990be02cc9db91e\/c804e7487d577856c8d1ce511732716d"},"modified":"2010-01-18T23:59:18","modified_gmt":"2010-01-19T04:59:18","slug":"ir-1-estimates-revisited-9","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/217014","title":{"rendered":"IR-1 Estimates Revisited [9]"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Note: Two previously overlooked estimates have been added to the data table, and the “observations” section updated accordingly.<\/I><\/p>\n

Last week, at an event sponsored by AAAS<\/span><\/a> (depicted above*), I had the privilege of giving a presentation on “Expert Opinion on Iran’s IR-1 Centrifuge.” The session was off the record, but I can share with you, Dear Reader, a data table assembled for the occasion, along with a few observations.<\/p>\n

This table is an amended version of the data previously assembled by the Federation of American Scientists (see Table 1 in this report<\/a>). I’ve tinkered with this dataset before (see: Estimating SWU<\/span> with Expert Opinion<\/a>, December 6, 2009). The amended table covers every published estimate of the separative power of the IR-1 centrifuge that I could find, running from March 2003 to December 2009. Explicit repetitions of previous estimates [or estimates explictly derived from earlier estimates]<\/em> are not included. <\/p>\n

(N.B. “Actual” indicates the mean performance of actual devices. “Nominal” indicates the maximum power of the device on paper. Despite some ambiguities, it’s usually apparent from context which type of estimate is intended, when not stated directly. For example, I’ve tagged as “nominal” those estimates that relate to the machines believed by different experts at various points to be ancestors of the IR-1.)<\/p>\n

There are 29<\/del> 31<\/em> estimates, although some of the “nominal” estimates from ISIS<\/span> appear to be repetitions. (More on this point in a few moments.) Here it is: the whole megillah.<\/p>\n

Note: Thanks to Scott Kemp for the clarification on his 5\/27\/08 estimate, which was actually two estimates. Thanks also to Andreas Persbo for the similar observation about his estimate of 2\/27\/09. I’ve corrected the table to reflect both of these inputs. I’ve also corrected a few minor errors and inconsistencies.<\/I><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Author(s) <\/th>\nData source(s) <\/th>\nkg SWU<\/span><\/span>\/yr <\/th>\nEstimate of <\/th>\nDate<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n
Hibbs <\/td>\n Official sources <\/td>\n 7 to 15 <\/td>\n Actual <\/td>\n 3\/13\/03 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Hibbs <\/td>\n IAEA<\/span><\/span> sources <\/td>\n 12 to 14 <\/td>\n Actual <\/td>\n 5\/12\/03 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Hibbs <\/td>\n AEOI<\/span><\/span> data <\/td>\n 6 to 7 <\/td>\n Actual <\/td>\n 5\/12\/03 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Albright & Hinderstein<\/a> (ISIS<\/span><\/span>) <\/td>\n Senior Western officials <\/td>\n 2 <\/td>\n Actual <\/td>\n 9\/1\/03 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Albright & Hinderstein<\/a> (ISIS<\/span><\/span>) <\/td>\n Senior IAEA<\/span><\/span> officials (stated subsequently<\/a>) <\/td>\n 3 <\/td>\n Nominal (based on 4M) <\/td>\n 3\/1\/04 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Gilinsky, Miller, & Hubbard<\/a> <\/td>\n Unclassified sources (and educated guesses) <\/td>\n 1 to 3 <\/td>\n Actual <\/td>\n 10\/22\/04 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Hibbs <\/td>\n IAEA<\/span><\/span> and Western governments <\/td>\n 2 <\/td>\n Nominal (based on SNOR<\/span><\/span> & CNOR<\/span><\/span>) <\/td>\n 1\/31\/05 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Glaser<\/a> <\/td>\n (not stated) <\/td>\n 2 <\/td>\n Nominal (estimate of P-1) <\/td>\n 6\/14\/05 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Lewis<\/a> <\/td>\n Rademaker (USDOS<\/span><\/span>) statement <\/td>\n 2 < and < 3, closer to 2 <\/td>\n Actual <\/td>\n 4\/15\/06 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Lewis<\/a> <\/td>\n Aghazadeh (AEOI<\/span><\/span>) statement <\/td>\n 2.3 <\/td>\n Actual <\/td>\n 4\/18\/06 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
“Feynman” via Lewis<\/a> <\/td>\n Aghazadeh (AEOI<\/span><\/span>) statement <\/td>\n 1.46 <\/td>\n Actual <\/td>\n 5\/12\/06 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
“Feynman” via Lewis<\/a> <\/td>\n Aghazadeh (AEOI<\/span><\/span>) statement <\/td>\n 2.3 <\/td>\n Nominal <\/td>\n 5\/12\/06 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Albright<\/a> (ISIS<\/span><\/span>) <\/td>\n Aghazadeh (AEOI<\/span><\/span>) statement <\/td>\n 1.4 to 2.7 <\/td>\n Actual <\/td>\n 5\/17\/06 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Albright<\/a> (ISIS<\/span><\/span>) <\/td>\n (not stated) <\/td>\n 2.5 to 3 <\/td>\n “the high end of the possible” <\/td>\n 7\/1\/06 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Albright & Shire<\/a> (ISIS<\/span><\/span>) <\/td>\n Level Pakistan is said to have achieved <\/td>\n 2 <\/td>\n Actual of P-1 <\/td>\n 11\/1\/07 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Garwin<\/a> <\/td>\n Aghazadeh (AEOI<\/span><\/span>) statement <\/td>\n 1.362 <\/td>\n Actual <\/td>\n 1\/17\/08 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Glaser<\/a> <\/td>\n (not stated) <\/td>\n 2.5 <\/td>\n Nominal (hypothetical max. of P-1) <\/td>\n 4\/16\/08 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Kemp via Lewis<\/a> <\/td>\n Observed efficiency of 42% <\/td>\n 1 <\/td>\n Actual <\/td>\n 5\/27\/08 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Kemp via Lewis<\/a> <\/td>\n (not stated) <\/td>\n 2.5 <\/td>\n Nominal <\/td>\n 5\/27\/08 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ISIS<\/span><\/span> NuclearIran FAQ<\/span><\/a> <\/td>\n (not stated) <\/td>\n 1 to 2 <\/td>\n Actual <\/td>\n ~9\/1\/08 (n.d.) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ISIS<\/span><\/span> NuclearIran FAQ<\/span><\/a> <\/td>\n (not stated) <\/td>\n 3 <\/td>\n Nominal <\/td>\n ~9\/1\/08 (n.d.) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Persbo<\/a> <\/td>\n Cascades operating between 27 and 36% of total capacity <\/td>\n 0.59 to 0.79 <\/td>\n Actual <\/td>\n 2\/27\/09 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Persbo<\/a> <\/td>\n (not stated) <\/td>\n 2.2 <\/td>\n Nominal (based on SNOR<\/span><\/span>) <\/td>\n 2\/27\/09 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Salehi<\/a> (AEOI<\/span><\/span>) <\/td>\n (not stated) <\/td>\n 2.1 <\/td>\n Unclear; nominal? <\/td>\n 9\/22\/09 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Oelrich & Barzashka<\/a> (FAS<\/span><\/span>) <\/td>\n IAEA<\/span><\/span> reports <\/td>\n 0.5 <\/td>\n Actual <\/td>\n 9\/25\/09; see also 11\/23\/09<\/a> <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Wisconsin Project<\/a> <\/td>\n IAEA<\/span><\/span> reports <\/td>\n 0.5 <\/td>\n Actual <\/td>\n 11\/16\/09 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Albright & Brannan<\/a> (ISIS<\/span><\/span>) <\/td>\n IAEA<\/span><\/span> reports <\/td>\n 1.0 to 1.5 <\/td>\n Actual <\/td>\n 11\/30\/09 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Albright & Brannan<\/a> (ISIS<\/span><\/span>) <\/td>\n (not stated) <\/td>\n 3 <\/td>\n Nominal <\/td>\n 11\/30\/09 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Oelrich & Barzashka<\/a> (FAS<\/span><\/span>) <\/td>\n IAEA<\/span><\/span> reports <\/td>\n 0.44 to 0.88 (0.88 is highly unlikely) <\/td>\n Actual <\/td>\n 12\/1\/09 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Kemp<\/a> <\/td>\n IAEA<\/span><\/span> reports <\/td>\n 0.6 to 0.9 <\/td>\n Actual <\/td>\n 12\/1\/09 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Wood via Kemp<\/a> <\/td>\n Max. of P-1 based on validated hydrodynamic codes from the U.S. program <\/td>\n 2.1 to 2.2 <\/td>\n Nominal (max. of P-1) <\/td>\n 12\/1\/09 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

Four Observations<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

First,<\/strong> as noted previously<\/a>, the trend of the estimates declines with time. This effect only becomes more pronounced with the inclusion of the estimates reported by Mark Hibbs in NuclearFuel<\/em> and Nucleonics Week<\/em> in early 2003: now the trend of the<\/em> decline is<\/del> follows<\/em> an exponential curve. These reports appeared when IAEA<\/span> inspectors had just put eyes on the IR-1 (then called the P-1 in IAEA<\/span> reports) for the first time. Their initial frame of reference presumably involved more up-to-date machines, rather than centrifuges whose design heritage extends back to the 1960s.<\/p>\n

[Update | 22:54.<\/strong> See Mark Hibbs’ account in the comments<\/a> below.]<\/p>\n

Second,<\/strong> the decline comes in bursts, coinciding with the availability of new information. This effect is loosely similar to the influence of news on stock prices, as documented in event studies<\/a>. The effect tends to be prompt in finance; a bit less so here.<\/p>\n