{"id":385797,"date":"2010-03-03T14:09:10","date_gmt":"2010-03-03T19:09:10","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.grist.org\/article\/myths-and-realities-of-cap-and-trade\/"},"modified":"2010-03-03T14:09:10","modified_gmt":"2010-03-03T19:09:10","slug":"myths-and-realities-of-cap-and-trade","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/385797","title":{"rendered":"Myths and realities of cap-and-trade"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>\t\t\t\tby Eric de Place <\/p>\n<p>Worries about &ldquo;gaming&rdquo; or market manipulation often crop up as objections to climate and energy legislation. While these concerns are understandable, they are not warranted&#8212;and they can be addressed in a well-designed system. So let&rsquo;s look at some of the most common myths.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Myth #1: <\/strong>Cap-and-trade markets have no track record.<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><strong>Reality:<\/strong> Cap-and-trade has been tested and proven in the United <br \/>State. More than a half dozen American cap-and-trade programs are <a href=\"http:\/\/www.epa.gov\/captrade\/programs.html\"> already up and running<\/a>&#8212;with <a href=\"http:\/\/daily.sightline.org\/resolveuid\/9db6e5df4d98ad20c915603534caee84\" title=\"How Cap-and-Trade Markets Work for Acid Rain and Smog\">no evidence of market manipulation<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>The U.S. Acid Rain Program, administrated by the EPA, has a track <br \/>record dating to 1995. The program exceeded the SO2 emissions cap <a href=\"http:\/\/www.epa.gov\/airmarkt\/progress\/arp07.html\">years <br \/>ahead of schedule<\/a> and for only <a href=\"http:\/\/www.sfgate.com\/cgi-bin\/article.cgi?f=\/c\/a\/2007\/12\/03\/MNMMTJUS1.DTL&amp;hw=Cap+trade+Acid+Rain&amp;sn=001&amp;sc=1000\">one-fourth the cost<\/a> that was expected. After <br \/>more than a decade of operation, analysts have concluded that the SO2 <br \/>cap-and-trade program has been <a href=\"http:\/\/www.epa.gov\/airmarkets\/resource\/docs\/US%20Acid%20Rain%20Program_Elec%20Journal%20Aug%202007.pdf\">successful<\/a> and <a href=\"http:\/\/www.epa.gov\/airmarkets\/resource\/docs\/marketassessmnt.pdf\">free of gaming<\/a>.&nbsp;<br \/>The EPA also runs the NOx Budget Trading Program&#8212;designed to <br \/>reduce smog-contributors&#8212;which has been <a href=\"http:\/\/www.wri.org\/publication\/greenhouse-gas-emissions-trading-us-lessons-from-otc-nox\">similarly successful<\/a>, and free<br \/> of market shenanigans too.<br \/>The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), the nation&rsquo;s first <br \/>climate cap-and-trade program, has been fully operational for more than <br \/>year&#8212;<a href=\"http:\/\/daily.sightline.org\/resolveuid\/7494559dae4184690f21e337273e0fff\" title=\"How Carbon Markets Work In RGGI\">with great success<\/a>. Close inspection has revealed <a href=\"http:\/\/www.potomaceconomics.com\/uploads\/documents\/Secondary_Market_Report_2009_05.pdf\">no evidence of<br \/> anti-competitive conduct<\/a> or market gaming. In fact, the program has met<br \/> its early goals <a href=\"http:\/\/daily.sightline.org\/resolveuid\/c96f67365e3ee718f8c3ada358d637d9\" title=\"Grading RGGI's First Year\">so easily and so cheaply<\/a> that some advocates are <br \/>calling for the carbon <a href=\"http:\/\/www.env-ne.org\/public\/resources\/pdf\/ENE_2009_RGGI_Evaluation_20100223_FINAL.pdf\">cap to be tightened ahead of schedule<\/a>.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>Myth #2:<\/strong> Europe&rsquo;s cap-and-trade program has failed.<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><strong>Reality:<\/strong> The European Union&rsquo;s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), <br \/>begun in 2005, has created a Europe-wide carbon market that is <a href=\"http:\/\/daily.sightline.org\/resolveuid\/a80eb03824c74ae7a4b96248e332c417\" title=\"How Carbon Markets Work in Europe\">a <br \/>remarkable success story<\/a>&#8212;both environmentally and economically.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Thanks to the ETS, Europe is <a href=\"http:\/\/www.eea.europa.eu\/pressroom\/newsreleases\/2009-greenhouse-inventory-report\">on track to meet its emissions-reduction obligations<\/a> under the Kyoto Protocol.&nbsp;<br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.pewclimate.org\/eu-ets\">Independent analyses<\/a> have <a href=\"http:\/\/www.gmfus.org\/doc\/GMF%20Grubb%2035.pdf\">repeatedly confirmed<\/a> that the c<a href=\"http:\/\/www.wri.org\/stories\/2009\/11\/truth-about-cap-and-trade-europe\">arbon <br \/>markets have been effective<\/a> at reducing emissions while remaining <br \/>largely <a href=\"http:\/\/greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com\/2009\/02\/16\/group-says-european-cap-and-trade-system-reduced-emissions\/\">free of interference<\/a>.<br \/>In fairness, there were some hiccups in the rollout of the ETS&#8212;<br \/>including an initial overallocation of allowances to polluters, <br \/>insufficiently stringent offset provisions, and some price volatility. <br \/>Yet these problems resulted from European efforts to create a system on <br \/>&ldquo;training wheels&rdquo; without complete information. And in fact, the <br \/>problems are fixable and are already being addressed as the program <br \/>evolves. U.S. policymakers can learn from Europe&rsquo;s early design mistakes, <br \/>but they should recognize that there are not fundamental flaws in the <br \/>policy or the carbon markets. <\/p>\n<p><strong>Myth #3:<\/strong> Carbon markets are at risk of Enron-style tricks or wild<br \/> derivatives speculation.<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><strong>Reality:<\/strong> Common-sense regulation makes carbon markets no riskier <br \/>than the markets for pork bellies or soybean futures. As U.S. <br \/>cap-and-trade programs have demonstrated, well-regulated markets can <br \/>reduce pollution cost-effectively.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.usclimatenetwork.org\/resource-database\/FINAL_Carbon%20Price%20Safeguards_Aug13.pdf\">Restricting trading<\/a> to registered exchanges is <a href=\"http:\/\/www.edf.org\/documents\/10408_Market%20Regulation%20one%20pager%20v2.pdf\">a smart idea<\/a>, at <br \/>least at the outset of the program. One good example is the &ldquo;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.govtrack.us\/congress\/billtext.xpd?bill=s111-1399\">Carbon <br \/>Market Oversight Act of 2009<\/a>,&rdquo; sponsored by Senators Dianne Feinstein <br \/>(D-Calif.) and Olympia Snowe (R-Maine), which puts the Commodity Futures<br \/> Trading Commission in charge of the carbon market, and creates other <br \/>restrictions on market behavior.&nbsp;<br \/>Other <a href=\"http:\/\/www.sightline.org\/research\/energy\/res_pubs\/cap-and-trade-101\/Cap-Trade_online.pdf\">particulars of market design also help<\/a>. To minimize price <br \/>volatility, authorities can ensure transparency about prices and the <br \/>number of permits available. Opening auctions to all bidders with <br \/>adequate financial reserves, conducting auctions frequently and early, <br \/>and limiting the number of permits any one actor may hold&#8212;all these <br \/>things will help keep prices stable and <a href=\"http:\/\/www.westernclimateinitiative.org\/component\/remository\/Markets-Committee-Documents\/Market-Oversight-White-Paper\">prevent market manipulation<\/a>.<br \/>Carbon markets have built-in disincentives to manipulation: neither<br \/> the public wants it (because it could raise power bills), nor do the <br \/>market participants that buy permits (because they don&rsquo;t want to pay <br \/>more to pollute).<\/p>\n<p>Of course, as with any policy, cap-and-trade&rsquo;s success will ultimately <br \/>depend on strong oversight, transparency, and vigorous enforcement. But <br \/>there is every reason to believe that a well-crafted and -regulated <br \/>system can function smoothly and cost-effectively.<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p>This post originally appeared at Sightline&rsquo;s <a href=\"http:\/\/daily.sightline.org\/daily_score\/\">Daily Score blog<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Related Links:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.grist.org\/article\/2010-03-04-arkansas-blanche-lincoln-bill-halter-better-on-environment\/\">Sen. Blanche Lincoln faces a challenger from the left, but is he any better on the environment?<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.grist.org\/article\/2010-03-03-the-energy-only-bill-and-byron-dorgans-deficit-hypocrisy\/\">The &#8216;energy-only&#8217; bill and Byron Dorgan&#8217;s deficit hypocrisy<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.grist.org\/article\/2010-03-02-grahams-dilemma-trying-to-deal-a-winning-a-hand-without-aces\/\">Lindsey Graham&#8217;s dilemma, part two: Trying to deal a winning hand without ACES<\/a><\/p>\n<p>\t\t\t<br clear=\"both\" style=\"clear: both;\"\/><br \/>\n<br clear=\"both\" style=\"clear: both;\"\/><br \/>\n<a href=\"http:\/\/ads.pheedo.com\/click.phdo?s=76b21a623d748ad7ce11a9e4cb2fc8d7&#038;p=1\"><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"\" style=\"border: 0;\" border=\"0\" src=\"http:\/\/ads.pheedo.com\/img.phdo?s=76b21a623d748ad7ce11a9e4cb2fc8d7&#038;p=1\"\/><\/a><br \/>\n<img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" alt=\"\" height=\"0\" width=\"0\" border=\"0\" style=\"display:none\" src=\"http:\/\/a.rfihub.com\/eus.gif?eui=2223\"\/><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>by Eric de Place Worries about &ldquo;gaming&rdquo; or market manipulation often crop up as objections to climate and energy legislation. While these concerns are understandable, they are not warranted&#8212;and they can be addressed in a well-designed system. So let&rsquo;s look at some of the most common myths. Myth #1: Cap-and-trade markets have no track record. [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":765,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-385797","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/385797","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/765"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=385797"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/385797\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=385797"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=385797"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=385797"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}