\nemitting greenhouse gases from coal. That conclusion is most famously
\nassociated with NASA’s climate chief James Hansen, but Hansen is not alone. In
\na recent paper<\/a>, nine other climate scientists—David Beerling, Robert Berner,
\nPushker Kharecha, Valerie Masson-Delmotte, Mark Paganini, Maureen Raymo, Dana
\nRoyer, Makiko Sato, and James Zachos—joined Hansen in identifying a 2030
\nphase-out as the “sine qua non” for avoiding dangerous climate change. The
\nscientists concluded:<\/p>\n
Decision-makers
\ndo not appreciate the gravity of the situation … Continued growth of greenhouse
\ngas emissions, for just another decade, practically eliminates the possibility
\nof near-term return of atmospheric composition beneath the tipping level for
\ncatastrophic effects. The most difficult task, phase-out over the next 20-25
\nyears of coal use that does not capture CO2, is Herculean, yet feasible when
\ncompared with the efforts that went into World War II. The stakes, for all life
\non the planet, surpass those of any previous crisis.<\/p>\n
So what’s the best way to
\naccomplish the phase-out of coal? That question, with its use of the singular
\n“way,” may be wrongly phrased. One
\nmistake that activists tend to make is “marrying” a particular solution to a
\nproblem. Not only does this result in unnecessary infighting, as factions line
\nup behind their favorite options, it also ignores the reality that changing the
\nworld is always a messy endeavor, and tactics often work better in combination
\nthan in isolation.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
In researching my book Climate <\/p>\n Across the country, the <\/p>\n Taking on the existing coal fleet<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Now the movement against coal <\/p>\n On the CoalSwarm wiki<\/a>, <\/p>\n In a groundbreaking 2004 <\/p>\n Throughout the 1990s, the <\/p>\n In its most recent survey, <\/p>\n To summarize: during the <\/p>\n Coal’s share<\/a> of the overall <\/p>\n Scenarios such as Google’s <\/p>\n Frontal assault or death <\/p>\n So how do you get rid of a <\/p>\n Note what wasn’t done. Though some excise taxes were imposed on <\/p>\n Outside the world of <\/p>\n Recently, T. Boone Pickens and <\/p>\n Is such a sensible solution <\/p>\n Nine “knives” that could pare down the coal fleet<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Here, then, is a list of <\/p>\n Knife #1: Efficiency <\/p>\n Knife #2: Direct actions <\/p>\n Knife #3: Renewable <\/p>\n Knife #4: Criteria <\/p>\n Knife #5: Coal waste <\/p>\n Knife #6: Holding industry <\/p>\n Knife #7: Squeezing coal <\/p>\n Knife <\/p>\n Knife #9: Cap-and-trade, <\/p>\n Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/p>\n When added together, are the <\/p>\n Assemble any group of Related Links:<\/strong><\/p>\n What’s the Proper Role of Individuals and Institutions in Addressing Climate Change?<\/a><\/p>\n The do-nothing energy tax: $3 gasoline dead ahead<\/a><\/p>\n Citizens gather in Washington to end ‘mountain bombing’ of Appalachia<\/a><\/p>\n
\nHope: On the Front Lines of the Fight Against Coal<\/a>, I investigated why investor Warren Buffett decided to
\ncancel<\/a> six new coal plants that his company PacifiCorp was planning to build as
\nrecently as 2007. The answer turned out to be surprisingly complicated,
\ninvolving no less than 10 different causal factors working in combination,
\nincluding direct action protests, petition drives, renewable portfolio
\nstandards, rising construction costs, competition from wind power, lawsuits,
\nthe prospect of climate legislation, and more.<\/p>\n
\nBuffett story has been repeated again and again, as underdog grassroots
\nactivists in state after state have taken on and defeated Big Coal and King
\nKilowatt. As of late February, activists had derailed 97 of the 151 new plants<\/a> that were in the pipeline in May 2007. Since 2001, according to the Sierra
\nClub, 126 coal plants<\/a> have been stopped. In 2009, not a single new coal plant
\nbroke ground<\/a>. All this was accomplished even though the U.S. still lacks any
\nsort of comprehensive climate policy. Rather than one overarching tactic or
\npolicy, the rush to build new coal plants was stopped by a broad, feisty
\nmovement that inflicted a “death of a thousand cuts.”<\/p>\n
\nis shifting its focus from blocking new plants to the second and harder part of
\nthe task: phasing out<\/a> the fleet<\/a> of existing coal plants. In the Pacific
\nNorthwest, the Sierra Club and others have targeted TransAlta’s Centralia<\/a> plant. In the Southwest, Natural Capitalism Solutions this week released a
\nmajor economic study<\/a> showing the economic benefits of shutting down the Navajo
\nGenerating Station<\/a>. Across the country, utilities including Xcel, Portland
\nGeneral Electric, Red Hawk Energy, Georgia Power, Progress Energy, Public
\nService Company of New Hampshire, DTE Energy, FirstEnergy, NRG Energy, and
\nExelon have recently announced coal plant retirements<\/a> or conversions<\/a>, and TVA
\nmay soon join the list. The 2030 deadline is a daunting challenge but not an
\nunrealistic one, since the coal fleet is the most antiquated part of America’s
\nenergy infrastructure and alternatives abound. The median plant was built in
\n1966<\/a>, making it older than most activists. Scores of plants <\/a>pre-date the Korean
\nWar. Almost 90 percent of existing coal-fired generating capacity dates from before
\n1985, which means that if we simply instituted a policy of retiring coal plants
\nat age 40, we’d be 90 percent of the way to the zero-coal goal by 2025.<\/p>\n
\ntraffic stats shows that climate change activists are becoming more and more
\nfamiliar with the details of the coal fleet. Of the 3,200 pages on the site,
\nthe most frequently visited is “Existing U.S. Coal Plants,”<\/a> which receives
\nhundreds of page views every day and links to individual pages on 679 separate
\ncoal plants (1,445 coal-fired generators), including plants located on at least
\n65 college campuses<\/a>. Each wiki page contains basic data, links to mines and
\nwaste sites, and Google satellite imagery of a plant and its surrounding area.
\nAt least 126 coal plants<\/a> are located in the midst of residential areas (i.e.
\nwith more than 10,000 people in a 3-mile radius), directly contradicting the image
\nof coal plants operating in isolated rural locations. These plants tend to be
\nof older vintage, and only 32 of them have sulfur scrubbers. The per capita
\nincome in these high-impact communities is 14 percent below the national average; 44 percent
\nof the residents are persons of color. Apart from the climate benefits, phasing
\nout these plants will have major health benefits for 6.1 million people who
\nlive within three miles of one of the plants, as well as the tens of millions
\nof other people affected by coal emissions.<\/p>\n
\nstudy<\/a>, the Clean Air Task Force put the annual health toll from power plant
\nparticulates at 23,600 premature deaths (14 years lost per fatality), 38,200
\nnonfatal heart attacks, and 554,000 asthma attacks. That’s nearly 35 premature
\ndeaths for each plant, a heavy price to pay for the 54 jobs<\/a> provided by the
\ntypical facility. It’s no wonder that studies of the “external costs” of
\ncoal-fired power<\/a> (i.e. the burden borne by society) invariably produce
\nstartling results. An October report<\/a> released by the Natural Research Council
\nplaced the annual costs due to three types of pollutants from coal (not
\nincluding mercury emissions or climate change impacts) at $62 billion annually,
\nor about 3.2 cents per kilowatt hour generated by coal.<\/p>\n
\nsize of the coal fleet<\/a> remained fairly stagnant at about 330 GW of capacity
\n(nameplate), with few plants built and few retired. During the past decade,
\nthat stagnation continued, with retirements roughly equaling new plant construction.
\nFrom 2000 through 2009, about 8 GW of new coal<\/a> plant capacity<\/a> came online.
\nMeanwhile, from 2000 through 2007, 132 coal-fired generating units were retired
\nor converted<\/a> to other fuels. Most of these were small, aging plants. The total
\namount of capacity retired or converted to other fuels from 2000 to 2007 was
\nabout 7 GW of capacity.<\/p>\n
\nthe Energy Information Agency lists 54 generating units totaling about 4 GW of
\ncapacity as scheduled for retirement or conversion<\/a> in the period 2008 to 2014.
\nNews sources report an additional 27 units totaling about 6 GW as scheduled or
\nunder study for retirement<\/a> or conversion<\/a> to other fuels, mainly biomass and
\nnatural gas. New additions are expected to exceed retirements and conversions,
\nwith about 17 GW of new coal-fired generation capacity under construction, near
\nconstruction, or permitted, according to the latest NETL report.<\/a><\/p>\n
\nentire period from 2000 to 2014, about 17 GW of capacity is expected to be
\nremoved from the coal fleet and 25 GW of capacity is expected to be added, for
\na net increase of 8 GW. While that may sound sizeable, it amounts to only a 2
\nto 3 percent increase in coal capacity during the entire 15-year period. Overall, the
\nfleet continues to age, and by 2016 over half the coal plants<\/a> in the U.S. will
\nbe more than 50 years old.<\/p>\n
\nelectricity mix has been on the decline since 1987, when it hit an all-time
\nhigh of 57 percent. In 2004, coal’s share dropped below 50 percent for the first time in four
\ndecades. In the most recently reported 12-month period (December 2008 –
\nNovember 2009), coal’s share in U.S. electricity generation dropped to 45 percent<\/a>. The
\ndecline in coal is mostly due to an increase in the share of electricity
\ngenerated by natural gas, especially in the Southeast<\/a>, where coal prices are
\nrelatively high and natural gas prices are relatively low. Going forward the 35
\nGW in new wind power capacity<\/a> that has come online since 2000 (including over
\n18 GW in 2008 and 2009 alone) will further cut into coal’s share of the
\nelectricity mix.<\/p>\n
\nClean Energy 2030<\/a> plan, the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Climate 2030<\/a> study,
\nand Scientific American’s Solar Grand Plan<\/a> show that it is feasible to replace
\ncoal with cleaner alternatives by 2030. What’s missing from such studies is the
\nspecific policies to drive the transition. Merely having sufficient
\nalternatives isn’t enough. The reason is simple: amortized coal plants are
\ncheap to run, and generally they can stay in operation almost indefinitely.
\nIt’s a fantasy to think that power companies will shut down existing coal
\nplants and replace them with alternatives, unless they are compelled to do so
\nor unless the current economic advantages of legacy plants change radically.
\n(Note: For an example of innovative thinking on making the economics work, see
\nthe newly released report “Coal Plants in Transition: An Economic Case Study<\/a>” [PDF].)<\/p>\n
\nof a thousand cuts?<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nbunch of old coal plants? For that matter, how do you get rid of any chunk of
\nold infrastructure that is standing in the way of progress? If it weren’t for
\nthe vested interests at stake, the answer would be simple: a scheduled
\nphase-out administered by federal regulators. Legislatively, this could
\nprobably be accomplished with a simple five-page bill that authorized the EPA
\nto create and implement a phase-out schedule for the legacy coal fleet. The
\nphase-out of CFCs and related compounds provides an analog. After scientists
\ndiscovered the Antarctic ozone hole in 1985, 24 countries agreed on the
\nMontreal Protocol<\/a> in 1987 to phase out their use of CFCs. When subsequent
\nresearch showed the situation to be worse than previously thought, the pace of
\nthe phase-out was accelerated. In the United States, production of CFCs and
\nmost other ozone-harming compounds was ended on Jan. 1, 1996.<\/p>\n
\nozone-depleting compounds, market signals were not relied on. With the planet
\nitself at stake, policy makers saw the need for a more decisive approach: a
\nscheduled phase-out.<\/p>\n
\nenvironmental policy, an example of a staged phase-out<\/a> of key infrastructure
\ncan be found in the Base Realignment and Closure Program (BRAC<\/a>), which
\nsuccessfully shuttered<\/a> over 350 military installations between 1989 and
\n1995. BRAC created mechanisms for
\ndepoliticizing the process, for aiding the economies of impacted communities,
\nand for managing workforce transitions.<\/p>\n
\nTed Turner proposed a “cash for clunkers” plan<\/a> that would pay utilities, plant
\nby plant, for shutting down old coal facilities, starting with the “oldest,
\nleast efficient and most polluting.” The beauty of the plan is that it would
\naim directly at the legacy fleet and, if the “cash” side of the proposition
\nwere attractive enough, might elicit the willing participation of utilities.
\nMoreover, given that the existing coal fleet is responsible for over 34 percent of
\nU.S. carbon dioxide emissions, a “cash for clunkers” program could provide a
\nstraightforward way for the U.S. to meet the promises made at Copenhagen.<\/p>\n
\nlikely? Realistically, a coordinated phase-out of coal is not in the cards, at
\nleast within the next few years. Instead, what’s likely to happen is a “death
\nof a thousand cuts” attack on the coal fleet via a swarm of activist pressure
\npoints and institutional policy measures. It’s a messy solution, but what makes
\nit promising is the fact that most of the coal fleet is already well into middle
\nage. Like the rusting car that falls apart one fender, one muffler, one tail
\nlight at a time, the idea is to make each coal clunker more trouble than it’s
\nworth, so that the operator eventually throws in the towel.<\/p>\n
\nmeasures—some existing, some proposed—that could play a role in whittling down
\nthe coal fleet. None of these measures, considered in isolation, will have an
\noverwhelming impact; what’s important is their ability to work in concert
\ntogether.<\/p>\n
\nmeasures. <\/strong>The numbers are staggering:
\nabout 40 percent of U.S. electricity consumption is pure waste that could be
\neliminated via tighter building and appliance standards, sensible retrofits,
\netc. Since 45 percent of electricity generation comes from coal, efficiency alone
\ncould largely do the job of displacing the coal fleet. In reality, it won’t be
\nthat simple, because the complicated logic of utility “dispatch order” may
\nfavor displacing natural gas instead. Nevertheless, weakening demand is the
\nnecessary condition that makes other efforts to diminish the coal fleet
\npossible, and it’s far and away the cheapest.<\/p>\n
\nand other protests. <\/strong>Protest makes
\npeople uncomfortable. Mainstream environmentalists often fret that it alienates
\n“regular people.” But the fact of the matter, as documented<\/a> by sociologist Jon
\nAgnone, is that protest produces results, though nobody knows exactly how or
\nwhy. Think of it as “movement caffeine”: a way of defining a moral edge, of
\nunderlining the urgency of what’s at stake. Taken in isolation, protests
\nagainst power plants<\/a> will not cause those power plants to be shut down. But
\nurgent, repeated, dramatic protest aimed at utilities, mines, railroads, ports,
\nbanks, regulators, elected officials, and the media are indeed essential within
\nthe overall mix of tactics. Note too that a mere two dozen executives<\/a> control
\n70 percent of the coal-fired generating capacity in the U.S. So far, these “old white
\nguys” haven’t been the direct target of much campaigning or pressure. That
\ncould change in the future.<\/p>\n
\nportfolio standards. <\/strong>At least 33
\nstates<\/a> accounting for 73 percent of U.S. electrical generating capacity have renewable
\nportfolio standards, with goals ranging from 8 percent by 2020 in Pennsylvania to 40 percent
\nby 2017 in Maine. Including the states that have no standards, the weighted
\naverage of all these programs amounts to a requirement that 13 percent of all
\ngenerating capacity be from renewable sources at by around 2020. Assuming that
\nefficiency improvements keep overall demand growth to a minimum, renewable
\nportfolio standards currently in effect will result in as much as 72 GW of
\nrenewable capacity and will undoubtedly serve to inhibit the building of new
\ncoal capacity. In fact, some companies (e.g. PacifiCorp, Tampa Electric,
\nSunflower Electric) have already cited the effect <\/a>of renewable portfolio
\nstandards in canceling new coal plants. As with efficiency improvements, the
\neffect on the existing coal fleet depends to some extent on the relative fuel
\ncosts of natural gas versus coal, which have experienced rapid shifts in both
\ndirections over the past two years. Significantly, renewable portfolio
\nstandards are backed by increasingly effective lobbying groups like the RES
\nAlliance for Jobs, which includes wind, biofuels, and geothermal companies. A
\nrecent study<\/a> for the RES Alliance by Navigant Consulting looked at the effect
\nof a nationwide renewable portfolio standard of 25 percent in the year 2025. According
\nto the study, a 25 percent RPS would displace 2,000 GWh of electricity, a figure equal
\nto the entire yearly output of the current coal fleet. There are serious
\nproblems with renewable portfolio standards: biofuels plants, for example, are
\noften worse polluters than coal plants. Nevertheless, state and federal
\nrenewable portfolio standards may be the most effective single item in the
\ntoolkit for phasing out coal.<\/p>\n
\npollutant regulation. <\/strong>As regulation
\nunder the Clean Air Act of “criteria pollutants” such as sulfur dioxide,
\nnitrous oxides, ozone, mercury, and particulates continues to tighten, utility
\nplanners and state regulators have to choose between authorizing hundreds of
\nmillions of dollars in pollution control retrofits<\/a>, or shutting down aging
\nplants and investing in clean technologies. For example, in 2008 the EPA
\nreleased a list<\/a> of scrubber retrofits expected at 56 coal-fired generating
\nunits in 2010 and 20 coal-fired generating units in 2011. Since scrubbers
\nactually increase carbon dioxide emissions, many climate activists are regrouping
\naround a position of “don’t retrofit: shut it down.” So far, that position has
\nnot been able to slow the momentum of retrofits. Last year’s showdown in New
\nHampshire over the future of the 459 MW Merrimack Station<\/a> highlighted the
\ncharged politics of the issue. When the price tag for a scrubber retrofit for
\nthe plant jumped from $250 million to $457 million, the ad hoc business
\ncoalition 21st Century New Hampshire, along with groups such as the
\nSierra Club, pressed the state to consider shutting the station down rather
\nthan undertaking the retrofit. That effort was defeated by a combination of
\npower company and union lobbying; consequently, Merrimack Station, which
\nconsists of a 42-year-old unit and a 50-year-old unit, is now likely to run for
\nseveral more decades. Meanwhile, in a similar fight in Oregon, a plan to
\nretrofit the 601 MW Boardman Plant<\/a> was defeated in favor of a smaller retrofit
\nand a shut-down by 2020, though activists continue to push for an earlier date.
\nLook for the retrofits-versus-shutdown issue to be a major preoccupation for
\ngroups like the Sierra Club during the coming decade. Since less than a third
\nof coal-fired generating capacity (101 GW<\/a> out of 329 GW in 2005) currently is
\nequipped with sulfur scrubbers, even a partial victory for the “don’t retrofit:
\nshut it down” side of the issue could carve a big chunk out of the existing
\ncoal fleet.<\/p>\n
\nregulation.<\/strong> The problem of
\nunregulated coal waste<\/a> at over 1,300<\/a> surface impoundments entered the national
\nconsciousness in the the wake of the Tennessee mega-spill of December 2008. In
\nJanuary 2009, an AP study found that 156 coal-fired power plants<\/a> store ash in
\nsurface ponds similar to one that ruptured at Kingston Fossil Plant. Currently,
\ngroups like Earthjustice are pushing hard for coal waste to be designated a
\nhazardous pollutant. On Dec. 10, 2009, Ken Ladwig of the Electric Power
\nResearch Institute told Congress<\/a> that tighter regulation of coal combustion
\nby-products could result in the closure of 190 to 411 older coal-fired
\ngenerating units totaling 40 GW to 97 GW. Even if Ladwig is grandstanding,
\nthere’s no question that fixing defective waste disposal systems at aging coal
\nplants will be expensive. When added to other costs such as scrubber retrofits
\n(see above) and rising coal costs (see below), the waste issue—and the
\nliability risks that go along with it—- may be one headache too many for a lot of
\nharried utility executives.<\/p>\n
\nto its “clean coal” promises. <\/strong>Rather
\nthan getting rid of coal plants, let’s simply retrofit plants for carbon
\ncapture and storage (CCS)—that’s the message that groups like American
\nCoalition for Clean Coal Electricity have spent tens of millions<\/a> of dollars
\nselling. So why not force utilities to live up to the rhetoric? One approach to
\nturning clean coal rhetoric into reality has been proposed by soon-to-depart
\nSierra Club chief Carl Pope, who proposes<\/a> that new plants meet strict carbon
\nemissions standards and that existing coal plants be required to meet the same
\nemissions standards once they reach the age of 50—or else be retired. Do regulators
\nhave the nerve to require such a standard? In three states, Washington, Maine,
\nand California, the standard<\/a> already exists, prohibiting utilities from
\nentering into electricity contracts for power from coal plants whose emissions
\nexceed 1,100 pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt hour, a level that cannot be
\nmet by coal plants that lack carbon capture. Note that California’s carbon
\nstandards apply to existing plants when they receive capital upgrades, and
\nWashington’s standard applies to both new and renewed contracts for
\nelectricity. Under the Bush administration, the EPA in July 2008 outlined an
\napproach<\/a> that would require merely marginal improvements at existing
\nplants, such as enhancements to boiler efficiency. But what if the EPA
\ndeveloped a more serious standard? For example, if EPA were to apply the 1,100-pounds-of-CO2-per-megawatt-hour standard to existing plants, what
\nwould the effect be on the coal fleet? The answer is that most plants would
\nhave to be phased out. Although researchers continue to investigate the CCS
\nretrofit option, there are some practical obstacles that stand in the way of
\nretrofitting<\/a> most existing coal plants. First, because carbon capture requires
\nlarge amounts of energy, it imposes a heavy parasitic power burden<\/a> on an
\nexisting plant. To be able to shoulder this burden and still have a reasonable
\namount of power left over, eligible plants need to be those that employ the
\nmore efficient supercritical technology rather than the less efficient
\nsubcritical technology. Currently, about 80 GW<\/a> of the coal fleet employs
\nsupercritical technology. A second criterion is that candidate plants be no
\nolder than 20 or 25 years<\/a>, so that enough lifetime remains for expensive CCS
\nretrofits to be worthwhile. That’s a serious obstacle, since most supercritical
\nplants in the United States were built between 1965 and 1980 and therefore are
\nalready 30 to 45 years old. Only a handful of existing plants meet both criteria: supercritical technology and recent
\nvintage. As if those two obstacles weren’t enough, there are others<\/a>, including
\navailability of water, sufficient vacant space to build the CCS facilities, and
\nproximity to geological formations suitable for carbon sequestration. The
\nupshot is that any CCS retrofits that may be mandated (e.g. by greenhouse gas
\nregulations) could not be economically undertaken by utilities. In effect,
\nholding utilities to the promise of “clean coal” amounts to a de facto shutdown
\nrequirement, at least for the vast majority of existing plants.<\/p>\n
\nsupplies. <\/strong>In 2007, the National
\nResearch Council released a report<\/a> challenging the common assertion that the
\nUnited States has a 250-year supply of coal. The NRC study suggested that 100
\nyears was a more reasonable estimate. Despite the downgrade, supplies of coal
\nappear to be adequate on a general basis. Nevertheless, in some regions,
\nespecially the Southeast, coal supplies may become a factor. Also, close
\nexamination<\/a> of Wyoming’s Power River Basin by the U.S. Geological Survey
\nsuggests that future coal supplies from that key region, which accounts for
\nabout 40 percent of U.S. production, are more constrained than commonly assumed.
\nMeanwhile, the EIA reports that production in both the Interior and Appalachian
\nregions is declining. As resistance to mountaintop-removal mining practices
\ncontinues to intensify, that decline will only steepen. By themselves, coal
\nsupply issues are unlikely to shutter any existing plants; however, higher coal
\nprices will augment the effectiveness of other shut-down measures, especially
\nif they alter the “dispatch order” such that gas-fired generation moves ahead
\nof coal-fired generation. In fact, a recent report<\/a> by the EIA concludes that rising coal prices and falling natural gas prices
\nhave already caused a shift in generation patterns in the South and to a lesser
\nextent along the South Atlantic states.<\/p>\n
\n#8: Carbon taxes. <\/strong>Carbon taxes are
\nlikely to be a much more effective measure for stopping new coal plants than
\nfor phasing out existing ones. Since new coal plants are expensive, even a
\nmodest tax on carbon dioxide would serve to tip the balance toward competing
\ngeneration options such as wind. But for existing plants, a study<\/a> for the
\nAmerican Public Power Association shows that carbon taxes of less than about $50 per
\nton of carbon dioxide won’t do the trick. Under $50 per ton, it will still be
\nmore economical for utilities to simply pay the tax and continue running
\nexisting coal plants than to dispatch sequestering-coal or natural-gas units. It’s not until the tax reaches $80
\nper ton that production from existing
\ncoal plants finally takes a nose dive, falling by 85 percent in 2030. Still,
\nthat doesn’t mean carbon taxes are meaningless in tackling the legacy coal
\nfleet. Applying the principle that combinations of measures may work where
\nindividual measures fail, a smaller carbon tax could combine with other factors
\nlike expensive scrubber retrofits and expensive coal waste reengineering to
\ndrive more plants into the “not worth the hassle” column.<\/p>\n
\ncap-and-dividend. <\/strong>Even before the
\nlegislation was weakened in the summer of 2009, an EPA analysis<\/a> of the
\nWaxman-Markey climate bill (ACES) showed that the legislation would have only a
\nminimal effect on the legacy coal fleet. According to the analysis, passage of
\nWaxman-Markey would cause 22 GW of the existing coal fleet to be retired
\nby 2015 (in addition to 5 GW predicted to be retired in the absence of the
\nlegislation). From 2015 through 2025, Waxman-Markey would force no further
\nretirements. Waxman-Markey would also block EPA from regulating greenhouse
\ngases, removing a potentially useful tool for closing coal plants. Another
\nfederal cap-and-trade bill, the Cantwell\/Collins CLEAR Act, has been analyzed
\nby World Resources Institute, but the analysis failed to provide any specific
\nconclusions about the effect of the bill on the existing coal fleet. As for the
\nthree regional cap-and-trade programs currently under development (the
\nNortheast’s RGGI, the Midwest’s MGGA, and the West’s WCI), only the RGGI<\/a> has a
\ntrack record of fees for carbon dioxide. At the current level of about $2 per
\nton, those fees are not sizeable enough to result in the closure of legacy coal
\nplants. As with carbon taxes, cap-and-trade laws could tip the economics away
\nfrom coal and might prove useful in combination with other measures. But that
\nprinciple only applies if the cap-and-trade regulation does not preempt other
\nmeasures—e.g. the preemption of EPA greenhouse gas regulation by ACES.<\/p>\n
\nmeasures outlined above sufficient to phase out coal? Not yet. But the process
\nis just beginning. As Bill Gates once observed, “We always overestimate the
\nchange that will occur in the next two years and underestimate the change that
\nwill occur in the next ten.” The anti-coal movement is still gaining strength,
\nand it has an important ally in the renewables industry. Increasingly these
\ncompanies, along with the tens of thousands of people they employ, will recognize that
\n40- and 50-year-old coal plants are blocking their growth, and they’ll add their
\nweight to the pressure to retire more plants. <\/p>\n
\nanti-coal activists, and you’ll soon hear more and more ideas for ways to shut
\ndown dirty old coal plants. An important principle to guide this discussion is
\nthat in a messy war of attrition, a host of small measures can add up to
\nvictory. As Gandhi said, “Whatever you do will be insignificant, but it’s very
\nimportant that you do it.”<\/p>\n
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