{"id":421355,"date":"2010-03-12T15:18:00","date_gmt":"2010-03-12T20:18:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.businessinsider.com\/the-secret-power-struggle-in-china-to-succeed-hu-jintao-2010-3"},"modified":"2010-03-12T15:18:00","modified_gmt":"2010-03-12T20:18:00","slug":"the-secret-power-struggle-in-china-to-succeed-hu-jintao","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/421355","title":{"rendered":"The Secret Power Struggle In China To Succeed Hu Jintao"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"float_right\" src=\"http:\/\/static.businessinsider.com\/image\/4b9a9da67f8b9ac567fb0600-323-242\/chinese-power-struggle.jpg\" border=\"0\" alt=\"chinese power struggle\" width=\"323\" height=\"242\" \/><\/p>\n<p><em>(This post appeared on the <a href=\"http:\/\/chovanec.wordpress.com\/2010\/03\/12\/political-power-and-the-nine-nations-of-china\/\">author&#8217;s blog<\/a>.)<\/em><\/p>\n<div class=\"entry clear\">\n<div class=\"snap_preview\">\n<p>The National People&rsquo;s Congress (NPC)  has been in full swing this week in Beijing.&nbsp; Even if it&rsquo;s mostly just  theater, the NPC offers an important&nbsp;stage for&nbsp;up-and-coming politicians  to jockey for position.&nbsp; In two years (2012), President Hu Jintao and  Premier Wen Jiabao are expected to retire, along with nearly half of the  25-member Politburo.&nbsp; An entirely new generation of Chinese leaders  will take over, and exactly who that will be is still being thrashed  out.<\/p>\n<p>I was recently reading <a href=\"http:\/\/media.hoover.org\/documents\/CLM31CL.pdf\" >the  first in a series <\/a>of upcoming articles in <em>China Leadership  Review<\/em> by Cheng Li, of the Brookings Institute.&nbsp; The series is  called &ldquo;China&rsquo;s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012,&rdquo; and the first  part focuses on provincial leaders.&nbsp; It&rsquo;s a worthwhile read on many  levels, but I was particularly struck by one point where he mentions  that &ldquo;approximately 58 percent of [provincial] leaders were born in &hellip;  six provinces, and about 40 percent were born in four provinces of  Eastern China (Shandong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Anhui).&rdquo;&nbsp; This seems to  be a rather remarkable concentration, and I decided to explore the  question further.<\/p>\n<p>Those who have read my article &ldquo;<a href=\"http:\/\/chovanec.wordpress.com\/2009\/11\/16\/the-nine-nations-of-china\/\" >The Nine Nations of China<\/a>&rdquo; in <em>The Atlantic <\/em>may  recall that I highlighted the region I call the Yellow Land (the Yellow  River Valley and North China Plain) as the traditional center of  political power in China.&nbsp; I also noted that the Metropolis (the Yangtze  Delta) is the only region wealthy and central enough to rival the  Yellow Land for political primacy.&nbsp; This was essentially a historical  argument&nbsp;based on the observation that, in&nbsp;virtually every period when  China was ruled as a unified state, the capital was located in the  Yellow Land.&nbsp; The only exceptions to this rule were a handful of times  it was moved to the richer Metropolis.&nbsp; None of the other regions have  ever ruled over a unified China.<\/p>\n<p>The implication &mdash; unproven &mdash; is that certain of the Nine Nations may  continue to exert greater political influence in China today.&nbsp; That&rsquo;s  also what intrigued me about Cheng Li&rsquo;s&nbsp;observation that China&rsquo;s leaders  tended to come from certain provinces.&nbsp; Are the historical patterns I  noted reflected in the composition of China&rsquo;s present-day leadership?<\/p>\n<p>To answer this question, I decided to focus on two groups.&nbsp; The first  is the 204-member Central Committee of the Communist Party.&nbsp; This body  includes not only China&rsquo;s top leaders, as defined by the Politburo, but  also most of its government ministers, top military leadership, senior  party functionaries, and&nbsp;a large number of provincial party leaders and  governors.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>The second group consists of all 62 provincial party leaders and  governors, plus the chief executives of the Hong Kong and Macau Special  Administrative Regions (SARs) and the&nbsp;director of the State Council&rsquo;s  Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office &mdash; a total of 65 officials.&nbsp; Taiwan  was not included in the analysis, because of the difficulty of making  reasonable comparisons across political systems.<\/p>\n<p>The following is the breakdown for each group, based on their  members&rsquo; place of origin.&nbsp; In a handful of cases where an official&rsquo;s  biography emphasized that he or she had been born in one place but&nbsp;is  considered a native of somewhere else, I went with the latter.&nbsp; Of  course, one must also compare the results with the population of each  region, which is not evenly distributed across China:<\/p>\n<table style=\"width: 542px;\" border=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\">\n<col span=\"1\" width=\"173\"><\/col>\n<col span=\"1\" width=\"101\"><\/col>\n<col span=\"1\" width=\"127\"><\/col>\n<col span=\"1\" width=\"141\"><\/col>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"173\" height=\"20\">&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td width=\"101\">&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td width=\"127\">Central<\/td>\n<td width=\"141\">Provincial<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td height=\"20\">Region<\/td>\n<td>Population<\/td>\n<td>Committee<\/td>\n<td>Leadership<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td height=\"20\">&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td height=\"20\">The Yellow Land<\/td>\n<td>27%<\/td>\n<td>37%<\/td>\n<td>37%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td height=\"20\">The Back Door<\/td>\n<td>8%<\/td>\n<td>2%<\/td>\n<td>8%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td height=\"20\">The Metropolis<\/td>\n<td>11%<\/td>\n<td>18%<\/td>\n<td>18%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td height=\"20\">The Refuge<\/td>\n<td>8%<\/td>\n<td>5%<\/td>\n<td>2%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td height=\"20\">The Crossroads<\/td>\n<td>17%<\/td>\n<td>16%<\/td>\n<td>15%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td height=\"20\">Shangri-La<\/td>\n<td>10%<\/td>\n<td>2%<\/td>\n<td>2%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td height=\"20\">The Rust Belt<\/td>\n<td>8%<\/td>\n<td>12%<\/td>\n<td>8%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td height=\"20\">The Frontier<\/td>\n<td>6%<\/td>\n<td>6%<\/td>\n<td>8%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td height=\"20\">The Straits<\/td>\n<td>4%<\/td>\n<td>2%<\/td>\n<td>3%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Two regions immediately stand out: the Yellow Land and the  Metropolis.&nbsp; True, they have larger populations than most, but even  taking that into account, their political influence is clear.&nbsp; While  together they account for just over a third (38%) of China&rsquo;s population,  they account for well over half (55%) of its leaders, both on the  Central Committee and provincial level.&nbsp; That&rsquo;s worth&nbsp;stating again,  just to be clear &mdash; <em>over half of China&rsquo;s senior officials come from  the Yellow Land or the Metropolis.<\/em><\/p>\n<p>The most under-represented region is, by far, Shangri-La (remote,  mountainous southwest China) &mdash; with 10% of China&rsquo;s population, it  accounts for&nbsp;a paltry&nbsp;2% of officials on the Central Committee and  provincial level.&nbsp; The Refuge (the Sichuan basin, just north of  Shangri-La) also comes up short, accounting for 8% of the population but  just 5% of the Central Committee and 2% of provincial leaders.<\/p>\n<p>The Back Door (the Pearl River Delta region) presents an interesting  case.&nbsp; Despite accounting for 8% of China&rsquo;s population, its  natives&nbsp;hardly hold any power (2%) on the Central Committee.&nbsp; But,  largely due to the fact that Hong Kong and Macau have been&nbsp;set up as  semi-autonomous SARs (&ldquo;one country, two systems&rdquo;), the Back Door enjoys a  proportional standing among provincial leaders.&nbsp; This pattern is  actually quite consistent with the Back Door&rsquo;s historical character, in  which it has been accorded <em>considerable local autonomy in large part  due to its lack of national influence<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>The Crossroads (the middle Yangtze)&nbsp;and the Rust Belt (Manchuria)  both have political influence roughly commensurate with their  populations.&nbsp; To some degree, this may be due to their strong  revolutionary heritages.&nbsp; The Crossroads was where both the Nationalist  and Communist revolutions got their start, and where many of China&rsquo;s  first generation of Communist leaders (including Mao) were born.&nbsp; The  Rust Belt was the first region to fall to Communist military control in  1947, and served as the focal point for state-led industrialized during  the heyday of Soviet-style central planning.&nbsp; It would not be surprising  for a reasonable portion of the present Communist party leadership to  hail from these regions.<\/p>\n<p>Finally, the Frontier (China&rsquo;s far west) and the Straits (its  southeast coast) are affected by their place at the margins of Chinese  political life.&nbsp; The natives of the Frontier receive a boost in&nbsp;their  provincial-level influence from the requirement that&nbsp;all chairman  (governors) of autonomous regions (including Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner  Mongolia, and Ningxia) must belong to the minority that comprises the  majority there (the same requirement does not apply, notably, to the  regional party secretaries, who&nbsp;are almost always Han Chinese).&nbsp; The  Straits, in contrast, enjoys proportionally less influence within the  PRC leadership, relative to its population, due to the unique status of  Taiwan.<\/p>\n<p>Obviously, it would be unwarranted to see Chinese officials as  &ldquo;representing&rdquo; their places of origin.&nbsp; Many have held posts in other  provinces and see their role and their careers from a national  perspective.&nbsp; But if&nbsp;37% of all leading officeholders in the U.S. hailed  from&nbsp;California, and over half came from California and Texas, it&nbsp;might  tell you something about their outlook and assumptions.<\/p>\n<p>What the figures seem to suggest is that,&nbsp;while political power is  fairly dispersed in China, some regions &mdash; the Yellow Land and the  Metropolis &mdash; continue to play a dominant role consistent with their  history and character, whereas other regions &mdash; Shangri-La, the Refuge,  and&nbsp;to some degree the Back Door &mdash; play&nbsp;a far more marginal role&nbsp;on  China&rsquo;s political stage.&nbsp; In any event,&nbsp;the numbers offer&nbsp;interesting  food for thought.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.businessinsider.com\/the-secret-power-struggle-in-china-to-succeed-hu-jintao-2010-3#comments\">Join the conversation about this story &#187;<\/a><\/p>\n<p><b>See Also:<\/b><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"http:\/\/www.businessinsider.com\/america-is-losing-competitiveness-in-the-global-market-and-were-doing-nothing-to-fix-it-2010-3\">America Is Losing Competitiveness In The Global Market And We&#8217;re Doing Nothing To Fix It<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"http:\/\/www.businessinsider.com\/1992-cia-document-shows-possible-scenarios-china-would-take-over-f-16-sales-to-taiwan-2010-2\">CIA Document Reveals What The Agency Thinks Beijing Would Do In Response To An Arms Sale To Taiwan<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"http:\/\/www.businessinsider.com\/the-secret-to-koreas-olympic-success-their-population-is-becoming-taller-2010-2\">Here&#8217;s The Real Reason Korea Is Winning So Many Olympic Medals<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"http:\/\/feeds.feedburner.com\/~r\/TheMoneyGame\/~4\/NIBkH9NcAc4\" height=\"1\" width=\"1\"\/><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>(This post appeared on the author&#8217;s blog.) The National People&rsquo;s Congress (NPC) has been in full swing this week in Beijing.&nbsp; Even if it&rsquo;s mostly just theater, the NPC offers an important&nbsp;stage for&nbsp;up-and-coming politicians to jockey for position.&nbsp; In two years (2012), President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao are expected to retire, along with [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6188,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-421355","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/421355","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/6188"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=421355"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/421355\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=421355"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=421355"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=421355"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}