{"id":579936,"date":"2010-05-26T11:42:42","date_gmt":"2010-05-26T15:42:42","guid":{"rendered":"tag:theatlantic.com,2010-05-26:mt-57288"},"modified":"2010-05-26T11:42:42","modified_gmt":"2010-05-26T15:42:42","slug":"more-on-why-we-shouldnt-bail-out-the-multi-employer-plans","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/579936","title":{"rendered":"More on Why We Shouldn't Bail Out the Multi-Employer Plans"},"content":{"rendered":"

Something I meant to write yesterday<\/a>, but forgot, is that there’s considerable moral hazard if we allow multi-employer plans to segregate the employees of now-defunct companies.  As one of my commenters wrote:<\/p>\n

The multi-employer plans are treated differently from the single-company
\n plans precisely because there is an expectation of the births and
\ndeaths of employers in the marketplace. They are common in industries
\nlike the garment industry, the construction industry and the trucking
\nindustry,where companies come and go frequently.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

There are a whole bunch of reasons for this birth and death cycle which aren’t particularly germane to our discussion.  But one thing that is worth noting is that it’s not uncommon for owners to serially start companies, or have three or four companies operating under the control of a single owner.  If you segregate the pensions of defunct firms, it seems to me that you may get a whole bunch of creative corporate bankruptcies so that the government can take over all the old pensions.<\/p>\n

It’s also important to note that this is not simply a disaster created by corporate bankruptcies or other market exit.  As the same commenter notes:<\/p>\n

The pension laws that govern the multi-employer plans already provide
\nvery specific guidance on how pension fund deficits are to be handled.
\nIn the non-construction multi-employer plans ( construction plans are
\ntreated somewhat differently),the unfunded liability actually belongs to
\n the employer in proportion to his percentage of the fund’s hours over
\nthe last five years. That liability should actually be booked each year
\nand becomes a clear balance sheet liability if there is ever a transfer
\nof ownership. Since the companies have equal representation on the plan
\nmanagement boards, the rules were devised to give the companies a very
\ndirect stake in the state of the fund and to discourage excess pension
\nawards.<\/p>\n

In the non-construction world,when a company withdraws
\nfrom the marketplace or goes bankrupt,its share of the unfunded
\nliability is immediately due and payable. And the fund trustees have a
\nfiduciary responsibility to see that what is owed is paid.<\/p>\n

So
\nwhat is the problem that Senator Casey is trying to solve? Did the
\ntrustees of the plans fail to collect what is owed or assert claims in
\nbankruptcy? Did they allow the failing companies to avoid paying their
\nroutine contributions? Did the trustees fail to keep an eye on what
\ncompanies are getting themselves in trouble? Did the company auditors
\nignore this liability? Did the company executives conceal it from their
\nauditors and bankers? Were the executives negligent in even asking about
\n it? Many people may be liable, but that is no excuse for a bail out.
\nAnd if this is a bill just to solve the problems of one giant employer,
\nwhy did they let things get so bad that the problem arose in the first
\nplace? Why wasn’t this problem sorted out in collective bargaining?<\/p>\n

There
\n is no question that a lot of multi-employer plans have seen a growth in
\n unfunded liabilities since the stock market crashed. But they have also
\n seen substantial recovery since. And now they have to tell companies
\nwhat each has as a share of unfunded liabilities,to further reinforce
\nattention to the issue.<\/p>\n

Now it may be that companies have left
\nthe marketplace. If new union employers have come into the marketplace
\nthere is no problem,since the contribution base hasn’t changed. If the
\nmarketplace has gone open shop, then the plans have to either get more
\nmoney in the door from each remaining company and employee or cut the
\npensions to fit the money available.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The problem, in other words, is that the pension funds did not accrue adequate assets to cover their liabilities, a problem which in some cases seems to rise to gross negligence.  Now those long deficiencies have to be made up by the companies that are still in business, including those that weren’t around when the worst of the underfunding occurred.<\/p>\n

The problem that Casey is trying to solve is that the plans with the worst unfunded liabilities have trouble recruiting new members–both because companies fight hard to avoid “helping”, and because workers are now getting statements showing what terrible state the pension fund is in.  Naturally, the Teamsters would like the government to pick up the tab for their previous poor management, and Senator Casey is, as always, only too happy to help.  But whatever your view on unions, it cannot be true that every single thing the unions want is a good idea.  Just as support for some forms of deregulation does not imply that companies should also be able to dump toxic swill into public waterways, support for unionization should not imply that unions can screw up their pension fund management and get the government to make up the difference whenever the underfunding becomes too noticeable.  <\/p>\n

If a company had done this, it would have to declare bankruptcy, and make way for more competent businesses.  Maybe the Teamsters should do the same.<\/p>\n

Update<\/b>:  a correspondent points out that it’s even worse than that.  UPS and the Teamster’s both had a big veto over companies that didn’t keep up their contribution, or the kinds of aggressive accounting tactics that result in underfunding.  Now the union is essentially selling out the workers of non-bankrupt employers (who, as I understand it, may get less than they were promised) in order to help out UPS.<\/p>\n



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\nBusiness<\/a> – Pension<\/a> – Stock market<\/a> – Senator Casey<\/a> – Investing<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Something I meant to write yesterday, but forgot, is that there’s considerable moral hazard if we allow multi-employer plans to segregate the employees of now-defunct companies.  As one of my commenters wrote: The multi-employer plans are treated differently from the single-company plans precisely because there is an expectation of the births and deaths of employers […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":80,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-579936","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/579936","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/80"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=579936"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/579936\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=579936"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=579936"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=579936"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}