{"id":582574,"date":"2010-05-28T06:00:09","date_gmt":"2010-05-28T10:00:09","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/washingtonindependent.com\/?p=85916"},"modified":"2010-05-28T06:00:09","modified_gmt":"2010-05-28T10:00:09","slug":"america%e2%80%99s-global-outlook-at-an-%e2%80%98inflection-point%e2%80%99","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/582574","title":{"rendered":"America\u2019s Global Outlook, at an \u2018Inflection Point\u2019"},"content":{"rendered":"<div id=\"attachment_85917\" class=\"wp-caption alignnone\" style=\"width: 490px\"><a href=\"http:\/\/washingtonindependent.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2010\/05\/rhodes.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-large wp-image-85917\" title=\"rhodes\" src=\"http:\/\/washingtonindependent.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2010\/05\/rhodes-480x318.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"480\" height=\"318\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-caption-text\">Ben Rhodes, right, in the Oval Office with Director of Speechwriting Jon Favreau and President Obama (White House photo)<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>&#8220;We&#8217;re at an inflection point,&#8221; Ben Rhodes observed about the United  States&#8217; global outlook, a year and a half into the Obama presidency.<\/p>\n<p>Rhodes  speaks from a unique vantage point. He&#8217;s the deputy national security  adviser for strategic communications, a title that obscures his  importance as one of President Obama&#8217;s closest and most influential  foreign policy advisers. He&#8217;s been with Obama since the beginning of his  presidential campaign, helping shape and explain the contours of  Obama&#8217;s foreign policy. And he&#8217;s the author of the National Security  Strategy of 2010, that policy&#8217;s foundational text.<\/p>\n<p><div id=\"attachment_2848\" class=\"wp-caption alignleft\" style=\"width: 140px\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-2848\" title=\"nationalsecurity\" src=\"http:\/\/washingtonindependent.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2008\/08\/nationalsecurity.jpg\" alt=\"Image by: Matt Mahurin\" width=\"130\" height=\"130\" \/><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-caption-text\">Image by: Matt Mahurin<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"floatButtons\">\n<div style=\"float: left; margin-right: 10px; margin-bottom: 10px;\"><script src=\"http:\/\/digg.com\/tools\/diggthis.js\" type=\"text\/javascript\"><\/script><\/div>\n<div style=\"float: left; margin-bottom: 10px;\"><script type=\"text\/javascript\"\n\tsrc=\"http:\/\/d.yimg.com\/ds\/badge2.js\"\n\tbadgetype=\"square\">\n\t<?php the_permalink(); ?><\/script><\/div>\n<div style=\"float: left; margin-right: 10px;\">\n\t<script type=\"text\/javascript\">\ntweetmeme_source = \"TWI_news\";\ntweetmeme_service = \"bit.ly\";\n<\/script> <script src=\"http:\/\/tweetmeme.com\/i\/scripts\/button.js\" type=\"text\/javascript\"><\/script>\n<\/div>\n<div style=\"float: left;\"><a name=\"fb_share\" type=\"box_count\" href=\"http:\/\/www.facebook.com\/sharer.php\">Share<\/a><script src=\"http:\/\/static.ak.fbcdn.net\/connect.php\/js\/FB.Share\" type=\"text\/javascript\"><\/script><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<p> The Washington  Independent spoke with Rhodes about the document, its implications for  American national security, and the &#8220;inflection point&#8221; it addresses. A  lightly edited transcript follows.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Washington Independent:  The National Security Strategy pledges, &#8220;We must pursue a rules-based  international system that can advance our own interests by serving  mutual interests.&#8221; How do you build a constituency in the U.S. for that,  after decades of that system being caricatured &#8212; sometimes accurately  &#8212; as ineffectual?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Ben Rhodes: The tradition in the United States  is actually the opposite. Look at the moment of our maximum global  power after World War II. We had a clean slate and we chose to build an  architecture of international institutions, international standards,  international rules, to include the United Nations, to include NATO, to  include international financial institutions, treaties, and to apply our  power to strengthening that architecture so that it could solve common  problems. And I think there was basically a pretty broad, bipartisan  consensus that America was served well by an international architecture  that could keep the peace and advance prosperity. Sure, there was  skepticism about it &#8212; there\u2019s always some skepticism about the  international order in parts of the American political culture &#8212; but I  think there\u2019s a broad tradition of support for that because I think the  American people are smart enough to know that if we don\u2019t act within  that context, we bear a far greater burden ourselves.<br \/>\n<strong><br \/>\nTWI: So  this is a matter of reminding people of what\u2019s worked in the past.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Rhodes: We&#8217;re at an inflection point. We\u2019re clear-eyed about the  shortcomings. We\u2019re not starry-eyed about the efficacy of the  international system as it is today. As the president has said many  times, it\u2019s in some instances buckling under the weight of challenges it  wasn\u2019t designed for. However, that presents you with a choice. And that  choice is you can say there are emerging challenges like terrorism,  like nuclear proliferation, climate, a global economy that\u2019s more  interwoven. We can deal with those challenges by saying that the  international system is fatally flawed and we\u2019re going to step outside  the lines and deal with these issues on our own on an ad-hoc basis. Or  you can say we are going to channel our strength and influence to  reshaping an international order where we can effectively deal with  these challenges.<br \/>\n<strong><br \/>\nTWI: Secretary Clinton said at the Brookings  Institution yesterday that the document&#8217;s main takeaway should be its  assertion that American power is fundamentally tied to the sources of  our strength domestically. But we&#8217;re still in the midst of  extraordinarily challenging economic times, and there are parts of the  dignity promotion section about food security, global health and  priorities that previous strategies considered peripheral. Is the agenda  too ambitious?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Rhodes: No, I don\u2019t think so. We&#8217;re  actually demonstrating this kind of collective action, in our first 15  months, that we\u2019re trying to describe in the actual document. So  international economic coordination can no longer be effectively  implemented through the G-8, it\u2019s got to be a broader spectrum of  nations at the table, to include both China and India, but also your  South Africas, your Brazils, your Indonesias, so it&#8217;s the G-20. Climate  change can\u2019t be dealt with simply by the Kyoto signatories. You\u2019ve got  to bring in all major economies, again, to include China, to include  India.  So that&#8217;s the framework we\u2019ve tried to begin through the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.majoreconomiesforum.org\/\">Major Economies Forum<\/a>,  through the Copenhagen Accord. It includes us, India, China. So we\u2019re  already trying to broaden the circle responsibility to deal with these  challenges.<\/p>\n<p>There is a rebalancing of the application  of American resources that this administration is pursuing that we  describe in the document. We&#8217;re rebalancing in terms of the capabilities  that we apply to our problems, in the sense that we are prioritizing  investments and factors like education, clean energy that have been  under-resourced over the years. Our commitment to draw down in Iraq and  our plans to go over the hump in Afghanistan will represent a long-term  rebalancing of our military deployments, which obviously take up a good  deal of resources. So we have already begun to see shifts in resources  that we project over time.<\/p>\n<p>The second and very  important thing, and this gets back to your first question, is an  international order that can successfully deal with challenges  necessitates less of an allocation of American resources. You were  talking about how you make your case to the American people. You make  the case to the American people that collective action is far cheaper to  America than unilateral action. I mean, that\u2019s just a fact. And if you  look at something like the Food Security Initiative, certainly it\u2019s  going to take resources, but we pursue that through the G-8 and into the  G-20 to try to leverage greater international action.<\/p>\n<p>Similarly,  if you look at the thrust of the dignity promotion and the development  policies, a lot of it is trying to see capacity in partners. So that  we\u2019ll focus development policy on the kind of economic and social  progress that we see as a human rights issue as well as a security issue  and a prosperity issue. But frankly, by focusing on building the  capacity of our partners, we\u2019re trying through our investments to see  progress that will diminish the necessity of foreign assistance over  time, insofar as we\u2019re building up the ability of nations to not just  combat individual diseases, but to develop their own public health  systems. We\u2019re not just trying to help them feed their people in a  humanitarian emergency, but the premise of the Food Security Initiative  is to help them develop the technique and technologies that will allow  them feed themselves over time.<\/p>\n<p>So I think again the  burden sharing is a critical aspect of the kind of force multiplication  that you can get, again, through an effective international order.  Similarly, just as we want more responsible action by a broader circle  of nations, we want more capable partners, so that over time that\u2019s the  means through which we\u2019re managing these problems.<\/p>\n<p><strong>TWI: I  noticed some <a href=\"http:\/\/washingtonindependent.com\/85811\/the-counterinsurgents-national-security-strategy\">similarities<\/a> between the National Security Strategy and the Army\/Marine Corps Field  Manual on Counterinsurgency, from the focus on legitimacy of action; on  taking responsibility for promoting dignity in at-risk populations; and  in its recognition that too much hard power can be counterproductive.  Did you draw on any of the counterinsurgency lessons of Iraq and  Afghanistan when writing the document?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Rhodes: Yeah, absolutely.  As the president <a href=\"http:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/the-press-office\/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan\">alluded  to at West Point<\/a>, the war in Afghanistan today is very different in  some ways than the war that began nine years ago, as it relates to the  nature of the fight and the tactics of the enemy and the lessons that  we\u2019ve learned in the application of our power in Afghanistan. And  certainly the same would be true in Iraq, that we ended up fighting a  war that was different than the kind of war that we, that many people  felt like we\u2019d be fighting at the beginning.<\/p>\n<p>So the lessons, I  think, we all learned included the importance of the legitimacy of our  actions, as it relates not just to the international community but most  immediately from the populations of the countries within which we\u2019re  operating. So that certainly informs Gen. McChrystal\u2019s approach in  Afghanistan, but it informs, again, our approach more broadly, as it  relates to Iraq and also other partners that we\u2019re also going to be  having to cooperate with on security issues going forward.<\/p>\n<p><strong>TWI:  As a strategic communicator, what do you want someone living in Miran  Shah, in the tribal areas of Pakistan, who might be caught between the  Haqqani network and a government program to degrade that network, to get  out of this document?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Rhodes: That the United States is not  seeking to control events where they live. Nor do we view their future  narrowly through a purely counterterrorism lens. In the first instance,  we\u2019re trying to develop the capability in their local area, as well as  their national government, to manage the threats within their borders  rather than the United States doing so. In the second instance, that we  have a broader agenda. We want to speak to their aspirations. America  cannot by itself deliver a better life, but it can tilt the scales, as  it were, in the direction of greater opportunity, greater human dignity.<\/p>\n<p>We don\u2019t simply have a negative agenda. We have a  positive agenda that is focused upon both the capacity of their  institutions to manage problems, as well as the dignity that they seek  in their own lives.<\/p>\n<p><strong>TWI: If, as the document says, the force of  American values is foundational for guiding international cooperation,  is there a tension with its <a href=\"http:\/\/washingtonindependent.com\/85857\/national-security-strategy-embraces-indefinite-detention-without-charge\">embrace  of indefinite detention without charge<\/a>?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Rhodes: Let me  take a step back and look at the issues that are touched by this.<\/p>\n<p>We  do believe that post-9\/11 there were new realities that Americans were  going to have to deal with as it related to terrorism and our response  to it. Part of the problem is that we have not been able to, as a  nation, forge sustainable, durable approaches to dealing with those  issues that were effective and that were in line with our values.  Now  what we\u2019re trying to wrestle with as an administration is the fact that  we do need to recognize that there are unique threats that we\u2019re now  facing, but that we have to approach those threats and how we deal with  them in line with certain principles. And what this administration has  said is there may be circumstances where certain individuals who  uniquely pose a threat that is demonstrable but that precludes criminal  prosecution.<\/p>\n<p>Now, we need to figure out a way to deal with this  issue in a way that builds in oversight, that is not simply subject to  the decisions of one person or the executive branch, but that is  basically embedded in the principles of checks and balances, of  oversight, of judicial review, that are at the core of our system. And  as the document makes clear at the end, in some of these issues are  going to take the actions of all three branches of government, because  the executive branch alone can&#8217;t make these decisions. That\u2019s been part  of the problem in the past.  So there needs to be buy-in from the  executive branch and from the legislative branch and trying to forge a  framework that, again, is durable, that can stand up to the test of our  laws, that can protect our security and that, again, can be sustained  for future administrations so that we\u2019re not continuing to deal with  these issues on an ad-hoc basis but rather within a framework that can  absorb the threat of terrorism without overturning the principles of our  system.<\/p>\n<p><strong>TWI: Do you expect the guy in Miran Shah to understand that?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Rhodes:  I think so. If you are demonstrating that you\u2019re affording rights to  individuals and that you are operating within America&#8217;s system of checks  and balances, of review and oversight, then that\u2019s the case that you  make. But I mean, that\u2019s something that we still need to work at as a  country. And again, that\u2019s a responsibility that falls squarely on the  executive branch but also falls on all three branches of government  because this touched on very fundamental but new issues.<\/p>\n<p><strong>TWI:  Peter Feaver, who helped write the 2006 NSS, <a href=\"http:\/\/shadow.foreignpolicy.com\/posts\/2010\/05\/27\/obama_s_national_security_strategy_real_change_or_just_bush_lite\">blogged<\/a> that he had some deja vu reading the 2010 version. His document called  for &#8220;effective, action-oriented multilateralism to address the  challenges of the day: to &#8217;strengthen alliances to defeat global  terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends&#8217; and to  &#8216;develop agendas for cooperative action with the other main centers of  global power.&#8217;&#8221; Is it fair to say there&#8217;s some overlap with the 2006  document?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Rhodes: I&#8217;d say a couple of things about that.  Number one, there\u2019s always certain forms of continuity in American  foreign policy. Number two, there were approaches that were pursued in  the latter years of the Bush administration that are certainly closer to  the approaches that we\u2019ve pursued than some of the decisions that were  taken in the first years of the Bush administration.<\/p>\n<p>But  number three, there are also clear distinctions in the approaches that  this administration has taken. I mean, I don\u2019t think anybody could stack  up the priorities that are embedded in this document as it relates to  the focus on the domestic economy as a source of our strength in the  world; as it relates to how we define our enemy as narrowly as &#8220;al Qaeda  and its affiliates&#8221;; as it relates to our efforts to end the war in  Iraq; as it relates to our focus on climate change and clean energy. I  could kinda stack up a whole on a whole number of issues.<\/p>\n<p>And  that\u2019s not even meant to be a criticism of Peter\u2019s document, which I  think is a good document.  It\u2019s meant to say that this document uniquely  represents the worldview and the priorities of this president and this  administration, which are different in some respects from the previous  administration. And I also do think that, again, the cooperative  approaches that we\u2019re trying to foster are ones that we believe do  represent more specifically the challenges of our times: the global  economy, the focus we place on our nonproliferation agenda, the  centerpiece of our efforts to apply pressure to nations like Iran. So,  you know, I think that, sure, there are areas of continuity in American  foreign policy, areas of continuity to, again, the latter years of the  Bush administration, and then there are areas of increased distinction  and different priorities that are natural to any worldview.<\/p>\n<p><strong>TWI:  Finally, one of the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.cnas.org\/blogs\/abumuqawama\/2010\/05\/national-security-strategy.html\">criticisms<\/a> I&#8217;ve seen of the National Security Strategy is that it doesn&#8217;t  prioritize amongst its wide-ranging goals. As a foundational text across  the national security bureaucracy, how will the government know how to  implement the document?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Rhodes: Within the document you have a  clear sense of the focus of the administration and how that relates to  resource allocation. We\u2019ve sent pretty clear signals about areas that  are going to be prioritized going forward, while also recognizing the  limits of what any one nation can do around town. Which again gets to  some of the rebalancing around our military deployments, it gets to some  of the burden sharing that we\u2019re trying to foster, it gets to some of  the deficit reduction that\u2019s embedded in health care and other things  that we\u2019re doing.<\/p>\n<p>On implementation, the Bush documents are  much shorter. We made the decision to encompass what really are our key  priority initiatives, so that the things that are listed in here  represent our priorities This document can basically serve as a  measuring stick that I think we would be happy to turn to in six months  or a year or several years and say: How did we do in implementing this  part of what we said was fundamental to our National Security Strategy? I  think that it does stake out those priority areas that are important to  us, that are important to American national security, and that we  expect to measure ourselves against going forward. So it starts as a  strategy document and then it turns into an implementation document.<\/p>\n<p>Now,  aside from that, I think these are actions that need to be taken in  concert with other nations. And to try to make them into a list wouldn\u2019t  kind of effectively capture the nature of national security in 2010. We  are moving in a concerted way on just about everything that is in that  document. So I think we&#8217;re providing the blueprint.<\/p>\n<p><strong>TWI: Oh,  good, because that allows me to make the Jay-Z reference.<br \/>\n<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Rhodes:  Yeah, exactly. <em>Blueprint 4: the National Security Strategy. <\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Ben Rhodes, right, in the Oval Office with Director of Speechwriting Jon Favreau and President Obama (White House photo) &#8220;We&#8217;re at an inflection point,&#8221; Ben Rhodes observed about the United States&#8217; global outlook, a year and a half into the Obama presidency. Rhodes speaks from a unique vantage point. He&#8217;s the deputy national security adviser [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4314,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-582574","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/582574","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4314"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=582574"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/582574\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=582574"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=582574"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mereja.media\/index\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=582574"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}