Participants in Afghan-led initiative Operation Moshtarak (photo: ISAF Media via Flickr)
The New York Times just reported that the UN will not participate in the reconstruction of Marjeh because of what it sees as the “militarization of humanitarian aid” that is a central feature of General Stanley McChrystal’s “government in a box” plan for the area:
Senior United Nations officials in Afghanistan on Wednesday criticized NATO forces for what one referred to as “the militarization of humanitarian aid,” and said United Nations agencies would not participate in the military’s reconstruction strategy in Marja as part of its current offensive there.
“We are not part of that process, we do not want to be part of it,” said Robert Watkins, the deputy special representative of the secretary general, at a news conference attended by other officials to announce the United Nations’ Humanitarian Action Plan for 2010. “We will not be part of that military strategy.”
The American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, has made the rapid delivery of governmental services, including education, health care and job programs, a central part of his strategy in Marja, referring to plans to rapidly deploy what he has referred to as “a government in a box” once Marja is pacified.
The Times article also provides a link to this (pdf) joint report by actionaid, Afghanaid, CARE Afghanistan, christian aid, CONCERN Worldwide, Oxfam International and Trocaire, titled “Quick Impact, Quick Collapse: The Dangers of Militarized Aid in Afghanistan“. The report states:
As political pressures to “show results” in troop contributing countries intensify, more and more assistance is being channelled through military actors to “win hearts and minds” while efforts to address the underlying causes of poverty and repair the destruction wrought by three decades of conflict and disorder are being sidelined. Development projects implemented with military money or through military-dominated structures aim to achieve fast results but are often poorly executed, inappropriate and do not have sufficient community involvement to make them sustainable. There is little evidence this approach is generating stability and, in some cases, military involvement in development activities is, paradoxically, putting Afghan lives further at risk as these projects quickly become targeted by anti-government elements.
/snip/
Part of the problem is that the militarized aid approach focuses not on alleviating poverty but on winning the loyalty of Afghans through the provision of aid. In “Commanders’ Guide to Money as a Weapons System,” a US army manual for troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, aid is defined as “a nonlethal weapon” that is utilized to “win the hearts and minds of the indigenous population to facilitate defeating the insurgents.”
Rather than just leveling criticism, the report goes on to outline an approach that the aid groups believe has a better chance of delivering real assistance to the Afghan people:
There are no quick fixes in Afghanistan. The militarized aid approach is not working for Afghans, and more of the same is unlikely to yield different results. The unrealistic goal of achieving dramatic, demonstrable development results within the next year has led to a continued emphasis on short-term projects and the same short sightedness that has plagued the international aid effort in Afghanistan since 2001.
The overemphasis on military issues at the expense of efforts to promote genuine development and good government matters not only because of the resulting human cost, but also because poverty, unemployment and weak, corrupt government are important drivers of conflict. Ultimately, these factors must be effectively addressed if there is to be any sustainable improvement in security and a lasting peace for Afghans.
The report then lists details of the approach that the aid groups feel will lead to effective relief.
The photograph at the top of the page is from the ISAF Public Affairs Flickr feed. The ISAF-supplied caption reads:
Operation Moshtarak is an Afghan-led initiative to assert government authority in the centre of Helmand province. Afghan and ISAF partners are engaging in this counter- insurgency operation at the request of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Helmand provincial government.
The date of the upload is February 17. The photo brings to mind this Reuters report on the “Human Terrain Team” accompanying the forces:
U.S. military officials say shooting their way to victory will not lead to peace in Afghanistan, and winning the cooperation of Afghan civilians is their most effective weapon.
Kristin Post, a social scientist working for a Department of Defense “Human Terrain Team,” is about 12 km (8 miles) south of Marjah, and she is looking forward to going into the town, alongside a battalion of Marines, and talking to its residents.
/snip/
Post and her team leader John Foldberg work with the Marines before, during and after operations to understand Afghans stuck between insurgents and advancing foreign troops.
“The population is the prize, it’s the center of gravity,” said Foldberg, a retired Marine.
“Our job is to get out and interview the local population, the elders, the mullahs, the men and women on the street.”
I suspect that the photo is from just such a meeting. It appears that the UN and the aid groups on the ground in Afghanistan reject this approach as rushed, ineffective and overly reliant on military support. Only time will tell if this addition of the “Human Terrain Teams” will improve on the current poor record of NATO efforts in Afghanistan humanitarian aid. However, given the cautions from the report, since these teams are from DOD, the prospects are not good.
