Author: jeffrey

So, I go to meetings on “deterring Iran” all the time where someone says “I think Thomas Schelling would say …”

The funny thing is, Tom is still around. And he has actual opinions on the issue. One needn’t perform exegesis on Strategy and Conflict or try to extrapolate from Arms and Influence. You can just ask him what he thinks.

So, Steve Clemons and I did! Tom is coming to the New America Foundation to talk about our interests in managing a nuclear-armed Iran.

So come join us at the New America Foundation on Friday at 12:15.

Thinking Through the Thinkable on a Nuclear Iran

Please join the New America Foundation for a conversation with Nobel prize winner Tom Schelling.

Participants

featured speaker
Thomas C. Schelling
Distinguished University Professor, University of Maryland
Winner, 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics

respondent
Jeffrey Lewis
Director, Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative
New America Foundation

moderator
Steve Clemons
Director, American Strategy Program
New America Foundation
Publisher, The Washington Note

Event Time and Location
Friday, April 16, 2010 – 12:15pm – 1:45pm
New America Foundation
1899 L Street NW Suite 400
Washington, DC, 20036

Does the Prague Treaty (aka New START) limit missile defenses? Certainly the text mentions defenses, but does it limit them?

“Limit” is a very particular word — The definitions in OED suggest usage most often involves those things that we can measure: time, acreage, troops, eggs, and whatnot.

That usage holds true, too, in the context of arms control treaties, where we use “limit” to mean a numerical constraint such as so-many ICBMs or so-many warheads. So, for example, the practice in START documents of referring to treaty’s “central limit” of 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, as well as various “limits” and “sub-limits” of delivery vehicles and warheads. In all cases, a “limit” refers to something numerical. Try search strings like start nuclear limit site:.gov or start nuclear limit site:.mil and the pattern is clear.

In that narrow sense, START does not limit US missile defenses. Nevertheless, the treaty touches upon missile defenses in three ways, which I gather will be the subject of discussion during the ratification process:

1. The preambular language recognizes that there is an interrelationship between strategic offenses and strategic defenses.
2. Article 3 (7A) excludes missile-defense interceptors from the definition of a ballistic missile, irrespective of other characteristics like trajectory or range.
3. Article V (3) prohibits further conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to hold missile defense interceptors, and vice versa. (Previously converted launchers are grand-fathered.)

Preambular Language

The preamble to the Prague Treaty contains a passage that comments on the relationship between strategic offenses and defenses:

Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties.

You could utter any or all these things at a Defense Policy Board meeting and no one would spit coffee through his nose. This is pretty bland stuff.

What will complicate the preambular language is Russia’s unilateral statement that “the extraordinary conditions” that might lead to Moscow’s withdrawal would include the development of US defenses that “would result in a threat to the potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.”

Such statements are not new — as Kingston Reif and Travis Sharp have both noted, Moscow made a similar statement after signing the original START. (I hasten to add that the vote on START was 93-6 with yes votes including Chuck Grassley, Orrin Hatch, Richard Lugar, John McCain, and Mitch McConnell.) The Administration, too, seems aware of this history.

Yet, it seems some are set to make an issue of this language and the Russian statement. I really don’t understand the issue. It is a fact of life that Russia takes current and anticipated US missile defense capabilities into account when making decisions about its nuclear forces. It is also the fact that the treaty has a withdrawal clause. The New START Treaty would not last long if the United States developed extraordinarily capable defenses that would allow the United States to negate the Russian deterrent.

That is precisely why even the Bush Administration sought to make clear that missile defense did not threaten Russia. On that score, I think missile defense advocates should welcome the preamble, which commits Russia to the statement that “current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties.” That’s going to be useful at some point.

Missile Defense Exclusion

The treaty defines intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and, for good measure, enumerates them by type. Although missile defense interceptors are not listed as treaty-limited equipment, the treaty contains a further provision to make clear that interceptors — without regard to their range or other properties — are simply not ballistic missiles to be covered by the treaty:

A missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which the provisions of the treaty apply.

No Silo Conversion

Finally, Article IV of the Treaty contains a number of provisions that confine the location of treaty limited equipment. So, for example, there are restrictions on joint basing of nuclear-equipped and non-nuclear-equipped heavy bombers. The principle is a straightforward one: Requiring parties to declare the locations of equipment substantially eases the task of verification.

Article V, which deals with the development of new offensive arms, contains a provision that prohibits the parties from using ICBM and SLBM launchers to house missile defense interceptors and vice versa:

Each Party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. Each Party further shall not convert and shall not use launchers of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein. This provision shall not apply to ICBM launchers that were converted prior to signature of this Treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors therein.

The advantages of this are obvious: otherwise, you would have Russian inspectors crawling all over US missile defense interceptors to ensure they weren’t stocked with contraband treaty-limited equipment.

Keith Payne and others have erroneously claimed the Prague Treaty counts the five Minuteman III silos at Vandenberg that were converted for missile defense missions and that “the launchers themselves probably will be eliminated.”

That is incorrect. The passage from the treaty clearly notes that the provision does not apply to launchers previously converted. (Nor, obviously, would it apply to new missile-defense launchers in Alaska or Poland.)

Moreover, the Seventh Agreed Statement of the Protocol contains procedures to conduct an exhibition to demonstrate that the silos at Vandenberg really were converted to hold missile defense interceptors. It is evident that nothing need be eliminated. All one had to do was read the treaty.

Ah, there is the rub! I confronted a colleague making this accusation the other day. He responded that we won’t know until the treaty text is released. The text had been released a couple of days before (and I had slogged through it before doing interviews). Not having read the treaty didn’t stop my colleague from being very confident about his assertion in a public setting, which is a life lesson, I suppose.

Does The Treaty Limit Missile Defenses?

I think it is very hard to conclude that the treaty “limits” missile defenses. The treaty may have some implications for missile defense programs, but on the whole it is written in such a way as to create space for current and planned missile defense programs, including language that exempts interceptors from the definition of an ICBM and the provision to “grandfather” the converted silos at Vandenberg.

Still, I suspect we will continue hear from some quarters that the treaty “limits” missile defense. This is a form of special pleading. The common-sense test is that no one would claim that the treaty “limits” conventional bombers, despite some provisions to separate conventional bombers from their nuclear-equipped brethren. By any consistent standard, the treaty limits neither.

As I have already argued, I believe the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review is a significant achievement — in a way that critics and some surprising advocates don’t quite grasp yet. Because everyone is focusing on the details — this caveat, that compromise — the broader shift in how we talk about the role of nuclear weapons is going unremarked.

With that ritual disclaimer, I am planning a series of posts on the details. After all, this is Arms Control Wonk. I am ending each post with an arbitrary grade, since I’ve been doing a little of that lately for real. It is a conceit, I admit; but a harmless one, I would argue.

Transparency

Following President Obama’s commitment to the most open and transparent Administration in history, the Nuclear Posture Review process was largely just that — open and transparent. I can’t recall all the meetings I attended with senior government officials, including those infamous DOD round tables. (No, the tables were not round. One was, in fact, an odd V-shape.)

As a result, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review is, as expected, an entirely unclassified document. That is a major accomplishment — the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review was really just a set of slides and the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review leaked in the worst possible way. (The sanitized version in the 2002 ADR drew little or no comment.)

So, kudos to the Obama Administration for writing an entirely unclassified Nuclear Posture Review. Whether there is a classified appendix or classified follow-on studies doesn’t really matter, the document stands alone as an unclassified statement. As Cheryl Rofer noted, “It is a message that this administration thinks that accountability is important and intends to stand by its words.” That’s a good thing.

So, the Obama Administration was heading toward an A+ for transparency — until the last minute.

Admiral Dennis Blair — the presumably soon to be former Director of National Intelligence — succeeded in killing a very sensible proposal to declassify aggregate stockpile numbers on the grounds that nuclear aspirants might learn something. This is a long-standing Arms Control Wonk pet rock. There is no reason this information should remain classified.

The argument, however, was the would-be nuclear nations might divide the amount of plutonium by the size of the stockpile and discover that, shock!, the IAEA significant quantity of plutonium (8 kilograms) is too high.

No kidding.

That 4 kilograms of plutonium is enough to make a nuclear weapon is an unclassified fact. For some strange reason, the average mass of plutonium per warhead for the stockpile as a whole remains classified.

So, as a result, when then-Secretary of Energy Sam Bodman in 2007 announced that he was declaring excess another 9 metric tons of plutonium (from the 46.8 metric tons
declared in the mid-1990s), the Administration divided by 8 to claim it was enough for more than 1,100 nuclear weapons. It was a lot more than that. (The Administration had cut the size of the stockpile in half, though not all the material was declared excess).

This is an odd sort of secrecy. We already know that the START negotiations put the United States on a glide path to 11,100 warheads about the same time that the United States declared a corresponding plutonium stockpile of 46.8 metric tons (excluding weapons to be dismantled). In other words, about 4.2 kilograms per warhead.

Now, my guess is that nuclear scientists in North Korea are probably going to want to do their own calculation. Oh, wait, the North Koreans already claimed their first nuclear test used 2 kilograms of plutonium. Hmmm, what information are we protecting again?

I understand the intelligence community is now doing a red-team analysis to see what harm might come of declassifying the stockpile number.

I think Denny Blair, should chillax. I gather virtually everyone else, including Tom D’Agostino, were in fact committed to declassifying basic data about the stockpile.

In any event, the stockpile data does not need to be in the NPR document — it could easily be done in subsequent release prior to, say, May. Yes, May would be good.

Final Grade: Incomplete

Update | 3:46 pm James Acton notes that the State Department just released a fact sheet in which they divide by 4, not 8:

– By updating the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), each country will proceed to complete and operate facilities that will dispose of at least 34 metric tons of this plutonium by using it as fuel in civil power reactors to produce electricity.

– Combined, this represents enough material for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons.

34,000 × 2 ÷ 17,000 = 4. Of course, that 4 kilograms is enough for a bomb is unclassified. Whether we do or not, shhh!

The late, great Arnie Kanter, attempts to explain nuclear weapons policy to a very dim student.

Arnie Kanter passed away over the weekend. I am disconsolate.

When I arrived at the New America Foundation, my first task was to convince Arnie to co-chair our Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative with Mort Halperin. Little did I know that they were old friends and that this would be an easy task.

In fact, I was terrified to call up a former Number 3 official in the State Department, and then Principal at the Scowcroft Group, in an attempt to convince him we might be able to do something interesting with his very valuable time.

Of course, I needn’t have worried. If you knew Arnie, you know he didn’t take himself nearly so seriously. He would later reflect on his first day in that august position as Undersecretary for Political Affairs by explaining that, on the day he was sworn in, both James Baker and Lawrence Eagelburger were out for one reason or another — leaving the newly sworn in Undersecretary as the Acting Secretary. As he told the story, when he got home, the conversation with his wife, Anne, went something like:

How did you first day go, Mr. Under Secretary?

Mr. Acting Secretary!

That’s nice Mr. Acting Secretary, now please take out the trash.

That was Arnie. He spends a day as Acting Secretary and it becomes a set-up for a gag about domestic bliss.

Once I had found the courage to call Arnie, he readily agreed to co-chair our effort. None of us had any idea what we were getting into — a two-year effort to unite a very fractious group of policy wonks that Arnie, with just the lightest touch of sarcasm, called “our merry band.”

Indeed, there were moments when it seemed like the only thing that we could agree on within the group was a shared respect, admiration and affection for Arnie. It says something, given Arnie’s formidable intellect, that it was his sense of proportion and humor that I came appreciate most during a series of dinner meetings that sometimes turned for the worse.

Over the course of the past year, Arnie and Mort churned out a series of memoranda designed to provide advice for the new Administration on a range of issues, from START negotiations to declaratory policy. Watching them reminisce, joke and argue — and then trying to write it up — was a challenge, but ultimately extraordinarily rewarding.

You could convince Arnie to change his mind — though more often than not, I found he was the one with the convincing argument. I still remember him bristling at the idea of “reducing the role of nuclear weapons” — the role was declining, he argued, because of external factors. Our goal, he said, is to align our forces, policies and posture with that reality. It was a little observation with big implications. And I think he was right.

Almost every day I find myself repeating something Arnie said, though with a little less eloquence and wit than he did. Those little reminders will make me miss him all the more.

I suspect that there are many, many people whose lives Arnie touched in the same way he touched mine. If you would like to make a donation in memory of Arnie, his family asks that you consider Clearbrook, where his brother lives, or the Leukemia and Lymphoma Society.

The Russians — big surprise — have released the Russian text of the New START/Prague Treaty and the Protocol. Last I heard, the Obama Administration was planning to wait until the entire packet was submitted to the Senate.

Of course, the documents are all in Russian. So, those of us who would like to be helpful are, again, reduced to working from a machine translation. Thanks almighty for Pavel Podvig.

The same thing happened this summer, when the Administration tried to sit on on the Joint Understanding, the Russians burned them, and the official copy leaked — all without action by the White House. Actually, the Russians have done this throughout the negotiation.

Every time, the White House gets caught flat-footed. What exactly is the major malfunction here?

Open note to the White House: The Russians don’t give a f*ck about your carefully managed roll-out, ok?

Upate | 11:13 am I take it all back. State has posted the Text and Protocol online. I can only assume this was the plan all along.

Remy just wants to remind everyone that we are hosting a happy hour tomorrow (Thursday) to celebrate Leonor Tomero’s move to the Hill.

The Big Hunt
1345 Connectiuct Ave. NW
After Work (say 5:30 or so).

There is, ultimately, going to be a post from me about the details of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review — but the details are probably not what is important. So, let me start with that.

What is important is that the NPR ledes with the notion that the priority goal is to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

That, conceptually, is an important shift. There have always been two views of nuclear weapons: One view holds that nuclear weapons are just another munition, albeit larger, in a modern armory. Ours our good; theirs are bad. Another view, however, is that nuclear weapons represent a shared danger that ultimately compels us to cooperate even with our adversaries.

The Nuclear Posture Review places the deterrent value of nuclear weapons in this much larger context of confronting the shared danger posed by the existence of nuclear weapons, including nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. If I understand Josh correctly, this is what he intends to convey with the image of a tunnel dug from two ends.

Although I will focus on the nitty-gritty details in a bit, none of that will matter a year from now. I suspect we will look back at this period — the release of the Nuclear Posture Review, the signing of the Prague Treaty, the Nuclear Security Summit and the NPT Review conference — and say that this was a pivot point, the moment when we began talking about nuclear weapons on terms that are different from those of the Cold War. The implication of this conceptual shift isn’t fully realized in any of the documents.

But that is usually the case. Historical documents are always less impressive in the details than in memory. Try looking at NSDM 6, Nixon’s decision to seek ratification the NPT. You’ll be surprised at how tentatively he embraced the notion of nonproliferation. It is a turning point, nonetheless.

And, since we have a President whose rhetoric references the civil rights movement, it is important to remember that the Emancipation Proclamation freed only those slaves held in states in rebellion. The 2010 NPR is not nearly as important as the Emancipation Proclamation, obviously, but I still remember how odd I felt when I realized that the details of that document fell so far short of its historical importance.

So, the details are interesting, but I suspect that the important development is how our narrative about the role of nuclear weapons has changed — and for the better. That’s hard to see in the details, love them though I do.

Photo credit: John McDowell. (Worth checking out his entire portfolio, by the way).

Peter Baker, in the New York Times, has a long piece on the bomber counting rules in the New START (or Prague Treaty).

The bottom line — as both Pavel Podvig and Hans Kristensen argue — is that the bomber rules are an accounting gimmick and, by extension, that the treaty would not meaningfully cut US strategic nuclear forces.

Despite my respect for both Pavel and Hans, I think their criticism is a little unfair. Although attacking the treaty from the left may help ratification — cue a senior official saying “This was a negotiation with the Russians, not the Arms Control Association.” The cuts in the Prague Treaty are real, if modest. (And let’s be clear: modest cuts were always the goal.)

Recall that the treaty imposes three limits, including two on delivery vehicles:

• 1,550 warheads. Warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs count toward this limit and each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments counts as one warhead toward this limit.

• A combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

• A separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

Complaining about one of the limits in isolation is a mistake. A primary purpose of US-Russian arms control treaties, I would argue, is to drive the two parties to more stable force structures. To do so requires integrated limits on both warheads and strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV, i.e. the missiles and bombers that would deliver those warheads). Similarly, an assessment of the treaty needs to understand how the provisions work together.

Yes, the bomber rules are silly. Bomber rules always are. But as a whole, the limits are serious and meaningful.

First of all, chillax about the bombers

The argument about the bomber counting rules is a proxy for the larger argument about the treaty, focusing on the total number of warheads as the measure of merit.

I happen to agree that the White House is wrong to compare the warhead reductions under this treaty to those in either START or the Moscow Treaty, since none of the three use the same counting rules. What you have are apples, oranges and maybe a ham sandwich.

The only thing the three treaties have in common with each other is that none of them counted actual bomber loadings.

START had completely artificial counting rules for bombers known as discount rules. You will thank me for not summarizing them, but for more than you ever wanted to know, see Kartchner, pp.195-215. To understand how artificial the START rules were, Colin Powell explained to Congress that the United States was moving to “6,500 accountable warheads which will result in 9,500 actual warheads.” That’s a 3,000 warhead slush fund, thank you very much.

The Moscow Treaty, by comparison, had no formal counting rules. As a result, the US counted warheads “stored in weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases” while Russia, as Amyfw noted, did not. That’s hardly an improvement.

The Prague Treaty is not so different in this sense. Overall, the Prague Treaty actually moves the United States and Russia much closer to an actual accounting of warheads, rather than the attribution rules under START — at least for ICBMs and SLBMs. That, however, is the subject of a later post, on verification.

Bombers remain difficult to count, since their warheads are in storage and the aircraft are usually training for, or deploying on, conventional missions. Bomber rules are always weird. Kingston Reif makes all the right arguments about why we shouldn’t be too worked up about that fact.

Fundamentally, I think of bomber loadings as a secondary concern. The main goal is to get stabilizing limits on ICBMs and SLBMs, then use the bomber force to make the math work. It’s not pretty, but if you watched health care reform unfold, you don’t care about the niceties.

Second, focus on the SNDV

The best argument Kingston makes about bombers is probably the best defense of the treaty as a whole: The treaty constrains the number of bombers, if not their warhead loadings.

While the number is warheads is important, the real key to the Prague Treaty is the numerical limit on deployed delivery vehicles — 700. Seven hundred is the number of Minuteman III missiles, Trident missiles and B1, B2 and B52 bombers.

The United States wanted a much lower warhead number than did the Russians, who were only willing to budge on warhead numbers of the US came down on delivery vehicles. So, the two numbers are tightly integrated.

Delivery Vehicles
Comparing the 1991 START and 2010 Prague Treaties

System	1991 START	Prague Treaty (2010)		Notional 2017 Force Structures
	MOU	Total	Deployed	A	B	C
Minuteman III	550	450	450	350	400	450
Trident	432	336	288	288	240	192
B1	47	0	0	0	0	0
B2	19	19	16	16	16	16
B52	141	76	44	44	44	44
TOTAL	1189	881	798	698	700	702

START data is from the MOU. All other are author estimates.

The bulk of the reduction in delivery vehicles will come from changes in counting rules. As the table above illustrates, using the 1991 START counting rules, the United States has today about 1189 delivery systems. Many of these are so-called “phantom” delivery systems, including:

• 100 unexploded silos (100 delivery vehicles). The 1991 START treaty provided for two procedures to eliminate missile silos: explosive destruction of the top 6-8 meters of “headwork” or excavation. Explosive destruction is significantly cheaper than excavation, but local opposition to explosive demolition in the United States left 100 unusable silos.

• 4 converted ballistic missile submarines (96 delivery vehicles). The United States converted four ballistic missile submarines to guided missile submarines (SSGNs).

• 47 converted B1 bombers (47 delivery vehicles). Similarly, the United States converted its B1 bombers to conventional roles.

• 65 B52 bombers sitting in The Boneyard (65 delivery vehicles). The 1991 START treaty rather famously contained extensive procedures for the verifiable elimination of heavy bombers.

The Prague Treaty appears to remove these “phantom” systems in a number of ways. Perhaps most importantly, Russia accepted the principle of conversion of strategic systems to conventional roles.

As a result, with the signing of the Prague Treaty, the total number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles will, with the stroke of a pen, drop to 881. (Well, maybe not quite with the stroke of a pen — in some cases, the treaty may simply provide for simpler elimination procedures, such as in the case of those empty silos.) As far as I can tell, of the 881 delivery vehicles, about 798 would be considered “deployed” – excluding two submarines in overhaul at any time (48 tubes) and 35 B2 and B52 aircraft that are not “combat coded.” (See Marc Schanz’s magisterial post, BUFF Blogging for Arms Control, for an arms-control oriented explanation of the bomber force.)

Even with the new counting rules, by my estimate, the United States would still need to convert or eliminate about 100 delivery systems to reach 700. If I am right about these counting rules, the number of non-deployed warheads (limited to 800) is largely a function of the deployed force, representing heavy bombers that are not combat-coded (for example, training assets) and ballistic missile submarines in overhaul.

Despite worries in some quarters, I don’t expect these cuts to come from the hide of the bomber force. Because ICBMs and SLBMs sum to more than 700 delivery vehicles, the United States will have to either eliminate additional squadrons of Minuteman III missiles or convert additional ballistic missile submarines. The bomber force is, in David Mosher’s turn of phrase, small potatoes.

It is my understanding that the White House has not yet decided how to achieve any reductions under the Prague Treaty, other than stating that the Holy Triad shall not be desecrated. But Options A-C (in the table above) show three notional force structures that are either compliant or very close with the limit of 700 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles:

• Option A eliminates two squadrons of Minuteman III missiles (100 delivery vehicles)

• Option B eliminates one squadron of Minuteman III missiles and converts two additional ballistic missile submarines (98 delivery vehicles)

• Option C converts four additional ballistic missile submarines (96 delivery vehicles)

I don’t know which is best — Option C inflicts the least political pain; Option A preserves the biggest “hedge.” Option B is middling, which is a kind of virtue.

But all three are real reductions.

***

You can see, looking at the current and notional forces, why the warhead loadings make little sense when isolated from the number of delivery vehicles. The United States could have downloaded the current force structure to meet the 1550 warhead limit. The expected reduction in delivery vehicles – and the change in counting rules – will bring the number of US warheads to between 1500-1700 warheads without any additional downloading. The United States appears headed toward 1550 warheads or below, with or without a new treaty. That momentum largely explains the US desire to see a significantly lower warhead limit, in some cases reported to be as low as 1,300 warheads.

I accept that the White House fact sheet oversells the reductions in the treaty, which are in fact modest. But a modest reduction is not the same as no reduction. And, when coupled with achievements in verification — which are very good — modest reductions are no mean feat.

The lovely and talented Leonor Tomero is leaving the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation for the greener pastures of the House Armed Services Committee.

You know what that means!

So, come help the Nukes of Hazard crew drown their sorrows in booze at … oh, you know the drill.

The Big Hunt, Thursday, April 8, after work (I’ll get there at 5:30 pm).

See you there!

The US-Korea Institute at SAIS has a new blog, with the swell name 38 North. (That’s the latitude longitude line that established the division of Korea.)

I’ve got an article (How AQ Khan Helped Distort America’s DPRK Policy) that applies the themes I described in my post, Leaks and Motives of AQ Khan, and applies them to North Korea. (See also Josh Pollack’s post, The Media, Generals, & Passion of AQ Khan).

Ah, more winning friends and influencing people.

But what is spectacular about 38 North is that James Church is a contributor. Church is the pseudonym of the author of the fabulous Inspector O novels. Church has a post on Six Party Talks that contains this exchange:

We were both quiet for a few moments. Finally, O broke the silence. “Why are you stuck in the mud again?”

“Me?”

“You know what I mean. Your people are hip deep in a swamp of their own making. Things should have been moving six months ago on the diplomatic front. Last August the door was wide open when Clinton came to dinner. It was as clear as day that the stars in Pyongyang were aligned. Instead, for the past six months, all we hear about is strategic patience. You don’t want to play that game, believe me. We may not have much, but patience we have by the bucketful.”

“You can’t wait forever.”

“We don’t have to wait forever. We only have to wait until November.”

“You on the RNC mailing list or something?”

“No, but I watch Wolf News.”

“Fox. And you do?”

“The Propaganda and Agitation Department has started using it as a teaching tool, part of our new opening policy. They record it on CDs and hand them out during training sessions.”

This person has a nice photostream with shots of Geneva, including the Maison Tavel.

It is that time of year — UNIDIR is talking space, so I am off to Geneva to discuss the finer points of verification. I intend to take up Michael Krepon’s recent challenge “to strengthen norms for responsible space-faring nations – including the norm of not using satellites for target practice.”

Readers, do let me know if you are around.

Here is the White House Fact Sheet on the terms of the New START Treaty (which we will be calling the Prague Treaty). I’ve got a bunch of meetings all day, but will try to put something up over the weekend:

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
March 25, 2010
Key Facts about the New START Treaty

Treaty Structure: The New START Treaty is organized in three tiers of increasing level of detail. The first tier is the Treaty text itself. The second tier consists of a Protocol to the Treaty, which contains additional rights and obligations associated with Treaty provisions. The basic rights and obligations are contained in these two documents. The third tier consists of Technical Annexes to the Protocol. All three tiers will be legally binding. The Protocol and Annexes will be integral parts of the Treaty and thus submitted to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

Strategic Offensive Reductions: Under the Treaty, the U.S. and Russia will be limited to significantly fewer strategic arms within seven years from the date the Treaty enters into force. Each Party has the flexibility to determine for itself the structure of its strategic forces within the aggregate limits of the Treaty. These limits are based on a rigorous analysis conducted by Department of Defense planners in support of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.

Aggregate limits:

• 1,550 warheads. Warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs count toward this limit and each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments counts as one warhead toward this limit.

• This limit is 74% lower than the limit of the 1991 START Treaty and 30% lower than the deployed strategic warhead limit of the 2002 Moscow Treaty.

• A combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

• A separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

• This limit is less than half the corresponding strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limit of the START Treaty.

Verification and Transparency: The Treaty has a verification regime that combines the appropriate elements of the 1991 START Treaty with new elements tailored to the limitations of the Treaty. Measures under the Treaty include on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the Treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring. To increase confidence and transparency, the Treaty also provides for the exchange of telemetry.

Treaty Terms: The Treaty’s duration will be ten years, unless superseded by a subsequent agreement. The Parties may agree to extend the Treaty for a period of no more than five years. The Treaty includes a withdrawal clause that is standard in arms control agreements. The 2002 Moscow Treaty terminates upon entry into force of the New START Treaty. The U.S. Senate and the Russian legislature must approve the Treaty before it can enter into force.

No Constraints on Missile Defense and Conventional Strike: The Treaty does not contain any constraints on testing, development or deployment of current or planned U.S. missile defense programs or current or planned United States long-range conventional strike capabilities.

##

No, the “separate” and “combined” limits do not make intuitive sense to me yet, but I will let you know.

Update | 11:51 You can watch the official briefing at the White House.

DNI has released the July-December 2009 721 Report.

I wish they just saved the text as a .pdf, rather than scanning it and converting the images.

Update | 2:14 pm And by “late,” I meant “second half of.” It is, as Josh Pollack notes, early by previous standards.

I hate posting on top of Josh’s fantastic AQ Khan post. Go read that first.

I don’t think I got around to mentioning the article on regional nuclear weapons free zones that I wrote for Janes Intelligence Review (Regional restraint – The uses of nuclear weapons-free zones):

Nevertheless, on balance a well-designed NWFZ treaty can complement universal approaches to non-proliferation by making explicit the ‘good neighbour’ bargain embodied in the NPT and allowing countries within a region to create obligations tailored to particular regional concerns.

“Well-designed” is the magic word — negative security assurances and provisions regarding transit ought to be designed to elicit support from the nuclear weapons states. (Something I discussed in an August 2009 African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone post that led to the longer article).

The issue of what constitutes a ‘well-designed” zone from the perspective of a nuclear weapons state is the subject of a talk I am giving at a day-long event hosted by USIP and the Eliot School to follow Ambassador Jayntha Dhanapala’s talk on Tuesday night. You can’t RSVP for the day-long conference exacly, but if you go to the form to RSVP for Dhanapala’s talk, you can ask to receive more information about the conference itself.

Obviously, I am interested in China’s hit-to-kill program, whether it is aimed at satellites or ballistic missiles.

Someone posted a very interesting analysis of the Chinese hit-to-kill program on a Chinese bulletin board (in Chinese of course). (I am not sure which is the original version, though I think it may be one of two.)

It is starting to make its way around — the post was extensively cited in a IISS Strategic Comment, and was reviewed by the blog TaiwanLink (which I have been meaning to recommend to readers.) Since Strategic Comments are unsigned and TaiwanLink is anonymous, two or even all three may have the same author. I honestly don’t know. But it seems that this little bbs posting is worthy of a closer look.

I don’t know yet how to evaluate the claims in the article — the author warns “草草而成，讹误难免，仅供参考.” I’ll let you decide what to make of that injunction. (My Chinese just isn’t good enough.) But (s)he offers names, dates and places that can be confirmed, which is always encouraging.

Also, the author is apparently a reader — (s)he reproduces an image from Geoff’s post, SBIRS—Two Heads are Better than One).

So.

I thought we might have a useful discussion of the post. And, since the author is at least familiar with the website, perhaps (s)he’d like to participate. I think it is a little early to annoint a random BBS post as the definitive account of the test, but on the other hand the author — in haste or not — seems to have put in a fair amount of research.

A side-note on that treasure trove of documents that AQ Khan gave Simon Henderson.

I keep recommending Henderson’s account of the documents in the Times as background, but allow me to make another recommendation — Henderson’s 1993 review of his involvement in the Pakistan nuclear issue in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, followed by a lengthy interview with Khan.

It’s a goldmine, not least for how Khan chooses to handle direct questions about the nuclear weapons production that we now know was occurring at Kahuta.

The most interesting part, to me, is Henderson’s revelation that Khan kept a diary in English:

But Khan looks forward to being able to collaborate with me on a book. He admitted that he has kept a diary since 1976, when he returned from Europe to start enrichment work. It is written in English “so that my wife can read it when I am gone.” I put in a request for a copy.

Wow, I’d love to see a copy of that. Wonder if the ISI grabbed it when Khan went under house arrest or if there is a second copy floating about.

I notice that Jeff Smith and Joby Warrick have yet another story
based on documents provided by AQ Khan to Simon Henderson. (For more about the documents, read Henderson’s account in the Times online.)

This story pisses me off. (I suspect the editors, not the reporters, are at fault here.)

The lede to the story is about Iran, but Khan doesn’t give a whit about Iran. He’s telling a story about domestic Pakistani politics. It’s like sending two reporters to watch a production of Othello, and then publishing a story about Ottoman maritime policy. (To refresh: Othello is sent from Venice to Cyprus to defend the island against the Turks. They Turks never appear; their fleet is destroyed in a storm.) The Post actually lists the players as though this were some off-beat summer stock production.

The main allegation is that Iran sent a senior military official, Ali Shamkhani, to Pakistan to pick up three nuclear weapons promised by the Pakistani military. When the Chairman of the Pakistani Joint Chiefs of Staff says they’ll have to discuss that further, all hell breaks loose. The Pakistanis send Shamkhani packing with little more than the promise of some refuse to be provided by AQ Khan from Kahuta:

Khan’s written statement to Henderson states that after [Ali] Shamkhani’s arrival in Islamabad on a government plane, he told the chairman of Pakistan’s Joint Chiefs of Staff committee that “he had come . . . to collect the promised nuclear bombs.”

When the chairman, Adm. Iftikhar Ahmed Sirohey, proposed to discuss other matters first and then “see how Pakistan could assist the Iranians in their nuclear program,” Shamkhani reportedly became irate, Khan wrote. He reminded Sirohey that “first Gen. Zia (ul Haq, the Pakistani president until 1988) and then Gen. Beg had promised assistance and nuclear weapons and he had specifically come to collect the same.”

[snip]

Khan said that after hearing Shamkhani’s demand for three finished weapons, Sirohey demurred and that other ministers backed him up. But Beg pressed then-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and her top military aide “to honour (Beg’s) . . . commitment,” Khan wrote.

Under pressure, the aide asked Khan to “get components of two old (P-1) discarded machines and pack them into boxes with 2 sets of drawings,” which were passed to Iran through an intermediary, he said. P-1 is the designation for the centrifuge model used in Pakistan.

I am writing a longer piece about the other two stories in this series as they relate to North Korea, but I have essentially the same complaint about all three: The apparent faith placed in AQ Khan.

There is good reason to be wary of Khan’s statements. He is not an historian, attempting to document the operation of a proliferation network for future scholars, or a journalist with a big scoop. He’s a perp, trying to save his own skin and repair his reputation. His motive is to demonstrate that everything he did, he did:

(1) with the approval, or indeed at the behest, of senior officials in Pakistan (which is not, precisely, the same thing as the Government of Pakistan), and

(2) in the service of Pakistan’s national interest.

That is the gist of Khan’s March 2004 “statement” to the Pakistani government, his handwritten December 10, 2003 letter to his wife Hendrina, and his 5-page description of his government’s nuclear cooperation with China. Indeed, the apparent reason that the Post won’t publish the documents is that they contain a lengthy list of likely litigious Pakistani officials whom Khan accuses of accepting bribes. (In the print version, there is an image of the statement with the name of one of Khan’s employees blacked out.) Khan is implicating others, casting his own actions as having served his country.

The whole Iran angle is just backdrop, like the never-seen Turkish fleet in Othello. The real drama is the fight between the Army and the civilian government, represented by General Beg and Prime Minister Bhutto. In this play, Khan is neither Othello nor Iago. He’s Roderigo — the fool used by one powerful force to get at another, then betrayed.

Seriously, the Post’s theater critic could have written a better story.

Who suggested giving Iran nuclear weapons? Not innocent AQ Khan, but the powerful Army Chief of Staff. Who decided to provide Iran with (old) centrifuges as a consolation prize? Not gentle AQ Khan, but Benazir Bhutto’s military aide. Seriously, I think Khan missed a career writing for stage and film.

Clearly the Iranians were up to no good with Pakistan, as were the Libyans, North Koreans and probably a few others. Khan played a central role in that relationship, so his account is interesting, if not dispositive. But to read Khan’s account of the wrangling in Islamabad as a story about motivations in Tehran is a bizarre editorial choice that speaks volumes about the state of the Post.

If the Post is worried about lawsuits arising from Khan’s allegations, doesn’t that say something about the credibility of the documents? Either the Post should have the courage to publish the documents in full, as David Albright et al. have suggested, or admit that there are real problems with Khan’s credibility.

And, while we’re doing public service announcements for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, let me remind readers that CNS is again hosting the Doreen and Jim McElvany 2010 Nonproliferation Challenge.

First prize is 10 Gs. Seriously, who can’t use a little extra baksheesh these days?

The due date is 11:59 PM (Eastern time, North America), May 31, 2010:

The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies strives to combat the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to state and non-state actors by training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists and disseminating timely information based on cutting-edge research and analysis.

In order to spur new thinking and policy initiatives to address today’s most urgent proliferation threats, CNS and its journal, the Nonproliferation Review, created an essay competition to identify and publish the most outstanding new scholarly papers in the nonproliferation field. Our priority is to generate new insights and specific recommendations for resolving today’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons challenges, including those involving both state and non-state actors.

Eligibility

This competition is open to persons worldwide, except for current faculty, staff, interns, and students of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, past winners of this competition, and anyone involved in reviewing or judging submissions. To be eligible for the student prize, an entrant must be enrolled at a college or university at the time of submission. A team of authors comprising one or more students and non-students is not eligible for the student prize.

• Students are eligible for the grand prize.

How to Enter

On or before May 31, 2010, e-mail your entry to essaycontest [at] miis.edu. A valid entry consists of two parts:

1. a completed official cover sheet [Word DOC] indicating the name(s) of the author(s), address, telephone number(s), e-mail address(es), indication of status as a student at the time of entry (yes or no, undergraduate or graduate), date of birth, title of the submission, and a one paragraph biography of the author(s) (the cover sheet is the only place where this information should appear); and

2. the submitted essay.

Past Grand Prize Winners are Ward Wilson for The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence and Anne Harrington de Santana.

Think you can do better?

Well, this is very interesting. You can now get an MA in nuclear terrorism. Imagine the class projects!

Alright, I kid, but the Monterey Institute has a new degree in “Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies” that brings together the best of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and the Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP):

The Monterey Institute is launching a new M.A. degree in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies (MANPTS). The first of its kind in the United States, it prepares students for careers in analyzing, preventing, and responding to terrorist threats and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Courses for this degree will be taught by faculty of the Graduate School of International Policy and Management; by policy, scientific, and technical specialists in the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and the Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP); and by experts invited from international organizations, government agencies, the private sector, and leading universities all over the world. Students in this M.A. program may also gain practical experience through internships at international organizations or work as research assistants at CNS and MonTREP. Placement assistance from our Center for Advising and Career Services helps graduating students find professional positions in government agencies and international organizations dedicated to combating terrorism or the spread of WMD as well as private firms specializing in security research, corporate security, or related fields.

I am not sure I would have called it MANPTS (Man Points?), but a rose by any other name … If you are interested, there relevant information is here.

So, the one time I met Tom D’Agostino, he called me “Jerry.”

It was interesting moment, because I couldn’t decide whether he just suffered from some mild aphasia or was trying to be insulting. (Though, you know, Jerry Lewis is big in France.)

I’ve since seem him speak a couple of times, and still can’t decide if this is just an act or he really is just in way over that shiny pate of his. But, the endless speculation entertains me in a cruel way — and I do love new data points.

Enter Nick Roth, of the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, who went to watch T-D’Ag testify before the Senate Appropriations Committee (Subcommitte on Energy and Water Development). Nick observes that T-D’Ag wildly misrepresented the recent JASON report on Lifetime Extension Programs, and got thumped pretty hard by Dianne Feinstein:

Tom D’agostino was explaining the findings about LEPs in the latest JASON report. Tom D’awg’s interpretation was if we don’t want to improve safety, security, and reliability, we continue doing what we do now. Senator Feinstein instantly interrupted explaining that was NOT what the JASONs said. Tom D’awg responded that he did not have the report in front of him.

Later in the hearing Senator Feinstein submitted the declassified JASON study for the record and acknowledged that the original rationale for new pits has been refuted. She also said that she is going to arrange a meeting for the JASONs to sit down with Tom D’awg.

You can listen to the whole thing as a webcast. T-D’ag draws Senator Feinstein’s ire at 29:24-30:04 and then later, at 51:30 she has the unclassified executive summary submitted for the record.

The report said, as Senator Feinstein noted correctly, something very different. Regular readers will remember that Arms Control Wonk acquired an early copy of the unclassified executive summary, titled Lifetime Extension Program (LEP), JSR-09-334E.

The study plainly states that refurbishment and component reuse will allow improvement of safety, surety and reliability (to be precise, “margins”). Replacement would be necessary only in one, extreme instance — an effort to add “intrinsic” surety features (ie those inside the nuclear explosive package) to some reentry vehicle warheads. (Elaine Grossman had a nice story before I had a copy of the document.)

Either T-D’ag has limited reading comprehension, or he was foolish enough to think he could get one past Senator Feinstein. I don’t know which is worse.

I think that sometimes, because she is such an effective politician in terms of speaking plainly, that wonks underestimate Senator Feinstein. That is, as T-D’ag has no doubt noticed, a big mistake. I had the pleasure of hosting Senator Feinstein at one of my nuclear strategy dinners, watching her talk to Mort Halperin and Arnie Kanter all evening. She’s impressive, and not just “for a politician.”

At any rate she’s certainly a lot smarter than Tom D’Agostino.