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A source at Feast in Decatur has confirmed that  Ryan Stewart will be the new chef at Farmstead 303 — the new, soon-to-open venture across the street that replaces the defunct Depeaux. Stewart, who is currently finishing up a gig at Mac McGee’s Irish Pub, earned a fan base for his work at the Glennwood in East Atlanta.

In other news:

• The shuttered Eno by Zaza will reopen as 5th St. Cafe in June. Owner (and Hawks Forward-Center) Zaza Pachulia has brought in the team of A.D. Allushi and Chef Ian Winslade (the forthcoming Buckhead Bottle Bar) to rework the vinous concept into more of a French bistro, with a bakery/patisserie where the wine bar used to be.
• Willamette Week is reporting that Brady Lowe — the Atlantan who travels the country with his  Cochon 555 porcine cook-off — landed in a Portland hospital with a leg fracture after getting into a fistfight with local chef Eric Bechard. The chef was apparently upset that Lowe allowed an Iowa pig into the locavore Valhalla of …

Android mobile phone user-bookworms might be thrilled to hear that Amazon plans to release a Kindle e-reader app that they can download for free this summer. The only thing surprising about this announcement is that it took so long. What was Amazon waiting for? Here are three reasons why it should have fallen over itself to get this app out as quickly as possible.

Other Devices Have Had It for a While

For starters, other mobile devices have had the free Kindle app for quite some time. The iPhone got it way back in March 2009. Blackberries got free Kindle in February. While there are surely other devices that still lack the app, Android is one of the fastest growing platforms. If Amazon has determined that it’s a smart strategy to provide its free Kindle reader for mobile devices (and it is, see reason #3 below), then it should roll this app out as quickly as possible to maximize market penetration.

Apple Is No Longer an Ally

Amazon should have also begun providing this app to other mobile devices with a renewed sense of urgency after learning that Apple was releasing its own tablet device. Yet, the iPhone remained the only mobile platform with the free Kindle app for nearly a year. The iPad is a direct competitor with the Kindle, even though Apple’s device has superior capabilities. Few people who own an iPad will think they also need to purchase a Kindle. Moreover, most Kindle users will just rely on Apple’s iBook store, rather than download the Kindle app for iPad — what’s the point?

Competition from Apple further accentuates the need for Amazon to push the app out to Android users. Think about the segment of the population who owns an Android phone. They’re almost certainly not Apple fanboys/girls. If they were, they’d have an iPhone. So that means they’re less inclined to buy an iPad than an iPhone owner. But they’re also more technologically savvy than consumers who might opt for a simpler mobile phone with fewer capabilities. Amazon should get their Kindle app in these consumers’ hands quickly, in an attempt to fend off any urges they may have to purchase an iPad instead of their device. Getting them hooked in Kindle first will lower the likelihood that they buy another e-reader or tablet instead.

There’s Really No Downside

From a strategic point of view, there’s really no reason why Amazon shouldn’t provide the free Kindle app to as many mobile devices as possible. Won’t that cut into Kindle sales? Probably not much, particularly not in regard to mobile phone app downloads. Anyone who really wants a richer e-reading experience won’t settle for reading books on their little phone screen: they’ll still spring for the full Kindle (or an iPad, tablet, or e-reader).

Meanwhile, those who can stomach reading books though the mobile app on their phone may choose to pay for books through Amazon’s Kindle store. Some may even like the Kindle experience on their mobile phone so much that they decide to buy the device from Amazon after all. Surely, Amazon would want to capitalize on the book purchases and potential new sales thanks to providing the Kindle app for the growing population of Android users.

All of these reasons likely had something to do with Amazon finely wising up and pushing out the Kindle app to Android users. It’s a smart move, long overdue.

by Robert Stavins

As with the Waxman-Markey bill (H.R. 2454), passed by the House of Representatives
last June, there is now some confusing commentary in the press and
blogosphere about the allocation of allowances in the new Senate
proposal—the American Power Act of 2010—sponsored by Sens. John Kerry (D-Mass.) and Joseph Lieberman (I-Conn.). As before, the mistake is being made of confusing the share of allowances that are
freely allocated versus auctioned with (the appropriate analysis of) the
actual incidence of the allowance value, that is,
who ultimately benefits from the allocation and auction revenue.

In this essay, I assess quantitatively the actual incidence of the
allowance value in the new Senate proposal, much as I did last year with the House legislation. I find
(as with Waxman-Markey) that the lion’s share of the allowance value—
some 82 percent—goes to consumers and public purposes, and only 18 percent accrues
to covered, private industry. First, however, I place this in context
by commenting briefly on the overall Senate proposal, and by examining
in generic terms the effects that allowance allocations have—and do
not have—in cap-and-trade systems.

The American Power Act of 2010

You may be wondering why I am bothering to write about the
Kerry-Lieberman proposal at all, given the conventional wisdom that the
likelihood is very small of achieving the 60 votes necessary in the
Senate to pass the legislation (particularly with the withdrawal of
Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-S.C.) from the former
triplet of Senate sponsors). Two reasons. First, conventional wisdoms often turn out to be wrong (although I must say that the vote count on Kerry-Lieberman does not
look good, with the current tally according to Environment & Energy
Daily being 26 Yes, 11 Probably Yes, 31 Fence Sitters, 10 Probably No,
and 22 No). Second, if the conventional wisdom turns out to be correct,
and the 60-vote margin proves insurmountable in the current Congress,
then when the Congress returns to this issue—which it inevitably will
in the future—among the key starting points for Congressional
thinking will be the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman proposals.
Hence, the design issues do matter.

The American Power Act, like its House counter-part, is a long and
complex piece of legislation with many design elements in its
cap-and-trade system (which, of course, is not called “cap-and-trade”—but rather “reduction and investment”), and many elements that go well
beyond the cap-and-trade system (sorry, I meant to say the
“reduce-and-invest” system). Perhaps in a future essay, I will examine
some of those other elements (wherein there is naturally both good news
and bad news), but for today, I am focusing exclusively on the allowance
allocation issue, which is of central political importance.

Before turning to an empirical examination of the Kerry-Lieberman
allowance allocation, it may be helpful to recall some generic facts
about the role that allowance allocations play in cap-and-trade systems.

The role of allowance allocations in cap-and-trade systems

It is exceptionally important to keep in mind what is probably the
key attribute of cap-and-trade systems:  the particular allocation of
those allowances which are freely distributed has no impact on the
equilibrium distribution of allowances (after trading), and therefore no
impact on the allocation of emissions (or emissions abatement), the
total magnitude of emissions, or the aggregate social costs. (There are some caveats, about which more below.) By the way, this independence of a cap-and-trade system’s performance
from the initial allowance allocation was established as far back as
1972 by David Montgomery in a path-breaking article in the Journal of
Economic Theory (based upon his 1971 Harvard
economics PhD dissertation). It has been validated with empirical evidence repeatedly over the years.

Generally speaking, the choice between auctioning and freely
allocating allowances does not influence firms’ production and emission
reduction decisions (although it’s true that the revenue from auctioned
allowances can be used for a variety of public purposes, including
cutting distortionary taxes, which can thereby reduce the net cost of
the program). Firms face the same emissions cost regardless of the
allocation method. When using an allowance, whether it was received for
free or purchased, a firm loses the opportunity to sell that allowance,
and thereby recognizes this “opportunity cost” in deciding whether to
use the allowance. Consequently, the allocation choice will not—for
the most part—influence a cap’s overall costs.

Manifest political pressures lead to different initial allocations of
allowances, which affect distribution, but not environmental
effectiveness, and not cost-effectiveness. This means that ordinary
political pressures need not get in the way of developing and
implementing a scientifically sound, economically rational, and
politically pragmatic policy. With other policy instruments—both in
the environmental realm and in other policy domains—political
pressures often reduce the effectiveness and/or increase the cost of
well-intentioned public policies. Cap-and-trade provides natural
protection from this. Distributional battles over the allowance
allocation in a cap-and-trade system do not raise the overall cost of
the program nor affect its environmental impacts.

In fact, the political process of states, districts, sectors, firms,
and interest groups fighting for their share of the pie (free allowance
allocations) serves as the mechanism whereby a political constituency in support of
the system is developed, but without detrimental effects to the
system’s environmental or economic performance. That’s the good news,
and it should never be forgotten.

But, depending upon the specific allocation mechanisms employed,
there are several ways that the choice to freely distribute allowances
can affect a system’s cost. Here’s where the caveats come in.

Some important caveats

First, as I said above, auction revenue may be used in ways that reduce the costs of the existing tax system or fund
other socially beneficial policies. Free allocations forego such
opportunities.

Second, some proposals to freely allocate allowances to electric
utilities may affect electricity prices, and thereby affect the extent
to which reduced electricity demand contributes to limiting
emissions cost-effectively. Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman both
allocate a significant number of allowances to local (electricity)
distribution companies, which are subject to cost-of-service regulation
even in regions with restructured wholesale electricity markets.
Because the distribution companies are subject to cost-of-service
regulation, the benefit of the allocation will ultimately accrue to
electricity consumers, not the companies themselves. While these
allocations could increase the overall cost of the program if the
economic value of the allowances is passed on to consumers in the form
of reduced electricity prices, if that value is instead passed on to
consumers through lump-sum rebates, the effect can be to compensate consumers for increased electricity prices without
reducing incentives for energy conservation. (There are some legitimate
behavioral questions here about how consumers will respond to such
rebates; these questions are best left to ongoing economic research.)

Third, “output-based updating allocations” can be useful
for addressing competitiveness impacts of a climate policy
on particularly energy-intensive and trade-sensitive sectors, but
these allocations can provide perverse incentives and drive up the costs
of achieving a cap if they are poorly designed. This merits some
explanation.

An output-based updating allocation ties the quantity of allowances
that a firm receives to its output (production). Such an allocation is
essentially a production subsidy. While this affects firms’ pricing and
production decisions in ways that can, in some cases, introduce
unintended consequences and increase the cost of meeting an emissions
target, when applied to energy-intensive trade-exposed industries, the
incentives created by such allocations can contribute to the goal of
reducing emission leakage abroad.

This approach is probably superior to an import allowance requirement, whereby imports of a
small set of specific commodities must carry with them CO2 allowances, because import allowance requirements can damage
international trade relations. The only real solution to the
competitiveness issue is to bring key non-participating countries within
an international climate regime in meaningful ways, an obviously
difficult objective to achieve. (On this, please see the work of the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements.)

Is the Kerry-Lieberman allowance allocation a corporate give-away?

Perhaps unintentionally, there has been some potentially misleading
coverage on this issue. At first glance, about half of the allowances
would be auctioned and about half freely allocated over the life of the
program, 2012-2050. (In the early years, the auction share is smaller,
reflecting various transitional allocations that phase out over time.) But looking at the shares that are auctioned and freely allocated can be
very misleading.

Instead, the best way to assess the real implications is not as “free
allocation” versus “auction,” but rather in terms of who is the
ultimate beneficiary of each element of the allocation and auction, that
is, how the value of the allowances and auction revenue are
allocated. On closer inspection, it turns out that many of the elements
of the apparently free allocation accrue to consumers and public
purposes, not private industry. Indeed, my conclusion is that over the
period 2012-2050, less than 18 percent of the allowance value accrues to
industry.

First, let’s looks at the elements which will accrue to consumers and public purposes. Next to each allocation element is the respective share of allowances
over the period 2012-2050:

I.  Cost Containment

a.  Auction from cost containment reserve, 3.1 percent

II.  Indirect Assistance to Mitigate Impacts on Energy
Consumers

b.  Electricity local distribution companies, 18.6 percent

c.  Natural gas local distribution companies, 4.1 percent

d.  State programs for home heating oil, propane, and kerosene
consumers, 0.9 percent

III.  Direct Assistance to Households and Taxpayers

e.  Allowances auctioned to provide tax and energy refunds for
low-income households, 11.7 percent

f.  Allowances auctioned for universal tax refunds, 22.3 percent

IV.  Other Domestic Priorities

g.  State renewable and energy efficiency programs, 0.6 percent

h.  State and local agency programs to reduce emissions through
transportation projects, 1.9 percent

i.  Grants for national surface transportation system, 1.9 percent

j.  Auctioned allowances for Highway Trust Fund, 1.9 percent

k.  Domestic adaptation, 1.0 percent

l.  Rural energy savings (consumer loans to implement energy
efficiency measures), 0.1 percent

V.  International Funding

m.  International adaptation, 1.0 percent

VI.  Deficit Reduction

n.  Allowances auctioned for deficit reduction, 7.4 percent

o.  Remaining allowances auctioned to offset bill’s impact on
deficit, 6.1 percent

Next, the following
elements will accrue to private industry, again with
average (2012-2050) shares of allowances:

I.  Allocations to Covered Entities

a.  Energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries, 7.0 percent

b.  Petroleum refiners, 2.2 percent

c.  Merchant coal-fired electricity generators, 2.2 percent

d.  Generators under long-term contracts without cost recovery, 0.9 percent

II.  Technology Funding

e.  Carbon capture and sequestration incentives, 3.8 percent

f.  Clean energy technology R&D, 0.7 percent

g.  Low-carbon manufacturing R&D, 0.3 percent

h.  Clean vehicle technology incentives, 0.3 percent

III.  Other Domestic Priorities

i.  Manufacturing plant energy efficiency retrofits, 0.1 percent

j.  Compensation for early action emissions reductions prior to cap’s
implementation, 0.1 percent

The bottom line? Over the entire period from 2012 to 2050, 82.6 percent of the allowance value goes
to consumers and public purposes, and 17.6 percent to private industry. Rounding error brings the total to
100.2 percent, so to be conservative, I’ll call this an 82/18 percent split.

Moreover, because some of the allocations to private industry are—
for better or for worse—conditional on recipients undertaking specific
costly investments, such as investments in carbon capture and storage,
part of the 18 percent free allocation to private industry should not be viewed
as a windfall.

I should also note that some observers (who are skeptical about
government programs) may reasonably question some of the dedicated
public purposes of the allowance distribution, but such questioning is
equivalent to questioning dedicated uses of auction revenues. The
fundamental reality remains: The appropriate characterization of the
Kerry-Lieberman allocation is that about 82 percent of the value of
allowances go to consumers and public purposes, and 18 percent to private
industry.

Comparing the Kerry-Lieberman 82/18 split with recommendations from economic analyses

The 82-18 split is roughly consistent with empirical economic
analyses of the share that would be required—on average—to fully
compensate (but no more) private industry for equity losses due to the
policy’s implementation. In a series of analyses that considered the
share of allowances that would be required in perpetuity for
full compensation, Bovenberg and Goulder (2003) found that 13 percent
would be sufficient for compensation of the fossil fuel extraction
sectors, and Smith, Ross, and Montgomery (2002) found that 21 percent
would be needed to compensate primary energy producers and electricity
generators.

In my work for the Hamilton Project in 2007, I
recommended beginning with a 50-50 auction-free-allocation split, moving
to 100 percent auction over 25 years, because that time-path of numerical
division between the share of allowances that is freely allocated to
regulated firms and the share that is auctioned is equivalent (in terms
of present discounted value) to perpetual allocations of 15 percent, 19
percent, and 22 percent, at real interest rates of 3, 4, and 5 percent,
respectively. My recommended allocation was designed to be consistent
with the principal of targeting free allocations to burdened sectors in
proportion to their relative burdens, while being politically pragmatic
with more generous allocations in the early years of the program.

So, the Kerry-Lieberman 82/18 allowance split (like the 80/20 Waxman-Markey allowance split) turns
out to be consistent—on average, i.e. economy-wide—with independent
economic analysis of the share that would be required to fully
compensate (but no more) the private sector for equity losses due to the
imposition of the cap, and consistent with my Hamilton Project
recommendation of a 50/50 split phased out to 100 percent auction over 25
years.

The path ahead

Going forward, many observers and participants in the policy process
may continue to question the wisdom of some elements of the
Kerry-Lieberman proposal, including its allowance allocation. There’s
nothing wrong with that.

But let’s be clear that, first, for the most part, the specific
allocation of free allowances affects neither the environmental
performance of the cap-and-trade system nor its aggregate social cost.

Second, we should recognize that the legislation is by no means a
corporate give-away.  On the contrary, 82% of the value of allowances
accrue to consumers and public purposes, and some 18% accrue to covered,
private industry. This split is roughly consistent with the
recommendations of independent economic research.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that the much-lamented
deal-making for shares of the allowances for various purposes that took
place in the deliberations leading up the announcement by Senators Kerry and Lieberman was a
good example of the useful, important, and fundamentally benign
mechanism through which a cap-and-trade system provides the means for a
political constituency of support and action to be assembled, without
reducing the policy’s effectiveness or driving up its cost.

Related Links:

The American Power Act and California’s AB 32

Battle of the Carbon Titans

Big Green and little green clash over the American Power Act

Las últimas semanas para Facebook han recordado los tiempos en los que atizar a Microsoft era la rutina diaria para analistas tecnológicos y representantes de otras compañías. Si bien para Redmond los tiempos han cambiado – ya no son inseguros sus productos ni tan maquiavélicas sus estrategias, tampoco ellos son tan relevantes en el sector – con Facebook parece que la lucha no ha hecho sino empezar: desde su lamentable política respecto a la privacidad hasta su asalto a la web en lo que se ha visto como un ataque a la “internet abierta y distribuida”.

Ante todo esto tenemos una lectura doble, siguen creciendo en usuarios e inversión publicitaria mientras que lo que podemos considerar voces de “influyentes” (con todos los matices que queramos hacer) en internet se están posicionando radicalmente en contra. Desde Calacanis a Jarvis, pasando por algunas figuras que han decidido borrar su usuario de Facebook como Leo Laporte o Matt Cuts. En España curiosamente han sonado más acciones como el borrado de cuenta de Berto Romero que el posicionamiento desde el sector más tecnológico, descontando a un nutrido grupo que se ha opuesto a los servicios de redes sociales por principio (por ejemplo, Versvs)

Con los “influyentes” creo que siempre conviene tener una doble lectura. Por un lado separaría cuando no son capaces de distinguir entre lo que buscan los usuarios más avanzados y lo que realmente le interesa a la gente normal, aquí entraría su preocupación por el hecho de que el servicio de red social esté distribuido y no centralizado, algo que directamente no le interesa realmente a casi nadie fuera de una minoría. Por otro, sí que valoraría su capacidad para detectar y dar visibilidad a corrientes de opinión cuando tienen un fundamento real: el caso de Facebook y sus políticas respecto a la privacidad (ojo no me refiero a los fallos, sino a su tozudez contumaz en empujar a los usuarios a compartir en público) y el peligro que constituye para las empresas entrar al trapo de su estrategia de conquista a la web son difícilmente cuestionables.

¿Mañana Facebook va a tener más usuarios que hoy? No tengo duda. Pero si estuviese en la piel de los directivos de Facebook me andaría con cuidado, Microsoft se permitió una imagen pésima durante años, de la que todavía no se ha recuperado. Sigue siendo un gigante rentable y con futuro – o al menos con muchas oportunidades – pero era una situación diferente: uno puede tolerar mejor que una empresa abuse de posición dominante o tener un sistema operativo con bugs y fallos de seguridad que la desconfianza respecto a la plataforma donde deja gran parte de su esfera más personal.

Relacionado: Facebook y su paulatina renuncia al valor de la privacidad

 

 Here’s some of the latest talk in the forums:

• The GSM Pre form is alight with activity since last weekend’s launch of the device on AT&T.  User dbd wants to know just how you new Pre Plus owners on AT&T are liking your new device, hollabak009 wants to know how your in-store experience went, and berdinkerdickle wants to know what kind of call quality and reception you’re getting.  
• The Droid Incredible may be one of the hottest Android devices on the market, but that hasn’t kept member techiegirl from coming to their senses and grabbing up a Pre Plus complete with the free mobile hotspot.
• The launch of the HTC EVO is right around the corner, and fredfox19 wants to know if you Sprint premier members out there are going to stick with Palm/HP/webOS or make the jump.
• New Pre owner SuzukiGS750EZ is wondering if Preware is worth using.  The answer to that question is, of course, a resounding yes.  Beyond the great resources available to webOS users in the forums, we have an in depth getting started guide.  Go forth, patch, and feel free to take part in the homebrew telethon!

We look forward to seeing you in the forums!  Not already a member? Join us!

The Illinois General Assembly must return to Springfield this month and pass a budget that meets the needs of all Illinoisans.

That message was delivered today at events held in Chicago, Rockford, Moline, Peoria, Quincy, Decatur, East St. Louis and Vienna, by the Responsible Budget coalition (RBC), which includes education employees, state employees and agencies that provide assistance to children, senior citizens and the mentally ill.

RBC representatives met with reporters in an effort to ensure that everyone understands what is at stake if lawmakers fail to pass a responsible budget, that is, that one that includes adequate revenue for education and state services.  Lawmakers have been considering budgets that lack revenue needed to meet the needs of all Illinoisans.  RBC is urging passage of HB 174, tax reform legislation that would increase the income tax and allow the state to stop digging the $13 billion revenue hole caused by failing to increase revenue to meet expenses.

IEA Vice president Bob Blade, speaking at the RBC event in Chicago, said current budget proposals, which would cut more than $1 billion from education, would result in thousands of education employee layoffs, larger class sizes and a significant reduction in education quality.

“Schools are reducing or deleting extracurricular activities, activities which are the magnet for attracting and keeping some students in school,” Blade said.

“Pk-12 school students are not the only ones being hurt by the current economic climate; recently one community college system laid off almost 20% of their staff which will increase college class sizes this fall.  Institutions of higher learning are raising tuition, pricing some students out of the ability to attain a higher education, at a point in our economic history where higher education is more important to the state’s economic development than ever before,” he added.

RBC member organizations, including IEA, are urging their members to contact their state legislators and tell them to pass a budget that includes adequate revenue to fund education and state services.

Take action

IEA members can contact their legislators through the IEA Website.

AARP has made available a toll-free telephone number that allows people to call their state legislators directly, urging their approval of a responsible budget with adequate revenues. That number is 800-719-3020.

For more information, visit the coalition at www.abetterillinois.com.

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Collection of sexy car girls wallpapers for drivers.

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Another first by autoTRADER
The autoTRADER App makes over 200,000 vehicles for sale searchable in real-time for iPhone users everywhere!

Vehicle shoppers can:

• Search for used cars, trucks, minivans and SUV’s
• Compare to find the best price
• Find closest dealers and map them
• Contact the seller with one touch

Growing your audience
Extend your reach among Canadian car buyers–with just a few taps, users can see all your vehicles with details, map your location and fill out a contact form right from the App. The autoTRADER App lets you leverage one of the fastest growing media platforms in the world – for FREE. In fact, the autoTRADER App climbed into the Top 10 Canadian Free Lifestyle Apps in the first 4 days– alongside consumer favourites like eBay and Starbucks.

• Canadians are loving the iPhone– an estimated 805,000 iPhone users ranks Canada 5th in the world.(1)
• Mobile traffic continues to grow rapidly on autoTRADER.ca. In fact, as of April, there were over 100,000 visits from mobile users. (2)
• 85% of our current mobile traffic is searching on autoTRADER.ca by iPhone and iPod Touch.(2) The autoTRADER App provides users with direct access to our used listings in a format they clearly prefer and are comfortable with.

As this number of users continues to increase, we’re committed to bringing you even more vehicle buyers.

Be sure to tell every iPhone user you see to get the FREE App. The more users we have means more potential leads for your listings.

We’re committed to being the #1 Canadian Automotive Marketplace in print, online and now on mobile! Stay tuned for more exciting news on support for all mobile platforms.

(1) AdMob, “Mobile, Metrics Report”, July 2009 (2) Google Analytics, TRADER

The Video Store on the PlayStation Network, up until now, has been a service that only those in Europe and the US have been able to enjoy. Pretty soon, Australia can, too!

below, from Gutierrez…..

Congressman Says BP Should Stand for “Banned Permanently” When It Comes To Profiting From U.S. Oil Drilling Leases

Luis V. Gutierrez Pens Letter to Interior Secretary, Uses Floor Speech, Blog Post to Urge Colleagues to Join Him

(Washington, DC) – U.S. Representative Luis V. Gutierrez (D-IL) has written a letter to Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar demanding that future oil drilling leases be ruled out and current oil leases reexamined for the giant corporation BP. Rep. Gutierrez said that when it comes to profiting from American oil production and exploration, the U.S. government should consider BP to stand for “Banned Permanently.” Rep. Gutierrez is circulating the letter to his colleagues urging them to join him as signatories to the letter. He also used a speech before the U.S. House of Representatives and a blog article to publicize his effort.

“We kick kids out of school, ban athletes from sports, and give people life sentences with fewer warnings than we have given BP and BP is responsible for much more serious and life-threatening catastrophes over the years,” said Rep. Gutierrez. “At some point the Congress and the American people have to stand up and say enough is enough, no more warnings, no more deaths, no more spills, you’re out of here, bye-bye.”

Rep. Gutierrez said on the House floor today (at approximately 2:00 p.m. today):

Almost a month into one of our worst manmade environmental and economic disasters and BP has worked harder to minimize public understanding and outrage than to minimize destruction to the Gulf of Mexico.

Citing the company’s environmental and worker safety record in recent decades, the Congressman’s letter to Secretary of the Interior Salazar says, in part (full text here):

Given this appalling record of misconduct and disregard, we ask that BP be banned permanently from receiving any future drilling leases. Their conduct at other operation sites indicates a blatant disregard for the lives of their workers, the preservation of the environment, and the millions of U.S. citizens who could be impacted by an environmental disaster.

In a blog article posted at Huffington Post, the Congressman wrote:

The President has used tough words and Secretary Salazar is pledging to get to the bottom of what happened and what BP can do now to clean up the disaster and compensate the families who lost loved ones or lost livelihoods due to BP’s mistakes. But I want to take this a step further: Prove to the American people you have changed your ways, BP, before we even consider another license from the American people to make astronomical profits from our oil.

The Congressman said he would recruit signatories to his letter to Secretary Salazar throughout the week and then keep up pressure on the Secretary and the Obama Administration until he receives a satisfactory response.

###

Robert Stavins, a professor of business and government at Harvard, thinks harder about climate legislation than almost anyone out there. Thus, his new analysis of the Kerry-Lieberman American Power Act should be required reading, particularly in light of stories that suggest the bill is stacked with giveaways for industry. (Not true, Stavins writes below. Between 2012 and 2050, only 18 percent of the allowance value will accrue to industry). His post is below and the original is here. 

As with the Waxman-Markey bill (H.R. 2454), passed by the House of Representatives last June, there is now some confusing commentary in the press and blogosphere about the allocation of allowances in the new Senate proposal — the American Power Act of 2010 — sponsored by Senator John Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Senator Joseph Lieberman, Independent of Connecticut.  As before, the mistake is being made of confusing the share of allowances that are freely allocated versus auctioned with (the appropriate analysis of) the actual incidence of the allowance value, that is, who ultimately benefits from the allocation and auction revenue.   

In this essay, I assess quantitatively the actual incidence of the allowance value in the new Senate proposal, much as I did last year with the House legislation.  I find (as with Waxman-Markey) that the lion’s share of the allowance value — some 82% — goes to consumers and public purposes, and only 18% accrues to covered, private industry.   First, however, I place this in context by commenting briefly on the overall Senate proposal, and by examining in generic terms the effects that allowance allocations have — and do not have — in cap-and-trade systems.   

The American Power Act of 2010 

You may be wondering why I am bothering to write about the Kerry-Lieberman proposal at all, given the conventional wisdom that the likelihood is very small of achieving the 60 votes necessary in the Senate to pass the legislation (particularly with the withdrawal of Senator Lindsey Graham — Republican of South Carolina — from the former triplet of Senate sponsors).  Two reasons.  First, conventional wisdoms often turn out to be wrong (although I must say that the vote count on Kerry-Lieberman does not look good, with the current tally according to Environment & Energy Daily being 26 Yes, 11 Probably Yes, 31 Fence Sitters, 10 Probably No, and 22 No).  Second, if the conventional wisdom turns out to be correct, and the 60-vote margin proves insurmountable in the current Congress, then when the Congress returns to this issue — which it inevitably will in the future  — among the key starting points for Congressional thinking will be the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman proposals.  Hence, the design issues do matter.   

The American Power Act, like its House counter-part, is a long and complex piece of legislation with many design elements in its cap-and-trade system (which, of course, is not called “cap-and-trade” — but rather “reduction and investment”), and many elements that go well beyond the cap-and-trade system (sorry, I meant to say the “reduce-and-invest” system).  Perhaps in a future essay, I will examine some of those other elements (wherein there is naturally both good news and bad news), but for today, I am focusing exclusively on the allowance allocation issue, which is of central political importance. 

Before turning to an empirical examination of the Kerry-Lieberman allowance allocation, it may be helpful to recall some generic facts about the role that allowance allocations play in cap-and-trade systems.   

The Role of Allowance Allocations in Cap-and-Trade Systems

It is exceptionally important to keep in mind what is probably the key attribute of cap-and-trade systems:  the particular allocation of those allowances which are freely distributed has no impact on the equilibrium distribution of allowances (after trading), and therefore no impact on the allocation of emissions (or emissions abatement), the total magnitude of emissions, or the aggregate social costs.  (There are some caveats, about which more below.)  By the way, this independence of a cap-and-trade system’s performance from the initial allowance allocation was established as far back as 1972 by David Montgomery in a path-breaking article in the Journal of Economic Theory (based upon his 1971 Harvard economics Ph.D. dissertation). It has been validated with empirical evidence repeatedly over the years. 

Generally speaking, the choice between auctioning and freely allocating allowances does not influence firms’ production and emission reduction decisions (although it’s true that the revenue from auctioned allowances can be used for a variety of public purposes, including cutting distortionary taxes, which can thereby reduce the net cost of the program).  Firms face the same emissions cost regardless of the allocation method.  When using an allowance, whether it was received for free or purchased, a firm loses the opportunity to sell that allowance, and thereby recognizes this “opportunity cost” in deciding whether to use the allowance.  Consequently, the allocation choice will not — for the most part — influence a cap’s overall costs.   

Manifest political pressures lead to different initial allocations of allowances, which affect distribution, but not environmental effectiveness, and not cost-effectiveness.  This means that ordinary political pressures need not get in the way of developing and implementing a scientifically sound, economically rational, and politically pragmatic policy.   With other policy instruments — both in the environmental realm and in other policy domains — political pressures often reduce the effectiveness and/or increase the cost of well-intentioned public policies.  Cap-and-trade provides natural protection from this.  Distributional battles over the allowance allocation in a cap-and-trade system do not raise the overall cost of the program nor affect its environmental impacts.   

In fact, the political process of states, districts, sectors, firms, and interest groups fighting for their share of the pie (free allowance allocations) serves as the mechanism whereby a political constituency in support of the system is developed, but without detrimental effects to the system’s environmental or economic performance.  That’s the good news, and it should never be forgotten. 

But, depending upon the specific allocation mechanisms employed, there are several ways that the choice to freely distribute allowances can affect a system’s cost.  Here’s where the caveats come in.   

Some Important Caveats

First, as I said above, auction revenue may be used in ways that reduce the costs of the existing tax system or fund other socially beneficial policies.  Free allocations forego such opportunities. 

Second, some proposals to freely allocate allowances to electric utilities may affect electricity prices, and thereby affect the extent to which reduced electricity demand contributes to limiting emissions cost-effectively.  Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman both allocate a significant number of allowances to local (electricity) distribution companies, which are subject to cost-of-service regulation even in regions with restructured wholesale electricity markets.  Because the distribution companies are subject to cost-of-service regulation, the benefit of the allocation will ultimately accrue to electricity consumers, not the companies themselves.  While these allocations could increase the overall cost of the program if the economic value of the allowances is passed on to consumers in the form of reduced electricity prices, if that value is instead passed on to consumers through lump-sum rebates, the effect can be to compensate consumers for increased electricity prices without reducing incentives for energy conservation.  (There are some legitimate behavioral questions here about how consumers will respond to such rebates; these questions are best left to ongoing economic research.)   

Third, “output-based updating allocations” can be useful for addressing competitiveness impacts of a climate policy on particularly energy-intensive and trade-sensitive sectors, but these allocations can provide perverse incentives and drive up the costs of achieving a cap if they are poorly designed.  This merits some explanation. 

An output-based updating allocation ties the quantity of allowances that a firm receives to its output (production).  Such an allocation is essentially a production subsidy.  While this affects firms’ pricing and production decisions in ways that can, in some cases, introduce unintended consequences and increase the cost of meeting an emissions target, when applied to energy-intensive trade-exposed industries, the incentives created by such allocations can contribute to the goal of reducing emission leakage abroad.   

This approach is probably superior to an import allowance requirement, whereby imports of a small set of specific commodities must carry with them CO₂ allowances, because import allowance requirements can damage international trade relations.  The only real solution to the competitiveness issue is to bring key non-participating countries within an international climate regime in meaningful ways, an obviously difficult objective to achieve.  (On this, please see the work of the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements.) 

Is the Kerry-Lieberman Allowance Allocation a Corporate Give-Away?

Perhaps unintentionally, there has been some potentially misleading coverage on this issue.  At first glance, about half of the allowances would be auctioned and about half freely allocated over the life of the program, 2012-2050.  (In the early years, the auction share is smaller, reflecting various transitional allocations that phase out over time.)  But looking at the shares that are auctioned and freely allocated can be very misleading.   

Instead, the best way to assess the real implications is not as “free allocation” versus “auction,” but rather in terms of who is the ultimate beneficiary of each element of the allocation and auction, that is, how the value of the allowances and auction revenue are allocated.  On closer inspection, it turns out that many of the elements of the apparently free allocation accrue to consumers and public purposes, not private industry.  Indeed, my conclusion is that over the period 2012-2050, less than 18% of the allowance value accrues to industry.  

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Many people who don’t follow these issues closely have long assumed that The Pirate Party and The Pirate Bay were somehow connected. That’s never been true, even if the people involved in each were philosophically aligned on certain issues (but not on all issues…). Either way, it’s a bit of a surprise to find out that, following the injunction against The Pirate Bay’s bandwidth provider, that The Pirate Party has agreed to become the new host for The Pirate Bay. It’s unclear exactly what this means, as The Pirate Party must be getting its bandwidth from another provider, who, one would imagine, is also soon to be a target for an injunction. Still, it seems like the Pirate Party is basically begging for a lawsuit to challenge these types of fourth party injunctions…

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Does Hanley Ramirez(notes) not have an agent? Advisers? Friends? Concerned neighbors? Might he listen to Billy the Marlin’s special brand of folksy wisdom?

It seems like there should be someone in Hanley’s life who can convince him — at least for a few days — to shut up. He’s making this loafing situation much, much worse than it needs to be.

By now you’ve all seen the highlight of Ramirez pursuing a booted ball into left field at a tectonic pace (and if you haven’t seen the clip, here it is). You’ve no doubt also seen manager Fredi Gonzalez’s reaction to the play; he confronted Ramirez in the dugout, then sent him to the clubhouse. Typical manager stuff. It was not an overreaction. As a Ramirez owner, I fully acknowledge the need to remove him from Monday’s game.

But I’d also like to see him back on the field in the not-too-distant future, and Ramirez isn’t making things easy for the man who fills out Florida’s lineup card.

Prior to Tuesday’s game, Ramirez told reporters that he was angry, that he’d lost respect for Gonzalez, and that he ran as hard as he possibly could on Monday — and, OK, even if he didn’t run with max-effort, it was just fine because "We have a lot of people dogging it after ground balls."

Not surprisingly, Gonzalez is now insisting on an apology. This from MLB.com’s Joe Frisaro:

"I think he needs to talk to his teammates a little bit," Gonzalez said. "Whatever feelings he has with me or doesn’t have with me, it’s fine and dandy. We don’t have to get along, but I think he has to get along with the other 24 guys on this team. When that happens, we’ll run him back in there. When he sets his ego aside, this could be good."

[…]

The manager said he didn’t know when Ramirez would return to the lineup.

"I think he needs to take care of the situation," Gonzalez said. "When he handles that, the right way, we’ll be fine."

You know, if anyone could have just handled Hanley the right way on Monday night, this situation would not have escalated. What’s the point in paying people to represent you if they don’t intervene when you’re about to say something insane? 

Honestly, I don’t care about Marlins team chemistry. And at this particular time, I don’t care if Hanley grows as a result of this experience. (He can grow up next season, on someone else’s fantasy roster). And I certainly don’t care what Wes Helms thinks. I just need Ramirez to be a contributing member of my fantasy portfolio. Here’s hoping that Hanley’s people — assuming he has people — will engage in a little belated damage control. 

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Photo via US Presswire

The Cliff Your Ride contest was designed to keep us top-of-mind and get people talking about autoTRADER. Since the launch at the 2010 Canadian International AutoShow, this promotion delivered: awareness, more visitors and a new audience.

Quick Facts:

• Over 280,000 visits to cliffyourride.ca
• More than 17,000 registered voters
• More than 40,000 votes
• Almost 1000 entries

Felix from Montreal was “the chosen one” and his 1992 Volvo was cliffed in a fiery explosion!

The Grand Finale
Witness the explosive conclusion here.

The rain really was quite heavy, and the sky quite dark. The temperature was still very pleasant though.When the road is wet, the film of the water on the asphalt causes tires to lose traction.

Less obvious is the fact that rain reduces driver perception — it’s harder to see through the rain — and also decreases visibility through its action on headlights, windshields and the road itself. While most people know to slow down in the rain, there are definitely other tips that will help keep you, and those who share the road with you, from becoming a statistic.

* Exercise extreme caution after a long dry spell. During a dry period, engine oil and grease build up on the road over time. When mixed with water from a new rainfall, the road becomes extremely slick. Continued rainfall will eventually wash away the oil, but the first few hours can be the most dangerous.

* Allow for more travel time. You should plan to drive at a slower pace than normal when the roads are wet. Keep in mind that traffic is likely to be moving slower as well. There’s also the possibility that your preplanned route may be flooded or jammed. Whatever the case, rushing equals higher risk.

* Brake earlier and with less force than you would normally. Not only does this increase the stopping distance between you and the car in front of you, it also lets the driver behind you know that you’re slowing down. Also, be more meticulous about using turn signals, so that other drivers know your intentions, and take turns and curves with less speed than you would in dry conditions.

* Most of America’s roads are crowned in the middle, which means that the water will run off to the sides. If possible, stay toward the middle of the road to avoid deep standing puddles.

* Don’t use cruise control. If you hydroplane, there’s the chance your car could actually accelerate. Cruise control also allows drivers to be less vigilant and to take their foot away from the pedals — not a great idea when reaction time is so important.

Please read more

New seamless integration of Facebook’s LIKE feature on autoTRADER.ca lets our vehicle buyers share their favourite listings with all their Facebook friends with one click!

Facebook’s continuous rise in popularity among online Canadians represents a huge opportunity to expand the audience for your vehicles and dealership. Almost half of Canadians–14 million people–are on Facebook and have an average of 130 friends. (3) That’s a lot of free exposure for you!

This integration is one of many initiatives we’ve committed to in order to keep autoTRADER top of mind and bring your the largest audience of vehicle buyers.

Try it now!
“Like” one of your vehicles to see it pop-up on your Facebook profile page–with a link back to the detail view!

(3) Facebook.com

Design house Norman-Copenhagen has been around now for more than a decade giving the world a mix of traditional and non-traditional products for everyday use. Their latest venture leads into the fascinating world of bicycles which is designed by Anne Lehmanne. As mentioned by the company, it is a classic man’s bike with an urbane style. It has a 50’s inspired lightness and comes in two colors: antrhacite grey and green. Limited to 50, each bike has been hand built by professional cycle builders. They will be sold from October 2010 through the Norman Copenhagen Flagship Store, through their online shop, and selected stores worldwide.

Continue reading for more images.

Source: Norman-Copenhagen

Rolls Royce has introduced its Ghost model at the 2009 Geneva Motor Show which made the media wow for the car’s evoking images of adventure and technical innovation. Aside from the impressive exterior and interior parts, the Ghost sports a turbocharged V12 engine which displaces 6.6-liter and cranks out 563 horsepower with a torque of 575 lb-ft.

According to Rolls Royce Motor Cars CEO, the Ghost car “will be the first in a new generation of models to carry this evocative name…”.

There are no surprises in the styling, which is unchanged from the 200EX concept displayed in Geneva last March.

naturally, the Ghost retains the Phantom-style coach doors (don’t call them suicide in the presence of a Rolls rep) with built-in umbrellas.

Inside, the Ghost carries over additional Phantom quirks, such as the “Power Reserve” gauge the driver gets in lieu of a traditional tachometer.

Aside from that, this is clearly more of a driver’s car than the Phantom, whose opulent backseat accommodations show that it’s more about being driven in. The Ghost’s steering wheel is much smaller in diameter and has a thicker rim than its big brother, and the seats appear to have more contouring for lateral support, as well.